Syria's new phase: Cracks in allied agendas and Russia's cautious return

Al Arabiya

2 days ago

Syria has entered a new phase. The 'honeymoon' that prevailed since the fall of the regime at the end of last year has ended. Many developments point to this, including: the 'unity conference' in Hasakah east of the Euphrates, the French–Turkish rivalry over the 'Kurdish file,' the Amman talks on the 'Druze file,' and the cautious return of the Russian role.
It would not have been possible for the unity conference – hosted by the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria – to be held without French support and no American objection, since the military and special forces of both countries are present east of the Euphrates as part of the international coalition. The participation of Druze sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and the head of the 'Alawite Council' Ghazal Ghazal, through recorded video statements in the conference, cannot be considered a mere coincidence; rather, it marks the beginning of forming an 'alliance of minorities' opposing the position of the government and the 'Sunni majority.'
There is thus a push toward a decentralized system in Syria, which was evident in the final statement of the conference supporting the principle of decentralization, the drafting of a new constitution, and the formation of a new army in the country. This trend was reinforced by subsequent steps, as the three main Druze authorities took measures to unify their position: Sheikhs Hammoud al-Hanawi and Yusuf al-Jarbou issued a recorded statement echoing al-Hijri's positions, openly criticizing the government's conduct, calling for an international investigation, and commending the stances of several countries, including Israel.
The additional step that followed the 'unity conference' was the start of Jordan and the US arranging a ministerial-level negotiation track in Amman between the government and Druze authorities, with the participation of officials from several countries. In reality, this track reflects a desire to create a regional process to replace the Paris international track in dealing with two complex issues: the Kurdish file and the Druze file. Paris had previously hosted Syrian–Israeli talks to discuss the future of the southern provinces bordering Jordan, where Tel Aviv presented a list of demands that included the withdrawal of all heavy and medium weapons from the south, allowing the establishment of local councils and autonomous administrations in the provinces of Sweida, Daraa, and Quneitra, under Israeli air cover. Paris had also hosted Syrian–American–French talks addressing the Kurdish file and implementing the agreement reached between President Ahmad al-Sharaa and the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, on March 10.
All available information indicates that the message delivered by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan during his meeting with al-Sharaa in Damascus a few days ago aimed to freeze the Paris track. The 'unity conference' came to reinforce the desire to dismantle the French track, given that Ankara considers Paris 'biased toward the Kurds' while Paris sees Ankara as biased toward al-Sharaa's government. The result was that the Syrian government officially announced it was freezing negotiations with the Kurds in Paris.
The French–Turkish rivalry over the Kurds and the Turkish–Israeli rivalry over the Druze file and southern arrangements are indicators of emerging cracks within the 'alliance of allies' of the Syrian government. The months of unified collective support by Arab, regional, and Western states for Damascus's position have ended, and a new phase has begun: the conflict between foreign agendas in Syria.
Another development now further complicating the scene is the sign of a Russian return to Syria. The visits to Moscow by Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani, Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and Intelligence Chief Hussein Salama – where they met President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials – mark the beginnings of a new relationship between Damascus and Moscow. This involves key issues: resuming Russian arms supplies to Syria, joint management of the Hmeimim and Tartus bases, economic relations, Russian patrols in various areas of Syria, and the fate of Bashar al-Assad and senior regime officials currently in Moscow.
It is most likely that Damascus, which had received 'unlimited Western support' over the past seven months, has begun to see a change in the tone, demands, and actions of Western countries following the events in the coastal region and Sweida, along with the continued Israeli strikes and incursions. It now seeks to reach out to Russia for specific objectives: creating an eastern counterbalance to the West, containing Israeli movements, ensuring stability in Syria's coastal region, and maintaining military balance on the ground by operating Qamishli Airport and conducting patrols in northeastern Syria. Turkey is unlikely to be far from this rapprochement between Moscow and the new Syria.
Will the US and European countries allow Russia, already engaged in Ukraine, to return to Syria? Will Damascus accept decentralized administrations? Will coordination between the 'components' move from political to military? How will Damascus respond to the changing landscape, demands, and rhetoric? What will be the nature of the relationship between the militarily involved parties – the US, Turkey, Russia, and Israel?