Why The U.S. May Prioritize Warfighting Amid Military Rank Reductions

Forbes

13-05-2025

Four Star General Insignia
DOD
The recent announcement by Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Pete Hegseth of a 20 percent reduction in the number of four-star general officers in the U.S. military has sent ripples throughout the defense establishment. His intent is clear: streamline senior ranks, flatten bureaucracy, and improve efficiency. As the Department of Defense (DOD) deliberates on which positions to reduce, it should prioritize warfighting effectiveness.
The United States military assigns its four-star general and flag officers to roles where their rank, authority, and strategic leadership are essential to national security and global command responsibilities. Over the years several reviews, proposals, and recommendations have been made to adjust (usually lower) the general/flag officer numbers. What is not widely known is that promotion boards stop at the grade of 'O8,' or Major General/Rear Admiral (two-star). For three and four star generals, the rank is associated with the position, and the individual acquires the rank by being selected for the position. While recommendations for these positions are initiated by the respective armed service Chiefs and Secretaries, along with concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, Section 601 of Title 10 U.S. Code, stipulates that '[t]
Congress has specified the grade for certain positions. For example, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of the unified commands, and the armed service Chiefs and Vice Chiefs. The SECDEF, under authority delegated from the President, has the discretion to designate which other specific billets should carry four-star rank.
Currently, the U.S. military has 42 four-star generals and admirals. Accordingly, the recent SECDEF direction would result in a reduction in rank of eight four-star generals/admirals. Which of those positions are targeted for reduction will have a significant impact on the strength and impact of the role of America's influence around the world. Dana Priest's book, "The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military" explores the reality of America's reliance on its military for managing global affairs. Which four-star positions are retained, and which are reduced go well beyond internal U.S. Department of Defense dynamics.
In each of the services, four-star assignments are allocated among some major commands that are components to the combatant commands—the organizations that fight our nation's wars—and leadership positions that oversee significant functions such as acquisition, training, future plans, nuclear propulsion of ships, and others. With a declared focus on lethality and warfighting, the SECDEF would be wise to retain four-star leadership in the respective service components to the combatant commands and shift other major organization leadership to three-star positions. The rationale for this approach is not simply based on a subjective assessment of relative importance of the military's major enterprises, but also to the second and third order effects such moves may have to U.S. influence and leadership around the world.
As an example, look at the position of the Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA). This position also is assigned the responsibility as the Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s Allied Air Command. In other words, this U.S. Air Force four-star general is not only a commander of U.S. forces. He is responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for the air and missile defense of all NATO member nations. In the event of armed conflict, this commander would lead all NATO air operations—a role that cannot be executed effectively without both the authority and perception of a four-star leader.
Should this position be downgraded to a three-star rank, the implications would be severe for U.S. leadership. Not only would the U.S. cede this critical warfighting role to another NATO nation's four-star officer, but it would also place American air forces in Europe under the command of a foreign military leader. That shift would mark a dramatic departure from decades of American leadership within the Alliance, would have operational consequences far beyond the European theater, and would not put America first.
This is not an isolated case. Similar multi-hatted and globally significant roles are embedded throughout the U.S. military's command architecture. U.S. service component commanders—such as those aligned to Indo-Pacific Command—must be led by officers with appropriate authority, experience, and command presence. These leaders are preparing for, and in some cases actively engaging in operations that defend the American homeland, ensure global stability, and deter and if necessary, defeat our most significant adversaries.
Strategic leadership requires more than competence; it requires credibility in the eyes of both allies and adversaries. A reduction in rank, regardless of the capabilities of the individual, sends a message—intentional or not—that the U.S. may no longer prioritize leadership in that realm. In multifaceted military alliance and partner structures everywhere the U.S. has traditionally led—where perception and trust are as important as capability—a reduction in grade would undercut U.S. security interests, not enhance them.
There are legitimate areas where four-star billets could be responsibly reduced. Service commands or positions that are largely support, managerial, or unlikely to be involved in combat may warrant reevaluation. Joint positions with minimal operational scope, or legacy roles created in a different era of warfare, could be transitioned to three star leadership without harming U.S. readiness or global posture. But four star service component commanders to combatant commands, especially in contested regions, are not the places to trim.
To understand the stakes, consider the strategic environment of 2025. Europe is facing the most precarious security challenge since World War II as Russia continues its aggression in Ukraine and threatens NATO's eastern flank. In the Indo-Pacific, China's military buildup and aggressive actions around Taiwan require constant attention, rapid decision-making, and integrated joint-force planning. In space and cyberspace, these domains of warfare demand strategic guidance from senior leaders with direct access to the highest levels of U.S. command. These roles cannot be delegated to lower ranks without risking operational cohesion and deterrence credibility.
Critics of the current four-star structure argue that the U.S. military has become too top-heavy. That is not an unreasonable concern, particularly as the force itself has shrunk since the Cold War's end. But any serious assessment of 'top heaviness' must differentiate between support roles and those requiring warfighting leadership.
Moreover, it is worth remembering that a reduction in senior leadership—if not smartly executed—can lead to a loss of operational continuity and strategic depth. Succession planning, mentorship pipelines, and international coalition coordination all rely on consistent and appropriately ranked leadership. Reducing these positions without a coherent framework will create instability and uncertainty at a time when neither is affordable.
In this context, 'putting America first' is not just a slogan—it is a strategic imperative. It means retaining U.S. leadership where it counts most: in the commands that provide warfighting capabilities, enable allied operations, and deter adversaries from testing the resolve of the United States and its partners.
In an era where great power competition is no longer theoretical, and where deterrence relies on visible strength and competent leadership, the U.S. must avoid moves that may indicate a lessoning in regional leadership, engagement, and/or concern. America's military strength has always rested not just on its weapons and technology, but on the leadership of the men and women entrusted to employ them wisely.
As decisions are made in the coming weeks about which four-star positions will be retained and which will be eliminated, we must ask the fundamental question: Will this change improve or impair our ability to fight and win America's wars? If it is the latter, then we would be weakening our combat capability, and no efficiency gain is worth that cost. Peace does not come from efficiency—it comes through strength, and senior U.S. military leadership in critical alliance positions are vital to that proposition.