
Putin fires Russian transport minister
Starovoit has long worked in Russia's road infrastructure sector. From 2012 to 2018, he led the Federal Road Agency, Rosavtodor, later becoming deputy minister of transport before being appointed transport minister in May 2024.
He previously served as governor of Kursk Region – from 2018 to 2019 as acting governor, and from 2019 to May 2024 as elected governor after winning 81% of the vote.
Since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022, the border region has been plagued by corruption scandals. Widespread theft of budget funds has been uncovered, particularly in projects related to defense construction. Over 20 individuals have been detained, including Starovoit's former deputy, Aleksey Dedov, and his gubernatorial successor, Aleksey Smirnov, who led the region from May to December 2024. It remains unclear whether the scandal is linked to Starovoit's dismissal.
Amid the conflict, Starovoit was sanctioned by the UK, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ukraine. He has been awarded the Order of Honor, the Order of Alexander Nevsky, and the Order of Friendship, and holds the rank of 1st class Active State Councillor, equivalent to the military rank of Army General in civil service.
Starovoit has been replaced by his former deputy, Andrey Nikitin, as acting minister.
Nikitin, the former governor of Novgorod Region, was appointed deputy transport minister in February 2025. At the ministry, he oversaw digital transformation, informatization, and automation of the national transport system. Before taking office in Novgorod in 2017, he served as CEO of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives.
Hashtags

Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles


Russia Today
an hour ago
- Russia Today
Forget nukes. This is Russia's new deterrence weapon
Just before dawn on November 21, 2024, a fireball streaked across the sky over the Dnieper River. It wasn't a meteor. It wasn't a drone. The explosion that followed – precise, deep, and eerily silent on the surface – tore through the massive Yuzhmash defense facility in southeastern Ukraine. Footage of the strike spread within hours, picked apart by open-source analysts and intelligence services alike. But it wasn't until Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed it that the world had a name for what it had witnessed: Oreshnik – a new kind of Russian ballistic missile. Capable of reaching speeds above Mach 10, surviving reentry temperatures of 4,000C, and delivering kinetic force that rivals tactical nuclear weapons, the Oreshnik isn't just fast. It's different. In less than a year, it has moved from classified prototype to serial production, with confirmed plans for forward deployment in Belarus by the end of 2025. Its emergence suggests that Russia is rewriting the rules of strategic deterrence – not with treaty-breaking escalation, but with something quieter, subtler, and potentially just as decisive. So what exactly is the Oreshnik missile? Where did it come from, what are its capabilities – and how might it reshape the battlefield? RT explains what's known so far about Russia's latest breakthrough in non-nuclear strategic weaponry. The missile that struck the Yuzhmash facility in Dnepropetrovsk (known in Ukraine as Dnipro) left behind no scorched landscape, no flattened perimeter. Instead, analysts examining satellite imagery noted a narrow impact zone, structural collapse below ground level, and almost surgical surface disruption. It wasn't the scale of destruction that stood out – it was its shape. This signature pointed to something new. According to available data and expert observations, the Oreshnik carries a cluster-type penetrative warhead, likely composed of multiple high-density submunitions. The detonation occurs only after the payload burrows into its target – a design meant to maximize internal damage to hardened military infrastructure. Putin has stated that Oreshnik's warheads can withstand reentry temperatures up to 4,000C. To survive such heat and remain stable at terminal speed, the payload would need to be encased in advanced composite materials – likely drawing on recent developments in heat-resistant ceramics and carbon-carbon structures used in hypersonic glide vehicles. One of the defining features of the system is its ability to maintain hypersonic velocity during the final phase of flight. Unlike traditional ballistic warheads that decelerate as they descend, Oreshnik reportedly retains speeds exceeding Mach 10, possibly Mach 11, even in dense atmospheric layers. This enables it to strike with massive kinetic energy, increasing penetration and lethality without requiring a large explosive charge. At such speeds, even a non-nuclear warhead becomes a strategic weapon. A concentrated high-velocity impact is enough to destroy command bunkers, radar sites, or missile silos. The weapon's effectiveness doesn't rely on blast radius, but on precise, high-energy delivery. That makes it both harder to detect and harder to intercept. In doctrinal terms, Oreshnik represents a new category: A non-nuclear strategic ballistic missile. It occupies the space between conventional long-range strike systems and nuclear ICBMs – with enough reach, speed, and impact to alter battlefield calculations, but without crossing the nuclear threshold. Though the Oreshnik missile system entered the public spotlight in 2024, its technological roots trace back decades. The architecture, design philosophy, and even its name follow a lineage shaped by one institution: The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT). Founded during the Cold War to develop advanced solid-fueled missile systems, MITT has long been responsible for some of Russia's most sophisticated mobile strategic platforms. These include the Temp-2S, Pioner, and later, the Topol family – Russia's first mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. The naming convention has remained surprisingly consistent over the years. Most of MITT's missiles are named after trees: Topol (Poplar), Topol-M, Osina (Aspen), Yars (a type of ash), Kedr (Cedar). The new system, Oreshnik (Hazel), fits within that tradition – both symbolically and organizationally. Analysts believe that the Oreshnik may be based in part on the RS-26 Rubezh, a mobile ICBM developed by MITT and tested from 2011 to 2015. The RS-26 was essentially a shortened version of the Yars ICBM, designed to deliver high-precision strikes at intermediate ranges. Development was quietly paused in the mid-2010s – likely in response to the constraints of the INF Treaty, which prohibited land-based missiles with ranges of 500-5,500km. That treaty is no longer in force. After the US formally withdrew in 2019, Russia was free to resume development in a domain that had been frozen for decades. The appearance of Oreshnik just five years later suggests that its core components – propulsion systems, targeting modules, and mobile chassis – were already well advanced. What began as a one-off operational strike has since evolved into a full-scale weapons program. In June 2025, during a meeting with graduates of Russia's top military academies, Putin announced that the Oreshnik missile system had entered serial production. 'This weapon has proven itself extremely effective in combat conditions, and in a very short time,' he stated. The speed of this transition – from battlefield debut to mass production – is notable. It suggests that both the missile system and its supporting infrastructure had been maturing quietly in the background, likely building off earlier research conducted under the RS-26 program. Even more significant than the production itself is the plan for forward deployment. On July 2, 2025, during an Independence Day gathering in Minsk, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko publicly confirmed that the first Oreshnik units would be stationed on in Belarus by the end of the year. 'We agreed with Putin in Volgograd,' Lukashenko said. 'The first Oreshnik positions will be in Belarus. You've seen how this system performs. It will be here before the year is out.' The move carries both logistical logic and strategic weight. Belarus has long provided heavy-duty mobile chassis for Russian missile systems – including the one used by Oreshnik. That industrial synergy makes Minsk a natural hub for deployment, but this is more than technical convenience. With a minimum range of 800km and a maximum reportedly almost 5,500, the Oreshnik stationed in Belarus would place virtually all of Central and Western Europe within reach. For Russia, it represents a non-nuclear forward deterrent. For NATO, it introduces a new class of threat – one that is fast, precise, and difficult to intercept, yet remains below the threshold of nuclear retaliation. In practical terms, this also opens the door to a possible joint Russian-Belarusian command structure for missile operations outside Russian territory – a development that would further formalize military integration between the two states. For decades, the term 'strategic weapon' has been synonymous with nuclear arms – tools of last resort, deployed not for use but for deterrence. Oreshnik changes that equation. By combining intercontinental reach, hypersonic speed, and precision penetrative capability, the system introduces a new tier of force: One that sits below the nuclear threshold, but far above conventional long-range artillery or cruise missiles. Unlike nuclear warheads, Oreshnik's payloads can be used without inviting global condemnation or risking escalation beyond control. Yet their destructive potential – especially against hardened military targets or critical infrastructure – makes them a credible tool of strategic coercion. This is the core of what we can call a 'non-nuclear deterrence doctrine': The ability to achieve battlefield or political objectives through advanced conventional systems that mimic the strategic impact of nuclear weapons – without crossing the line. In this emerging framework, Oreshnik is not just a missile. It is a prototype of future war logic: Fast enough to strike before detection, survivable enough to evade interception, and powerful enough to shape decisions before war even begins.


