The verdict that removed South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol from power

Korea Herald

04-04-2025

Below is an unofficial translation of the summary released by the Constitutional Court of Korea detailing its ruling Friday that upheld Yoon Suk Yeol's parliamentary impeachment, confirming his immediate removal as president. -- Ed.
(Verdict read out by acting Chief Justice Moon Hyung-bae)
I will begin announcing the verdict on the 2024 impeachment case of President Yoon Suk Yeol.
First, we will examine the conditions for legal validity.
1. We will look at whether the declaration of martial law in this case is subject to judicial review.
Considering the purpose of an impeachment trial, which is to uphold the constitutional order against violations by high-ranking officials, the declaration of martial law, in this case, can be reviewed for its constitutionality and legality, even if it involves a highly political decision.
2. We will examine the fact that the impeachment motion in this case was pass without an investigation by the National Assembly's Legislation and Judiciary Committee.
The Constitution delegates the impeachment procedure to legislative regulations, and the National Assembly Act gives discretion regarding whether the Legislation and Judiciary Committee conducts an investigation. Therefore, the absence of such an investigation does not render the impeachment resolution unlawful.
3. We will examine whether the impeachment motion in this case violates the principle of not deliberating same bill twice during same session.
The National Assembly Act prohibits resubmitting a rejected bill during the same session. Although the first impeachment resolution against the respondent failed to reach a vote in the 418th regular session, the impeachment resolution, in this case, was submitted in the 419th special session, meaning it does not violate the principle of not deliberating the same bill twice during the same session.
Additionally, Justice Cheong Hyung-sik issued a concurring opinion suggesting that legislation should limit the number of times an impeachment resolution can be submitted across different sessions.
4. We will examine whether the protected interest was compromises, as the martial law was lifted in a short period of time and no damage occurred as as result.
Even though the martial law in this case was lifted quickly and did not cause harm, the grounds for impeachment had already arisen due to its imposition, so the benefit of the trial cannot be denied.
5. We will examine the argument that the crime of treason and other violations of criminal law in the impeachment motion were included as acts violating the Constitution after the impeachment trial request.
Withdrawing or changing the applicable legal provisions while maintaining the basic facts the same does not constitute withdrawal or change of the grounds for prosecution, and is therefore permitted without going through any special procedures.
The defendant claims that if the grounds for impeachment had not included the crime of insurrection, the quorum for passing the motion would not have been met, but this is merely a hypothetical claim and has no objective basis to support it.
6. We will examine the claim that the authority of the impeachment motion was abused to seize the presidency.
Since the impeachment resolution process was lawful and the respondent's constitutional or legal violations were sufficiently substantiated, the impeachment power cannot be deemed abused.
Thus, the impeachment trial request for this case is legally valid.
Meanwhile, regarding evidentiary rules, Justices Lee Mi-son and Kim Hyung-du expressed a supplementary opinion that the hearsay rule under criminal procedure law can be applied more flexibly in impeachment trials. In contrast, Justices Kim Bok-hyeong and Cho Han-chang argued that the hearsay rule should be applied more strictly in future impeachment proceedings.
First, we will examine each of the grounds for impeachment.
1. We will examine the declaration of martial law in this case.
According to the Constitution and the Martial Law Act, one of the substantive requirements for the declaration of martial law is that 'there must be a realistic situation in which there is a state of war with the enemy or social order is severely disrupted due to wartime, an incident or a similar national emergency, making it significantly difficult to perform administrative and judicial functions.'
The defendant argues that the grave crisis situation described above arose due to the tyranny of the National Assembly, where the opposition party holds the majority of seats, including an unprecedented impeachment drive, the unilateral exercise of legislative power and attempts to cut the budget.
From the time the defendant took office until the declaration of martial law in this case, the National Assembly proposed a total of 22 impeachment motions against the minister of interior and safety, prosecutors the chair of the Korea Communications Commission, and the chair of the Board of Audit and Inspection. This raised concerns that the National Assembly was using the impeachment trial system as a means of political pressure on the government based solely on suspicions of violations of the law without considering the unconstitutionality and illegality of the grounds for impeachment.
However, at the time martial law was declared in this case, only the impeachment trial of one prosecutor and the chair of the Korea Communications Commission were in progress.
The defendant also argued that several laws passed by the opposition party were problematic because they were unilaterally passed, but these laws had not yet taken effect, as the defendant had either requested reconsideration or withheld promulgation.
Furthermore, the 2025 budget bill was still under review at the time martial law was declared, and since the 2024 budget was still in effect, the budget deliberations had no immediate impact on governance. In fact, the budget bill had only passed the National Assembly's Special Committee on Budget and Accounts and had not yet been voted on in a plenary session.
Thus, the National Assembly's exercise of its powers — whether through impeachment motions, legislative actions or budget deliberations — did not, in itself, create a severe crisis situation at the time justifying the declaration of martial law.
