Syria's continuing turmoil: al-Sharaa, Druze and Israel
These developments underlie the complexity of the challenge facing Syria President Ahmed al-Sharaa: as he tries to pick the pieces of a bloody 14-year-long civil war, fissures within the Syrian body politic and external geopolitical pressures have put him in a very difficult situation.
Distrustful minorities
In his six months as President, Sharaa has publicly presented a singular focus: the integration of Syria's various ethnic/sectarian factions under the new Syrian flag. This is crucial for Syria's reconstruction and economic revival.
But Sharaa's personal history — he was formerly an al-Qaeda leader and a designated US terrorist, and has been implicated in violence against Syrian minorities during the civil war — and inability/lack of intent to prevent sectarian violence has complicated this effort. Thus far, he has faced scrutiny on three fronts: the Alawites, the Kurds, and the Druze.
Alawites: Residing primarily along Syria's Mediterranean coast, Alawites are the country's largest ethnic minority who served as the former President Bashar al-Assad's principal support base. Alawite areas have been a staging ground for last-ditch armed efforts by pro-Assad militias.
Clashes with Syrian security forces in March led to the death of more than 1,500, mostly Alawite civilians and unarmed fighters. While Sharaa has promised an investigation, he has also repeatedly blamed the supporters of the former regime for the violence, and called them to disarm and surrender.
Kurds: Like their counterparts in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, Syrian Kurds fiercely guard their distinct ethnic identity. An (uncomfortable) modus vivendi with the Assad regime in 2012 gave them a semi-autonomous civil administration (Rojava) with an armed wing (Syrian Democratic Forces; SDF) in oil-rich northeastern Syria.
Sharaa has sought to bring the region under Damascus' direct control and maintained that the SDF needs to fully integrate itself with the Syrian Army. This led to daily clashes between the SDF and armed forces allied with Damascus till March, when the Kurds largely agreed to Sharaa's demands in exchange for specific protections.
But the failure of Syria's interim constitution to specifically guarantee Kurdish rights has been viewed as a betrayal: the Kurds demand a longer timeline to implement the March agreement as well as American and French oversight.
Israel, Syria & the Druze
Around 500,000 Druze live in Syria, mostly in the Suweida Governorate. This historically persecuted ethno-religious minority has rejected the interim constitution, which would see the disarmament of all Druze militias and the imposition of Damascus' rule on the semi-autonomous Suweida Governate.
But unlike the Alawites and the Kurds, Israel's interest in 'protecting' the Druze represents a fundamentally different challenge to Damascus. Israel is the home of some 150,000 Druze: there is a vocal, highly integrated Druze community in the Jewish country which has, in recent months, constantly pushed for Israeli intervention against Sharaa's 'imposition'.
Israel itself sees the Druze as additional cover for its ongoing territorial expansion in southern Syria. Between December and July, Israel has repeatedly struck Syria in order to destroy its conventional military capabilities and expand its occupation of the Golan Heights. This, Israel says, is to ensure that hostile forces cannot use the region as a springboard for attacks on the country.
The recent clashes between Druze and Bedouin militias, the latter of whom Israel claims is backed by Damascus and Sharaa, only gave the Jewish nation further justification to intensify its attacks until a US-brokered ceasefire on July 19.
Despite Israeli aggression, Sharaa has refrained from taking an overly antagonistic position vis-à-vis his southern neighbour. In fact, Sharaa in May confirmed that Syria had been indirectly negotiating with Israel 'to pressure them to stop interfering in Syrian affairs.'
Sharaa's reconciliatory tone has as much to do with his country's incapability to take on the Middle East's predominant military power, as it has to do with his domestic priorities. That said, Israel itself has repeatedly undercut Sharaa's position.
In February, when Sharaa was convening the much-anticipated National Dialogue Conference with various tribal, ethnic and sectarian stakeholders, Benjamin Netanyahu declared that Israel 'will not allow… the new Syrian Army to enter the area south of Damascus', promising 'indefinite' Israeli presence in the demilitarised buffer zone — a direct challenge to Syria's sovereignty. The very same month, Netanyahu asserted that Israel will 'not tolerate any threat to the Druze community in southern Syria'.
What this means
Syria's Arab neighbours and Turkey have supported Sharaa's attempts at rebuilding Syria. Gulf states have repaid Syria's $15.5 million debt to the World Bank, successfully convinced the Trump administration to lift American sanctions on Syria, and have committed vast sums of money for Syria's reconstruction.
This is fuelled both by their common interests in preventing an Iranian resurgence in the region — another factor that has driven Sharaa to negotiate with Israel — and a hope for a more stable neighbourhood.
Israel's independent interests in Syria, however, hinder this regional effort and create what scholars call a 'broken windows' effect: instability and violence in one part of Syria risks further instability elsewhere.
Broadly, strong ethnic and sectarian tensions continue to tug at Syria's peripheries while its political core in Damascus struggles with enforcing national unity. In the south specifically, Israel's military actions have supplemented Sharaa's pre-existing challenges.
For the time being, it remains in Sharaa's continued interest to seek peace with Tel Aviv, leveraging Arab and Turkish support. However, the more pressure Israel exerts externally, the more Sharaa's position is weakened internally, spelling more instability for Syria, and the whole region.
Bashir Ali Abbas is a Senior Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi
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