UK parliament votes to decriminalise abortion, repeal Victorian-era law
London: Britain's parliament voted on Tuesday to decriminalise abortion in England and Wales to stop a growing number of women from being investigated by police for terminating pregnancies under legislation dating back to the mid-19th century.
Abortions have been legal in England and Wales for almost 60 years but only up to 24 weeks and with the approval of two doctors. Women can face criminal charges if they decide to end a pregnancy after 24 weeks under a Victorian-era law that carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
In Britain, criminal convictions for breaking this law are rare, but the number of prosecutions has increased following the COVID-19 pandemic when a change in the law allowed abortion pills to be taken at home to end pregnancies within 10 weeks of conception.
In a free vote in parliament, when politicians were not ordered to vote along party lines, lawmakers gave an initial approval by 379 votes to 137 for an amendment to stop prosecutions for women who end pregnancies in all circumstances.
Medical professionals who assist women in obtaining an abortion outside the 24-week limit could still face prosecution.
The proposal could still be altered or even voted down as it is a part of a greater bill that is making its way through the House of Commons and the unelected upper chamber of parliament.
Labour Member of Parliament Tonia Antoniazzi, who proposed the amendment, said the current law had been used to investigate 100 women in the last five years, including some who had given birth prematurely or had been forced into abortions by abusive partners.
"Each one of these cases is a travesty enabled by our outdated abortion law," she told parliament. "This is not justice, it is cruelty and it has got to end."
The vote was part of a broader government criminal justice bill that if passed in its entirety would bring the abortion laws in England and Wales in line with other Western countries including France, Canada and Australia.
'NO CONSEQUENCES'
Some politicians warned the proposed amendment was being rushed through parliament and could have unintended consequences.
Rebecca Paul, a Conservative member of parliament, warned "if this becomes law, fully developed babies up to term could be aborted by a woman with no consequences."
The amendment would revoke parts of a law passed in 1861 by a then all-male parliament that made deliberately ending a pregnancy a crime and stipulated that those who carried it out could be "kept in penal servitude for life".
A change to the law in 1967 permitted abortions in certain circumstances, but left the 19th century criminal prohibition in place.
Between 1861 and 2022, only three women in Britain were convicted of having illegal abortions, according to the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, which works to improve women's healthcare. But since then, six women have been charged by police, the group said. One woman has been jailed.
In May, a British woman, Nicola Packer, was acquitted after taking prescribed abortion medicine when she was around 26 weeks pregnant, beyond the legal limit of 10 weeks for taking such medication at home.
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Time of India
41 minutes ago
- Time of India
Why blocking Hormuz is a losing strategy for Iran
In the early hours of June 13, Israel unleashed a series of pre-emptive strikes on Iran's nuclear development, its missile production sites and attacks on strategic personalities, including nuclear scientists and Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders. The attacks on Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow inflicted severe structural damage and claimed the lives of at least fourteen nuclear scientists in coordinated assassinations. Tel Aviv justified these raids by pointing to Iran's uranium enrichment levels, which had already reached 60 per cent purity – alarming close to the 90 per cent threshold for weapons-grade material. Iran responded with a wave of missile and drone barrages against Israeli cities – Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Bnei Brak, Petah Tikva, and Rehovot – prompting air-raid sirens and Iron Dome interceptions. Yet Tehran's retaliation extended beyond Israel's borders, striking the US military installations in the region and daring to challenge America's naval supremacy in the Gulf. As tensions soared, three commercial vessels in the Gulf of Oman caught fire in incidents widely attributed to Iranian sabotage. Additionally, Tehran publicly threatened to seal off the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow maritime chokepoint through which nearly one-fifth of the world's oil supply flows. The spectre of a Hormuz blockade is not new in Tehran's strategic lexicon. The first recorded Iranian threat to close the strait dates back to 1951, when the then Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh hinted that nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian oil company could lead to Western embargoes and blockade of the waterway. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, particularly between 1987 and 1988 in the so-called Tanker War, Iran deployed fast attack boats and mines, warning that any assault on its oil exports would close Hormuz to all shipping. In 2008, after British forces seized Iranian naval vessels in the Gulf, Tehran again menaced the strait. More recently, it has issued similar warnings in 2011-12 when it threatened to block the strait in retaliation for US and European sanctions and after the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, as well as following the 2020 assassinations of General Qassem Soleimani and nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Yet a full closure of the strait would do far greater harm to Iran than to its adversaries. A SWOT analysis makes this clear, particularly in the realm of diplomatic isolation. Strengths of a coalition condemning Iran would include unified political will among the United States, European Union, Japan, and other major consumers, backed by legal frameworks for sanctions and vast diplomatic networks. Weaknesses in their stance lie in competing energy needs. While Europe seeks to diversify away from Russian gas, Asian giants like China and India depend heavily on Gulf oil, which could complicate unanimous action. Opportunities for these countries include reinforcing international norms of freedom of navigation and deterring future coercive measures. Yet threats remain. If the coalition applies too harsh a diplomatic squeeze, it risks driving Iran closer to alternative partners like Russia and China, and could trigger regional destabilisation that boomerangs in higher energy prices and security costs. Within this context, India