Russia Today
2 hours ago
- Russia Today
West using ‘Russia threat' to distract from own failures
Western leaders are deliberately painting Russia as a threat to distract their citizens from domestic economic and social woes, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said. In an interview with the Hungarian newspaper Magyar Nemzet on Monday, Lavrov dismissed claims made by Western intelligence agencies that Moscow is plotting to attack or occupy Europe. 'Perhaps those who make such claims know more about Russia's plans than we do. At least we are unaware of our plans to 'attack Europe', let alone 'occupy' it,' he quipped. Lavrov said he generally concurs with analysts who believe that the 'ruling circles in Europe and North America are working hard to create an image of Russia as an enemy to rally populations tired of social and economic problems.' He accused Western governments of systematically 'demonizing' Russia through media manipulation and pushing the notion of Moscow harboring some kind of 'imperial ambitions.' Among the issues Western leaders hope to deflect attention from are inflation, unemployment, falling living standards, illegal migration, and rising crime, he added. Lavrov went on to criticize what he described as the EU's transformation into a 'military-political bloc' and 'an appendix to NATO.' 'This is a dangerous trend that could have far-reaching consequences for all Europeans,' he warned. The minister's comments come on the heels of the NATO summit in The Hague last month during which the leaders of the bloc agreed to work toward a target of spending least 5% of GDP on defense – something US President Donald Trump has insisted on – and continue to support Ukraine. Moscow has consistently argued that military shipments to Kiev will only prolong the conflict without changing its outcome.


Russia Today
2 hours ago
- Russia Today
Fired Russian transport minister commits suicide hours after dismissal
Russian Transport Minister Roman Starovoit has committed suicide hours after being dismissed from his post by President Vladimir Putin. Russia's Investigative Committee confirmed on Monday that Starovoit's body was found in a private car in Moscow Region with a gunshot wound. DETAILS TO FOLLOW