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Will the Last Surviving Parent of a Japanese Abductee Get Closure?

Will the Last Surviving Parent of a Japanese Abductee Get Closure?

The Diplomat08-08-2025
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, North Korea systematically abducted foreign citizens to train them as spies, indoctrinating them with North Korean language, culture, ideology, to support covert operations abroad. Nearly five decades after North Korea began abducting foreign citizens – including Japanese nationals – only one parent of a known abductee remains alive. Yokota Sakie, 89, waits, with diminishing hope, as bilateral talks have stalled since 2014 and more immediate current events command the attention of elected leaders.
The abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea is one of the last Cold War legacies for Japan. The late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who made the issue a special focus, called it 'unparalleled act of state criminality, as well as a grave violation of the sovereignty of [a nation] and the lives of its people. We absolutely cannot condone it.' The lingering trauma of the abductions has become intertwined with Japan's complicated relations with the Korean Peninsula.
Today, as the Indo-Pacific enters another phase of transitions in political leadership and policy reprioritization, and as time runs out for the last living parent of an abductee, the United States, Japan, and South Korea must revisit their commitment to ensuring the return of those who have been abducted by North Korea. Otherwise the opportunity for firsthand justice may disappear forever.
The Japanese government officially recognizes 17 of its citizens as abductees, while Pyongyang admitted to only 13 when it finally confirmed the abduction program in 2002. Of those, the North Korean government returned five to Japan, claiming the rest had died – including Megumi, Yokota Sakie's daughter, who was abducted in 1977 at age 13. The claims about the deaths remain unverifiable and widely disputed. Despite sustained efforts by Tokyo to secure credible updates, bilateral engagement has stalled for over a decade, largely due to Pyongyang's refusal to provide further information or accept responsibility.
The abduction issue has long been treated as a bilateral concern between Japan and North Korea. But amid shifting geopolitics, it now warrants a broader regional response. North Korea continues to rely on China for both trade and diplomatic shielding – especially at the U.N. Security Council. Meanwhile, Pyongyang has strengthened its alignment with Russia by supplying arms and labor in violation of U.N. sanctions. In 2024, North Korea and Russia signed a 'Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership' that included a promise of mutual military assistance in the event of a war. These partnerships blunt traditional pressure tools, embolden Pyongyang's defiance, and highlight the urgency of coordinated action by Japan, South Korea, and the United States – not only on denuclearization, but also on longstanding human rights violations like the abductions.
Against this backdrop, trilateral coordination has advanced significantly. At the 2023 Camp David Summit, leaders pledged to uphold a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' and announced practical commitments: joint missile-warning collaboration, regular military exercises, and institutionalized annual trilateral summits. This framework presents an opportunity to embed the abduction issue in a new era of Indo-Pacific diplomacy.
To make meaningful progress, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea should elevate the abduction issue through sustained leadership engagement and targeted public diplomacy. Leaders must raise the issue consistently at bilateral and trilateral summits – as President Donald Trump did during his historic summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un – and reinforce it at global platforms including the G-7, G-20, and U.N. General Assembly. Crucially, policymakers must also brief and involve legislators across all three countries to ensure long-term political will and oversight.
A trilateral public awareness campaign can amplify this effort. While Japanese civil society has long mobilized around the abductions, awareness remains limited in South Korea and the United States. Yet South Korea's own experience – tens of thousands of Koreans were abducted during and after the Korean War – and the presence of Korean American and Japanese American communities in the U.S. offer natural bridges. Coordinated efforts across embassies, NGOs, and diaspora groups – leveraging digital media, cultural storytelling, and exchanges – can build momentum and connect abduction-impacted communities across the Indo-Pacific.
Importantly, the abductions must be disentangled from the nuclear non-proliferation agenda. For decades, the U.S.-led diplomatic track with North Korea has prioritized denuclearization, sidelining humanitarian concerns. This linkage has allowed Pyongyang to stall on basic accountability while continuing nuclear brinkmanship. Elevating the abduction issue as a standalone humanitarian priority, distinct from strategic negotiations, will signal that basic human rights are not negotiable, and that security cannot come at the expense of justice.
With new leadership in Seoul and a potential transition in Tokyo, political conditions are favorable for a coordinated, principal approach. As Washington weighs reengagement with Pyongyang, the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral must speak with one voice: unresolved human rights abuses are not a peripheral issue – they are a core test of North Korea's willingness to engage in good faith. Embedding this message at multilateral summits such as the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF), ASEAN meeting, and the U.N. Human Rights Council will reframe the abductions as not just a Japanese grievance, but a regional concern tied to global norms of civilian protection and state accountability.
By reframing the abductions as a trilateral priority, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea can reinforce the moral foundation of their alliance, restore momentum to a long-stalled issue, and reaffirm a shared Indo-Pacific vision grounded in rule of law and democratic values.
Some argue that the abduction issue is too difficult to resolve, or that it's too late to do so. But silence carries a strategic cost. Ignoring North Korea's state-sponsored abductions set a precedent that vulnerable civilians can be disappeared, denied justice, and ultimately forgotten. The Indo-Pacific cannot be secure if basic human rights are treated as expendable bargaining chips. Each year that passes brings us closer to a time when no direct family members remain to speak for the abductees. This moment, with trilateral cooperation at a high point and regional diplomacy in flux, might be the last chance to ensure justice is part of the conversation.
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