Fifth wave of arrests hits Istanbul as Turkey jails more opposition voices
According to the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, arrest warrants were issued for 47 individuals, with at least 30 already detained. The latest operation marks the fifth round of detentions since March, when Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu—President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's most prominent political rival—was imprisoned.
Local officials, particularly from the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), have been the primary targets of these raids. Turkish officials maintain that the crackdown is rooted in legitimate corruption allegations and deny any political agenda, asserting that the judiciary remains independent.
In a letter sent from prison and read at an opposition rally on Saturday, Imamoglu condemned the ongoing arrests. 'It is time to say 'enough is enough' to this unjust and unlawful order.' He added, 'Now you are taking our district mayors with fictitious excuses. What will you do? Where will you stop? Are you going to throw 16 million Istanbulites in jail one by one?'
Imamoglu, a rising star within the CHP, has been accused of corruption and links to a terrorist organization—charges he denies. His imprisonment has sparked nationwide protests and further arrests, with the Istanbul prosecutor's office reporting that 819 individuals detained during demonstrations are now facing trial in 20 separate cases.
The latest arrests involved four coordinated operations across Istanbul and Adana. Among those apprehended were municipal mayors, city officials, and members of the CHP. Baki Aydöner, a CHP Party Assembly member, shared on X that he was in Ankara when his wife informed him their home was being searched. Aydöner said he was traveling to Istanbul in response to a detention order issued against him.
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