Even if the National Assembly's exercise of its power is unlawful or unfair, it cannot justify invoking a national state of emergency, as it could have been addressed through ordinary consitutional mechanisms for exercising power, such as Constitutional Court impeachment trials or the defendant's right to request the legislature to reconsider a bill.
The defendant also claimed that martial law was declared in this case to address suspicions of election fraud. However, the mere existence of suspicions does not constitute an immediate and serious crisis situation.
In addition, the National Election Commission announced that it had taken measures against most security vulnerabilities before the 22nd general election, and that it had prepared measures such as disclosing CCTV footage of advance and postal ballot box storage locations 24 hours a day, as well as introducing a ballot counting system during the vote counting process, so the defendant's justification for declaring martial law cannot be considered valid.
Ultimately, even if all of the circumstances claimed by the defendant are taken into consideration, it cannot be said that a crisis situation existed at the time of the declaration of martial law in this case that could objectively justify the defendant's decision.
The Constitution and the Martial Law Act require that there be a substantive requirement for the declaration of martial law, namely, that 'there must be a need and purpose to respond to military needs or maintain public peace and order with military forces.'
However, political gridlock or suspicions of election fraud due to the National Assembly's exercise of its authority claimed by the defendant should be resolved through political, institutional and judicial means, and cannot be resolved by mobilizing military forces.
The respondent claimed that the declaration was intended as a "warning martial law" or an "appeal martial law" to inform the public about the tyranny of the opposition party and a state crisis. However, such objectives are not legitimate grounds for declaring martial law as stipulated in the Martial Law Act.
Furthermore, the defendant did not stop at declaring martial law, but went on to commit acts of violating the Constitution and laws, such as mobilizing the military and police to obstruct the National Assembly from exercising its authority. Thus, the defendant's argument that martial law was a warning or appeal cannot be accepted.
Therefore, the declaration of martial law in this case violates the substantive requirements for the declaration of emergency martial law.
Next, we will examine whether the declaration of martial law in this case complied with procedural requirements.
The declaration of martial law and the appointment of a martial law commander must undergo deliberation by a Cabinet meeting.
It is acknowledged that, just before declaring martial law, the defendant briefly explained the purpose of the declaration of martial law to the prime minister and nine members of the Cabinet.
However, considering that the defendant did not explain the specific details of the martial law in this case to the martial law commander or other members, nor did he give the other members the opportunity to state their opinions, it is difficult to see that any deliberation took place regarding the declaration of martial law in this case.
In addition, the defendant declared martial law without obtaining the signatures of the prime minister and relevant Cabinet members, failed to publicly announce when the martial law would be implemented, in which area it would be implemented as well as the martial law commander, nor did he notify the National Assembly without delay. As a result, the defendant violated the procedural requirements set forth in the Constitution and the Martial Law Act for declaring emergency martial law.
2. We will examine the deployment of the military and police to the National Assembly.
The defendant ordered the minister of national defense to deploy military troops to the National Assembly. In response, soldiers entered the Assembly premises using helicopters and other means, and some broke windows and entered the main building.
The defendant gave instructions to the Army special warfare commander and others, saying, 'It seems the quorum for the motion has not been met, so break down the doors, go in and drag out all the people in there."
In addition, the defendant informed the commissioner general of the Korean National Police Agency of the content of the decree for this case through the martial law commander, and also called him directly six times. In response, the commissioner general ordered a complete blockade of the National Assembly.
As a result, some of the National Assembly members who were gathering at the Assembly had to climb over the wall or were unable to enter at all.
Meanwhile, the defense minister directed the commander of the Defense Counterintelligence Command to confirm the locations of 14 individuals, including the speaker of the National Assembly and the leaders of each political party, for the purpose of arresting them if necessary. The defendant also called the first deputy director of the National Intelligence Service and asked him to support the DCC. The commander of the DCC then requested the first deputy director of the NIS to confirm the locations of the above individuals.
Through these actions, the defendant interfered with the National Assembly's exercise of its authority by deploying the military and police to block the Assembly members from entering and by ordering them to be dragged out, thereby violating the constitutional provision that grants the Assembly the right to demand the lifting of martial law. The defendant also violated lawmakers' rights to deliberate and vote, as well as their right to immunity from arrest.
In addition, by interfering with attempts to confirm the locations of the leaders of each political party, the defendant violated the freedom of political party activities.
By deploying military troops for political purposes, such as blocking the exercise of power by the National Assembly, the defendant caused soldiers who had served the country with the mission of ensuring national security and defending the country into direct conflict with civilians. In doing so, the defendant violated the political neutrality of the military and the duty of the commander-in-chief of the military under the Constitution.
3. We will examine the issuance of the decree for this case.
By issuing the proclamation in this case and prohibiting the activities of the National Assembly, regional assemblies and political parties, the defendant violated the constitutional provisions granting the National Assembly the right to demand the lifting of martial law, the constitutional provisions stipulating the political party system, representative democracy and the principle of the separation of powers.