faces a delicate strategic dilemma. Historically, New Delhi has maintained cordial ties with Tehran, importing nearly 600,000 barrels per day from Iran before 2019. However, after Washington's 'maximum pressure' campaign, India reduced these imports, pivoting toward the United States and Gulf producers. If Iran moves to choke Hormuz, India would find itself confronted with converging imperatives: supporting broader international action to keep maritime lanes open, while safeguarding its own energy security and investments in Iranian infrastructure such as the Chabahar Port. New Delhi's likelihood of diplomatically isolating Iran hinges on balancing these interests. It could, for instance, vote in favour of UN resolutions condemning the blockade, while quietly affirming its need to maintain minimal oil flows. Ultimately, India's principle of strategic autonomy suggests it would join consensus measures that protect global commerce without entirely severing ties with Tehran. Roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption, around 20 million barrels per day, passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making it the most crucial chokepoint in global energy logistics. The strait, barely 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, is the gateway through which the oil-rich Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran itself send crude oil to global markets. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, about 76 per cent of the oil that transits Hormuz heads to Asia, powering the economies of China, India, Japan, and South Korea. In addition, liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments from Qatar, which alone accounts for 20 percent of global LNG exports, also pass through this strategic corridor. Even a temporary closure or disruption in the Strait could send oil prices soaring above US$150 per barrel, aggravating global inflation, destabilising developing economies, and threatening already fragile post-pandemic economic recoveries. The Brent crude benchmark has already crossed US$102 per barrel in the aftermath of the Israeli strikes. Any military move to seal off Hormuz would send shockwaves through every major energy-importing economy. Notably, blocking Hormuz will prove to be a losing strategy for Iran itself. First, Iran's economic fragility would be laid bare. Under the US sanctions, oil exports have plummeted from over 2.5 million barrels per day in 2017 to roughly 1.2 million barrels per day today, cutting national revenues by two-thirds. With oil accounting for nearly 80 per cent of Iran's foreign exchange receipts, a blockade that chokes off exports could erase upwards of US$40 billion in annual income, triggering a double-digit GDP contraction and reversing a decade of modest growth. Skyrocketing inflation already exceeding 45 per cent and youth unemployment above 27 per cent would turn economic hardship into social unrest, jeopardising the regime's domestic stability. Second, global military escalation would become almost inevitable. The US Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, maintains a constant presence precisely to guarantee freedom of navigation. Any attempt to blockade Hormuz would invite direct naval confrontation, potentially involving mine-clearing vessels, destroyers, and airstrikes on Iranian naval assets. Such clashes risk expanding the conflict well beyond Iranian proxies and could draw in allied forces from Europe, Australia, and even China, whose energy supply lines would be under threat. Third, diplomatic isolation would deepen. Major consumers such as China, India, Japan, and European states would expedite the diversification of their energy imports, renegotiate existing contracts, and support secondary sanctions. Even long-standing partners like Russia would hesitate to side with Iran at the expense of their own oil revenues. Unlike the targeted suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, which impacted only Pakistan and maintained dispute-resolution channels, a Hormuz blockade would unite a broad coalition against Iran's action. Fourth, there is a significant risk of financial contagion and insurance upheaval. Closing Hormuz would send tanker insurance premiums to unprecedented levels, potentially tripling current rates and causing shipping firms to reroute through longer, costlier passages around the Cape of Good Hope. This would not only cripple Iran's capacity to export oil but also undermine its plans for alternative overland pipelines through Oman and Iraq by making them economically unviable. Fifth, the environmental and strategic fallout could be disastrous. Mine warfare or missile strikes on civilian shipping lanes would risk oil spills in the ecologically fragile Gulf, devastating fisheries and coastal economies in Iran and neighbouring states alike. Furthermore, Iran's own critical infrastructure, such as ports, pipelines, and refinerie,s would become legitimate military targets, compounding the costs of reconstruction already estimated to exceed US$10 billion. In essence, a Hormuz blockade would play into Iran's perceived strength, its geostrategic leverage over an essential trade artery, but would magnify its vulnerabilities. Economic self-harm, military escalation, diplomatic isolation, financial chaos, and environmental destruction combine to make such a move profoundly counterproductive. Instead, Iran's optimal course lies in diplomacy and economic diversification. A ceasefire agreement paired with renewed nuclear negotiations – whether under a revamped JCPOA or a fresh multilateral framework – could secure limited sanctions relief. Mediators like Switzerland, Oman, and Qatar have the credibility to facilitate backchannel talks and rebuild trust. Tehran's strategic calculus at this critical juncture will not be assessed by the potency of its rhetoric, but by the prudence of its actions. A closure of the Strait of Hormuz may offer short-term leverage, but it neither redresses the damage inflicted by Israel's pre-emptive strikes nor constrains the formidable maritime presence of the United States and its allies. On the contrary, such a move would deepen Iran's diplomatic isolation, exacerbate its economic vulnerabilities, and risk transforming a regional crisis into a multi-actor conflagration with global repercussions. In an interconnected world order, where geoeconomic stability often supersedes geopolitical defiance, the imperative for dialogue and calibrated diplomacy has never been more urgent. The pathway to regional security and global credibility lies not in coercive disruptions but in constructive engagement, de-escalation, and a forward-looking economic vision grounded in resilience and cooperation. Facebook Twitter Linkedin Email Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.
