IAEA chief: Iran's nuclear facilities not totally damaged
The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency says Iran's nuclear facilities were not totally damaged by the US attack and the country could resume uranium enrichment within months.
CBS News on Saturday released a transcript of its interview with IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi.
US President Donald Trump claimed that Iran's nuclear facilities were "obliterated" in the attack. But multiple US media outlets reported that a preliminary intelligence assessment indicated the Iranian nuclear program has only been set back by a few months.
Grossi noted that the IAEA has not made any military evaluations in Iran, but said, "It is clear that there has been severe damage, but it's not total damage."
He also pointed out that Iran has industrial and technological capacities, and suggested that the country could spin centrifuges and produce enriched uranium "in a matter of months" or "less than that."
Asked whether Iran had moved enriched uranium before the attack, Grossi responded that the IAEA does not know where it could be. He said, "Some could have been destroyed as part of the attack, but some could have been moved."
Grossi stressed the need for the IAEA to conduct inspections as soon as possible.
On Wednesday, Iran's parliament adopted a plan to ask the government to suspend cooperation with the IAEA.
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