China accuses US's Hegseth of 'vilifying' remarks at security forum
BEIJING: China has lodged a protest with the United States over "vilifying" remarks made by Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, the foreign ministry said on Sunday, while accusing Washington of deliberately ignoring regional calls for peace.
China objected to Hegseth referring to it as a threat in the Indo-Pacific, the ministry said, describing his comments at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Saturday as "deplorable" and "intended to sow division".
"Hegseth deliberately ignored the call for peace and development by countries in the region, and instead promoted a Cold War mentality focused on bloc confrontation, vilified China with defamatory allegations, and falsely labelled China a 'threat'," the ministry stated on its website.
Hegseth had urged allies in the Indo-Pacific region to increase defence spending, warning of a "real and potentially imminent" threat from China.
"The United States has deployed offensive weaponry in the South China Sea and continues to stoke tensions in the Asia-Pacific, turning the region into a powder keg," the ministry added.
As part of its longstanding defence ties with the Philippines, the US military this year deployed Typhon launchers capable of firing missiles that can strike targets in both China and Russia from the island of Luzon.
China and the Philippines dispute sovereignty over several islands and atolls in the South China Sea, with increasing maritime confrontations between their coast guards as both seek to assert control in the area.
The ministry also warned the United States not to "play with fire" regarding the Taiwan issue.
In his speech at Asia's leading forum for defence leaders, military officials and diplomats, Hegseth said any attempt by China to take Taiwan "would result in devastating consequences".
China has vowed to "reunify" with the self-governed island, by force if necessary. Taiwan's government rejects Beijing's sovereignty claims, stating that only the island's people can determine their future.
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