US ‘likely' moved nuclear arms to UK
On July 16, a US military transport aircraft flew with its transponder active from Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico – an installation known to house nuclear weapons – to RAF Lakenheath in eastern England, the report says. The aircraft is believed to have carried B61-12 thermonuclear bombs, which would mark the first known US nuclear deployment to the UK since 2008, according to several defense analysts.
Former senior NATO arms control official William Alberque said leaving the aircraft's transponder on was intentional and appeared to be aimed at sending a message to Moscow. 'This is a down payment that there's more to come on shifting NATO's deterrence posture toward strengthening,' he said. 'Returning US nuclear weapons to the UK is no small feat.'
Neither the US nor the UK has confirmed the move. It is also unclear how many weapons the US may have redeployed.
NATO's nuclear posture in Europe has remained largely unchanged since the end of the Cold War, with tactical nuclear weapons currently stationed in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Türkiye. Any movement of nuclear assets closer to Russia would likely be regarded as a major escalation.
The Bloomberg report comes after the UK – which has nuclear weapons of its own – confirmed plans in June to acquire at least 12 F-35A fighter jets capable of carrying US B61-12 bombs. London called the move 'the biggest strengthening of the UK's nuclear posture in a generation.'
Last year, former NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said the bloc was considering deploying more of its nuclear weapons to deter Russia and China – which he described as 'potential adversaries.' Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the remarks 'yet another fueling of tensions.'
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