China's ‘robot Olympics' sees humanoids from 16 nations compete in table tennis, football, track
Robots will compete in sports such as football, track and field, and table tennis, as well as tackle robot-specific challenges from sorting medicines and handling materials to cleaning services.
Teams come from countries including the United States, Germany, and Brazil, with 192 representing universities and 88 from private enterprises. Robots from Chinese companies including Unitree and Fourier, are among those competing.
The Beijing municipal government is among the organising bodies for the event, underscoring the emphasis Chinese authorities place on the emerging robotics industry and reflecting the country's broader ambitions in AI and automation.
China's robotics push also comes as the country grapples with an ageing population and slowing economic growth.
The sector has received government subsidies exceeding $20 billion over the past year, while Beijing plans to establish a one trillion yuan ($137 billion) fund to support AI and robotics startups.
China has staged a series of high-profile robotics events in recent months, including what it called the world's first humanoid robot marathon in Beijing, a robot conference and the opening of retail stores dedicated to humanoid robots.
However, the marathon drew criticism after several robot competitors emitted smoke during the race and some failed to complete the course, raising questions about the current capabilities of the technology.
Still, while some may view such competitions and events as publicity stunts, industry experts and participants see them as crucial catalysts for advancing humanoid robots toward practical real-world applications.
Morgan Stanley analysts in a report last week noted a surge in attendance to a recent robot conference from the general public compared to previous years, saying this showed 'how China, not just top government officials, has embraced the concept of embodied intelligence.'
'We believe this widespread interest could be instrumental for China's continued leadership in the humanoid race, providing the necessary talent, resources, and customers to boost industry development and long-term adoption,' they said.
Booster Robotics, whose humanoid robots are being used by a Tsinghua University team in the football competition, views soccer as an effective test of perception, decision-making and control technologies that could later be deployed in factories or homes.
'Playing football is a testing and training ground for helping us refine our capabilities,' said Zhao Mingguo, Chief Scientist at Booster Robotics.
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