Emblem marks Anti-Fascist War victory anniversary
Emblem marks Anti-Fascist War victory anniversary
The emblem features symbolic elements of the Great Wall, olive branches and brilliance. Photo: Xinhua
The State Council Information Office on Tuesday unveiled an emblem commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.
Highlighting a striking yellow number "80" in the center, the emblem also features symbolic elements of the Great Wall, olive branches, brilliance and "1945-2025."
The Great Wall symbolizes the spirit of the Chinese people uniting together and fighting with courage, representing the decisive role of a national spirit to which patriotism is central in the victory of the war against Japanese aggression.
The olive branches demonstrate that after an arduous war of resistance, the Chinese people have won peace with victory, and that the Chinese people unite with people of all other countries to cherish and safeguard peace.
A "gate of victory" formed by brilliance symbolises that the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War is a victory of justice over evil, light over darkness, and progress over reaction.
It indicates that the country has bright prospects for realising national rejuvenation under the strong leadership of the Communist Party of China.
The emblem may be used in decorations for events commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, as well as in the production of materials for publicity, educational activities and relevant foreign affairs events, according to the office.
Fighting from 1931 to 1945, the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression began the earliest and lasted the longest.
As the main theatre in the East of the World Anti-Fascist War, China served as the mainstay of resistance against Japanese militarism, making a pivotal contribution to victory in the war. (Xinhua)
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As a professional in geopolitical risk analysis and strategic foresight, Paulo regularly shares his insights through various publications and on his own Substack.
