Hamas reviewing ceasefire deal as Israel continues bombing Gaza
Israel has reportedly agreed to a 60-day truce, aid for Gaza and a hostage and prisoner exchange. But that hasn't stopped its military ordering civilians to immediately leave five more areas of northern Gaza, or continuing its bombing campaign.
Produced by Millicent Teasdale and Yousef Hammash
Edited by Alastair Fergusson
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Wael Zwaiter, a young Palestinian translator in Rome, returned to his flat to find two men on the stairway leading to his apartment. They shot him 11 times, a bullet for each Munich victim. Journalistic opinion at the time and since concluded that Mossad got the wrong man – a bit-part player at best. But the Kilowatt telegrams show that he had an important logistical role. One operation that Mossad very definitely got wrong was in the small Norwegian town of Lillehammer in 1973 when they shot an innocent Moroccan waiter alongside his seven-months pregnant wife. Not only that, but the assassins were caught. Contributing factors to this debacle were an inexperienced, hurriedly assembled team and insufficient research – the poor man was confused with a real terrorist solely on photographic resemblance. 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