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Nat. sec clause in application for new scheme to convert commercial buildings into student hostels

Nat. sec clause in application for new scheme to convert commercial buildings into student hostels

HKFP22-07-2025
A national security clause is included in the application guidelines of a new scheme that allows commercial buildings in Hong Kong to be converted into student hostels.
The application guidelines were released on Monday, the same day as the Education Bureau and the Development Bureau announced that the Hostels in the City Scheme had started accepting applications.
The new scheme has streamlined development control procedures, allowing commercial buildings to be converted into student accommodation to provide housing for local and non-local full-time students, the government said.
According to the application guidelines, if any applicant 'has engaged in or is engaging' in activities which are 'likely to constitute or cause the occurrence of offences endangering national security or which would otherwise be contrary to the interest of national security,' the premises will be excluded from the scheme and the applicant will be barred from joining the scheme for the coming three years.
During his policy address last year, Hong Kong leader John Lee announced the 'Study in Hong Kong' brand to attract more overseas students, especially those from ASEAN and other Belt and Road countries, to study in Hong Kong.
He said that to increase the supply of student hostels, a pilot scheme would be introduced to facilitate the market to convert hotels or commercial buildings into student hostels 'on a self-financing and privately funded basis.'
The government also said on Monday that applicants for Hostels in the City Scheme must ensure the premises are occupied by full-time local or non-local students of eligible post-secondary institutions.
Currently, a total of 31 such institutions are listed as eligible for the scheme.
Non-students, such as visiting scholars, are allowed to live in such accommodation, but the number should not exceed 10 per cent of the total residents.
The applicants of the scheme must also make sure the hostels have 'effective access control,' and no part or parts of eligible student hostels, such as rooms, shall be sold off by whatever means.
Shortage of student accommodation
Hong Kong has seen a shortage of student accommodation as more and more mainland Chinese students are admitted to universities in the city.
Real estate services company Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) estimated in March 2024 that the influx of non-local post-secondary students would fuel a shortage of 22,300 bedspaces for students in Hong Kong in the next four years.
Bennett Yim, director of undergraduate admissions and international student exchange at the University of Hong Kong, told local media outlets in October that HKU supported the government's plan to create the 'Study in Hong Kong' brand, but universities in the city found it difficult to accommodate overseas students.
Yim said HKU would consider cooperating with private developers to build student hostels.
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