Israel wants Gaza hostages front and centre on world stage: Minister
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar on Monday said he wants the issue of hostages held in Gaza at the "front and centre" of the world stage, and that he will discuss it at a special U.N. Security Council session.
"The world must put an end to the phenomenon of kidnapping civilians. It must be front and centre on the world stage," Saar said during a briefing with journalists, adding he will take part in the U.N. session Tuesday.
AFP
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