Aircraft carrier tech: Plans for future cooperation discussed in key India-US defence meet
TDT | agencies
Plans for future India-US cooperation in aircraft carrier technology were discussed during a recent joint working group meeting between the two sides, officials said on Tuesday. The eighth meeting of the India-US Joint Working Group on Aircraft Carrier Technology Co-operation (JWGACTC), constituted under the auspices of the India-US Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), was organised in India from May 13-16.
"A six-member US delegation headed by RAdm (Rear Admiral) Casey Moton, Programme Executive Officer, Aircraft Carriers, visited various defence establishments in Delhi and Goa," a Navy spokesperson said.
The opening session of the Joint Working Group meeting was held on May 13 in New Delhi, which was co-chaired by Rear Admiral Vishal Bishnoi, the Assistant Controller Carrier Projects.
During the meeting, Rear Admiral Moton highlighted the importance of the Joint Working Group and the progress it has made over the last 10 years, he said.
Both sides appreciated the "remarkable work" undertaken by the group towards valuable information exchange on aircraft carriers.
"Plans for future cooperation under various aspects of aircraft carrier technology were discussed and a joint statement was also released," the spokesperson said.
In Goa, professional interactions were undertaken with the Indian Navy's aviation specialists on aircraft carrier operations and technical aspects. The meeting marked yet another "significant milestone" in the ongoing cooperation between the two countries in the field of aircraft carrier technology, he said.
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