Soldier's death by fellow soldier qualifies as ‘battle casualty', rules Punjab and Haryana High Court
Delivering the order on July 16, a division bench of Justice Anupinder Singh Grewal and Justice Deepak Manchanda said: 'It is manifest that a soldier deployed in a military operation, being shot by a fellow soldier, cannot be in any manner denied the benefits, which would be applicable to those soldiers who are killed in action.'
The case arose from the death of Rukmani Devi's son, an Indian Army jawan, who was on duty with Operation Rakshak in Jammu and Kashmir when he suffered a fatal gunshot injury on October 21, 1991, fired by another soldier. Army Air Defence Records, through Part-II Order No. 01/BC/05/002 dated August 27, 1992, had categorised his death as a 'battle casualty.' However, the claim for liberalised family pension remained unresolved for decades.
In 2018, Rukmani Devi approached the AFT seeking relief. The tribunal directed the government to consider her claim, relying on its own 2017 decision in the case of Harvinder Kaur vs Union of India, where a similar claim was allowed for a widow whose husband had died during Operation Parakram. The Union government appealed, arguing that the cases were not comparable, as Harvinder Kaur's husband had died while the operation was ongoing, whereas Devi's son was killed in 1991.
The Centre also objected to the long delay of over 25 years in approaching the tribunal. However, the High Court rejected both arguments. Citing instructions issued by the Ministry of Defence in January 2001, the bench said the benefit of liberalised family pension extends to all armed forces personnel deployed in notified military operations, including those killed by 'acts of violence/attack by extremists, anti-social elements etc' or in other war-like situations. The court reproduced the government's pension categories, noting that the soldier's death fell squarely within Category E of Paragraph 4.1, which covers operational casualties.
On the issue of delay, the bench relied on the Supreme Court's 2023 ruling in M.L. Patil vs State of Goa, which held that pension entitlements constitute a 'continuous cause of action.' 'There is no justification at all for denying the arrears of pension…,' the Supreme Court had ruled, and the High Court applied the principle to Devi's case.
The bench pointed out that the AFT's 2017 ruling in Harvinder Kaur's case has attained finality, strengthening the claim of similarly placed families.
The High Court concluded: 'We do not find any illegality in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. The petition stands dismissed accordingly.'
With the dismissal of the Union government's petition, the AFT's order stands, ensuring that Rukmani Devi receives the liberalised family pension due to her for her son's death in service.
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