How safe is the food on your plate?
Dear Reader,
Last month I travelled to north Bihar to take a closer look at two of India's most loved summer fruits, litchi and mango. The Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University at Pusa, Samastipur, was holding a national seminar on litchi and litchi honey that turned out to be an eye opener. Scientists were honest to admit that despite the heritage and pride associated with the famous rose-floral scented Shahi litchi of Bihar, the orchards are in a state of despair.
Unwilling to bear climate and market risks, owners and absentee landlords are selling their harvest months in advance to contractors. The contractors use a cocktail of chemicals to manage pests and maximize yields without caring for the overall wellbeing of orchards. Some insecticides are fatal for pollinators like bees, and excess use is hurting fruit yields and honey production. Most litchis won't pass pesticide residue standards for export to western markets. Farmers of Bihar, in good years, sell litchis for the price of potatoes-- it's a tragedy. Meanwhile, the urban consumer is paying a hefty price to buy the fruit, unaware of the toxic chemical residues they may be ingesting. The story is not very different for mangoes -- one can no longer be sure that the fruits are naturally ripened and residue-free.
Worryingly, many Indian consumers are unaware of pesticide residue levels in primary agricultural produce, be it grains, pulses, fruits or vegetables. During my travels, I have met farmers who grow vegetables for their own kitchen without using chemical inputs -- for crops like okra and brinjal -- in separate, smaller plots. Many would not consume the other produce they themselves grow to sell in the market. Those who are part of the farm supply chain know of high pesticide residues in fresh produce -- made worse by a warmer climate leading to higher pest infestation. But all this is carefully kept under the wraps. We only seem to take notice when exports are red-flagged in developed markets. This has happened repeatedly, across products like rice, tea and spices.
State of the Climate
Late last month, several Indian cities went under water following extreme rains. The list includes Mumbai, Bengaluru and Guwahati. Over forty died following floods in the North-east. Experts blamed abnormally high sea surface temperature and a depression over the Bay of Bengal. Compared with the 50-year-average, the month of May witnessed 106% more rainfall this year for the entire country. The June-September annual monsoon arrived early this year and by 10 June, had seen a deficit of 33%.
Right after this deluge, the focus shifted to the dreaded summer heat. Parts of central and northern India are now in the grip of a heatwave spanning Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Delhi and the Jammu region. Residents of the national capital region usually flock to the hill states to escape the heat. But Himachal Pradesh, too, is in the grip of a severe heatwave with maximum temperatures crossing 42 degree Celsius in Una and 35 degrees in the popular tourist destination of Dharamshala on 10 June. Parts of the adjoining hill state of Uttarakhand are also witnessing high temperatures with Dehradun, the state capital, recording a maximum temperature of 39 degrees on Monday.
The news in brief
Climate Change Tracker
Widespread use of pesticides and fertilizers, light and chemical pollution, loss of habitat and the growth of industrial agriculture have led to a drastic fall in insect population. Scientists are now witnessing a new phenomenon: a catastrophic collapse of insect populations in protected areas like forests. Global warming seems to be the culprit.
David Wagner, an entomologist who spent his life documenting insect diversity, recently returned home empty-handed. 'I just got back from Texas, and it was the most unsuccessful trip I've ever taken… there just wasn't any insect life to speak of." And it was not only the insects which were missing. 'Everything was crispy, fried; the lizard numbers were down to the lowest numbers I can ever remember. And then the things that eat lizards were not present – I didn't see a single snake the entire time."
Know Your Jargon
Fast Fashion
Fast fashion can be described as quickly produced and cheaply priced garments which copy the latest styles. The products are hurriedly pushed into stores to encash on current trends. The target is to shorten the lead time of a product, from design to purchase. The term 'fast fashion' was coined in the 1990s to describe Zara's rapid production system which was later adopted by other brands.
The fast fashion industry has a huge environment footprint— because it uses copious amounts of water besides polluting rivers and seas. When consumers dump clothes after wearing them a few times, it adds to the waste load. The fashion choices of Gen Z in India, a 300 million consumer cohort, are not very planet-friendly. Because for every Greta Thunberg, thousands are chasing trends by stuffing their wardrobes with fast fashion.