By violating the provisions of the Constitution and Martial Law Act that stipulate the requirements for restricting basic rights under martial law and the warrant requirement principle, people's basic political rights, right to collective action, freedom of occupation, etc., were violated.
4. We will examine the search and seizure of the National Election Commission.
The defendant ordered the defense minister to mobilize troops to inspect the National Election Commission's computer systems. Accordingly, the troops deployed to the commission headquarters restricted access, confiscated on-duty staff members' phones and filmed the computer systems.
This search and seizure was conducted without a warrant, violating the warrant requirement principle by allowing the NEC to undergo search and seizure without a warrant, and infringing on the independence of the NEC.
5. We will examine the attempt to confirm the location of judicial officers.
As previously stated, the defendant engaged in location-tracking attempts for the purpose of potentially arresting the former chief justice and former justices of the Supreme Court who had recently retired.
These actions created pressure on current judges, suggesting they could be subject to arrest by the executive branch at any time. This violated the independence of the judiciary.
We will examine whether the defendant's violations of the law examined so far are serious enough to warrant his removal.
In order to overcome the political conflict with the National Assembly, the defendant declared martial law in this case and then deployed the military and police to obstruct the National Assembly from exercising its constitutional authority, thereby denying the sovereignty of the people and democracy. In addition, by deploying the military to raid the National Election Commission, the defendant disregarded the governing structure stipulated in the Constitution, and by issuing the decree in this case, the defendant extensively violated the fundamental rights of the people.
These acts violate the basic principles of the rule of law and the principles of a democratic state, and in themselves, they infringe upon the constitutional order and seriously threaten the stability of the democratic republic.
On the one hand, the fact that the National Assembly was able to quickly pass a resolution demanding the lifting of martial law was thanks to the resistance of citizens and the passive performance of duties by the military and police. However, this does not affect the determination of the gravity of the defendant's violations of the law.
Presidential authority is granted solely by the Constitution. The defendant exercised national emergency powers -- which should be exercised with the utmost care -- beyond the limits set by the Constitution, thereby undermining public trust in the exercise of his authority as president.
Since the defendant took office, the opposition party has led and has carried out an unusually large number of impeachment motions, which has led to the suspension of the exercise of authority by several high-ranking public officials during the impeachment trial.
Regarding the 2025 budget, for the first time in constitutional history, the National Assembly Budget Settlement Special Committee voted solely on a reduction without authorizing any increase.
The major policy initiatives of the defendant could not be implemented due to opposition from the opposition party, and the opposition party unilaterally passed bills opposed by the government, which led to repeated requests for reconsideration by the defendant and the National Assembly's deliberation on the bills.
In the process, the defendant must have felt a great sense of responsibility to somehow overcome what he saw as a paralysis of state affairs and a significant harm to national interests due to the tyranny of the opposition party, in his view.
The defendant's judgment that the National Assembly's exercise of its authority is an abuse of power or an act that causes state affairs to be paralyzed must be respected politically.
However, it is difficult to see the conflict that arose between the defendant and the National Assembly as being the responsibility of one party, and this is a political issue that must be resolved in accordance with democratic principles. Expression of political views or public decision-making on this matter must be done within the scope that can be in harmony with democracy as guaranteed by the Constitution.
The National Assembly should have respected minority opinions and tried to reach a conclusion through dialogue and compromise based on tolerance and self-restraint in its relationship with the government.
The defendant should also have respected the National Assembly, which represents the people, as a subject of cooperation.
However, the defendant has made the National Assembly the subject of exclusion, which destroys the premise of democratic politics and is difficult to see as being in harmony with democracy.
Even if the defendant viewed that the National Assembly's exercise of its power to be form of tyranny by the majority, he should have ensured that checks and balances were realized through self-help measures provided for in the Constitution.
Roughly two years after taking office, the defendant had an opportunity during the general election to persuade the public to support his leadership. Even if the outcome was not in his favor, he should not have attempted to override the will of the people who supported the opposition party.
Nevertheless, the defendant declared martial law in violation of the Constitution and the law, thereby reenacting the dark history of the abuse of national emergency powers, shocking the public and causing chaos in all areas of society, the economy, politics and diplomacy.
As the president of all citizens, the defendant has a duty to unite society as a community beyond his support base. He failed to fulfill that duty.
By deploying the military and police to undermine the authority of the National Assembly and other constitutional institutions and violate the fundamental human rights of the people, the defendant failed in his duty to protect the Constitution and seriously betrayed the trust of the South Korean people, the sovereigns of the Republic of Korea.
In the end, the defendant's unconstitutional and illegal acts are a betrayal of the people's trust and constitute a serious violation of the law that cannot be tolerated from the perspective of protecting the Constitution.
Since the defendant's unlawful acts have had a significant negative impact and ripple effect on the constitutional order, it is recognized that the benefit of protecting the Constitution by removing the defendant is so great that it overwhelms the national loss that comes with removing the president.
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