Putin approves new naval strategy as Russia seeks to restore maritime power
Patrushev, a former KGB officer, told the Russian newspaper that the new document, titled The Strategy for the Development of the Russian Navy up to 2050, was approved in late May.
"Russia's position as one of the world's greatest maritime powers is gradually recovering," Patrushev said. He added that such work requires a long-term vision of future maritime challenges and threats.
Patrushev provided no further details on the new naval strategy
Russia currently operates the world's third most powerful navy, according to most public rankings, behind China and the United States. However, the fleet has suffered a string of losses during the war against Ukraine, particularly in the Black Sea.
Since September 2022, Ukraine has used naval kamikaze drones to target the Russian Black Sea Fleet, destroying several vessels. The latest strike sank a Mangust-class patrol boat off the coast of occupied Crimea using a domestically produced Magura drone.
Ukraine's campaign has drawn on the Jeune École naval doctrine, leveraging small, low-cost drones against larger warships. After losing its conventional surface fleet early in the war, Ukraine turned to developing its own naval drones.
The approach has proven effective.
In April 2022, Ukraine sank the Moskva, the fleet's flagship, with Neptune missiles. It has since struck key naval bases and reportedly disabled or destroyed around a third of Russia's Black Sea Fleet. The General Staff said in June that 29 Russian vessels had been taken out of action.
In response, Russia began pulling back ships from occupied Crimea to the port of Novorossiysk in late 2024 to shield them from further attacks. The redeployment limited Moscow's ability to blockade Ukrainian grain exports, though Russian naval capabilities in other regions remain largely intact.
Read also: As Ukraine, Russia agree to ceasefire at sea, Moscow's battered Black Sea Fleet is set to get a reprieve
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