Prime Number
14
US-based businesses have cancelled or delayed over $14 billion in investments and 10,000 new jobs in clean energy and clean vehicle factories since January, as per an assessment by E2, a coalition of business leaders and investors. This was due to rising fears around the future of federal clean energy policy and tax credits.
As per E2, in April alone, businesses cancelled $4.5 billion of investments in new battery, electric vehicle and wind projects ahead of the US House's passage of a massive tax and spending package -- dubbed the 'One Big Beautiful Bill Act.'
Movie of the Month
Gints Zilbalodis' 'Flow" is an Oscar-winning eco-fable about a lone cat navigating a post-apocalyptic world. Made with a tiny team and free software, this Latvian animation shines. A silent film, it resists anthropomorphism: the animals do not speak in human tongue. The works draws emotional depth from a cat who journeys in a weathered sailboat with an unlikely crew -- a lemur, a capybara, a Labrador and a bird. 'Flow" explores climate collapse, cooperation, and resilience, reminding us that nature, not humans, may have the final word.
That's all, for now. Bibek will be back with the next issue, in a fortnight.
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The Bhuj airstrip was upgraded to accommodate fighter aircrafts, while all-weather airstrips were constructed at Chhad Bet, Khavda and Kotda, enabling Austers and Dakotas to land with ease. A saltwater distillation plant was set up at Chhad Bet, and a protective bund was built to guard against tidal flooding in the area. As a long-term measure, several roads of strategic importance were proposed to be built. With these measures in place, India fortified the region, ready for any future threats. Public opinion in Pakistan could never forget Indian antagonism, and the Rann remained a critical piece in Pakistan's ambitions, waiting for the right moment to be played. As mentioned earlier, in 1963, Pakistan's foreign minister Bhutto went to Peking eager to break bread with the Chinese communists. As an ideological state, the allure of forging ties with fellow ideological nations such as China was irresistible, but more importantly, it could provide a counterweight to a bigger and stronger India. Pakistan was more than willing to bend backwards, and apart from the boundary agreement and cultural cooperation, it also became the first non-communist country to start its commercial flights to Beijing. Years later, in his final testament, Bhutto regarded his efforts in forging ties with China, despite US pressures, as the crowning achievement of his legacy. On a visit to the US in November 1963, just before the state visit of the Chinese leader Zhou Enlai to Pakistan, Bhutto met with President Lyndon Johnson and received a veiled warning: 'He [Johnson] wanted Bhutto to know there would be a serious public relations problem here if Pakistan should build up its relations with the Communist Chinese. He [Johnson] was not pro-Pakistani or pro-Indian but pro-Free World. Such a state visit would make it increasingly difficult for us.' The Sino–Pakistan bond has proven to be vital to Pakistan's social and economic development, especially in the hydropower and roadway sectors. China, though, in the early phase, maintained a discreet stance in its relationship with Pakistan, even opting to remain uninvolved in the India–Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971; but by the mid-2000s, it began to elevate Pakistan as a crucial ally in its global ambitions, driven in part by shifting dynamics in US–India relations. Notwithstanding concerns over debt and security – dismissed by China as Western propaganda – the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has, to date, delivered $25.4 billion in direct investment, created 2,36,000 jobs, built 510 km of roadways and generated more than 8000 MW of electricity. By January–February 1965, the Rann had become a volatile flashpoint. In fact, trouble had already started in the Kanjarkote area several months earlier, with Pakistani forces frequently trespassing into Indian territory. Kanjarkote was a fort in ruins, about 1.3 km south of the Pakistan border on the northwestern fringe of the Rann. While the area south of Kanjarkote was a flat and featureless plain, the north consisted of a series of parallel sand dunes providing a vantage point for Pakistan troops. Pakistan had developed its border area around Kanjarkote with a sizeable town called Badin, 30 km from the border, complete with drinking water, road connectivity, communication and an airfield nearby with radar. In contrast, no drinking water was available for Indian troops except at Khavda, and a very limited water provision at Vigokot, which were 104 km and 119 km from the border, respectively. The logistical advantage prompted Pakistan to deploy its Indus Rangers into Kanjarkote, a move that India claimed violated the 1958 ceasefire line agreement. Pakistan, however, believed India had deliberately provoked the situation, using the spectre of external aggression to divert attention from its own internal crises. Rather, Pakistan saw India's internal disturbances as an opportune moment to test and challenge its neighbour.