NDTV
an hour ago
- NDTV
The Long Complicated History Of How Iran And US Became Enemies
Relations between the United States and Iran have been fraught for decades – at least since the U.S. helped overthrow a democracy-minded prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, in August 1953. The U.S. then supported the long, repressive reign of the Shah of Iran, whose security services brutalized Iranian citizens for decades. The two countries have been particularly hostile to each other since Iranian students took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, resulting in economic sanctions and the severing of formal diplomatic relations between the nations. Since 1984, the U.S. State Department has listed Iran as a ' state sponsor of terrorism,' alleging the Iranian government provides terrorists with training, money and weapons. Some of the major events in U.S.-Iran relations highlight the differences between the nations' views, but others arguably presented real opportunities for reconciliation. 1953: US overthrows Mossadegh In 1951, the Iranian Parliament chose a new prime minister, Mossadegh, who then led lawmakers to vote in favor of taking over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, expelling the company's British owners and saying they wanted to turn oil profits into investments in the Iranian people. The U.S. feared disruption in the global oil supply and worried about Iran falling prey to Soviet influence. The British feared the loss of cheap Iranian oil. President Dwight Eisenhower decided it was best for the U.S. and the U.K. to get rid of Mossadegh. Operation Ajax, a joint CIA-British operation, convinced the Shah of Iran, the country's monarch, to dismiss Mossadegh and drive him from office by force. Mossadegh was replaced by a much more Western-friendly prime minister, handpicked by the CIA. 1979: Revolutionaries oust the shah, take hostages After more than 25 years of relative stability in U.S.-Iran relations, the Iranian public had grown unhappy with the social and economic conditions that developed under the dictatorial rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Pahlavi enriched himself and used American aid to fund the military while many Iranians lived in poverty. Dissent was often violently quashed by SAVAK, the shah's security service. In January 1979, the shah left Iran, ostensibly to seek cancer treatment. Two weeks later, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from exile in Iraq and led a drive to abolish the monarchy and proclaim an Islamic government. In October 1979, President Jimmy Carter agreed to allow the shah to come to the U.S. to seek advanced medical treatment. Outraged Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Nov. 4, taking 52 Americans hostage. That convinced Carter to sever U.S. diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980. Two weeks later, the U.S. military launched a mission to rescue the hostages, but it failed, with aircraft crashes killing eight U.S. servicemembers. The shah died in Egypt in July 1980, but the hostages weren't released until Jan. 20, 1981, after 444 days of captivity. 1980-1988: US tacitly sides with Iraq In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, an escalation of the two countries' regional rivalry and religious differences: Iraq was governed by Sunni Muslims but had a Shia Muslim majority population; Iran was led and populated mostly by Shiites. The U.S. was concerned that the conflict would limit the flow of Middle Eastern oil and wanted to ensure the conflict didn't affect its close ally, Saudi Arabia. The U.S. supported Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in his fight against the anti-American Iranian regime. As a result, the U.S. mostly turned a blind eye toward Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran. U.S. officials moderated their usual opposition to those illegal and inhumane weapons because the U.S. State Department did not ' wish to play into Iran's hands by fueling its propaganda against Iraq.' In 1988, the war ended in a stalemate. More than 500,000 military and 100,000 civilians died. 1981-1986: US secretly sells weapons to Iran The U.S. imposed an arms embargo after Iran was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984. That left the Iranian military, in the middle of its war with Iraq, desperate for weapons and aircraft and vehicle parts to keep fighting. The Reagan administration decided that the embargo would likely push Iran to seek support from the Soviet Union, the U.S.'s Cold War rival. Rather than formally end the embargo, U.S. officials agreed to secretly sell weapons to Iran starting in 1981. The last shipment, of anti-tank missiles, was in October 1986. In November 1986, a Lebanese magazine exposed the deal. That revelation sparked the Iran-Contra scandal in the U.S., with Reagan's officials found to have collected money from Iran for the weapons and illegally sent those funds to anti-socialist rebels – the Contras – in Nicaragua. 1988: US Navy shoots down Iran Air flight 655 On the morning of July 8, 1988, the USS Vincennes, a guided missile cruiser patrolling in the international waters of the Persian Gulf, entered Iranian territorial waters while in a skirmish with Iranian gunboats. Either during or just after that exchange of gunfire, the Vincennes crew mistook a passing civilian Airbus passenger jet for an Iranian F-14 fighter. They shot it down, killing all 290 people aboard. The U.S. called it a ' tragic and regrettable accident,' but Iran believed the plane's downing was intentional. In 1996, the U.S. agreed to pay US$131.8 million in compensation to Iran. 1997-1998: The US seeks contact In August 1997, a moderate reformer, Mohammad Khatami, won Iran's presidential election. U.S. President Bill Clinton sensed an opportunity. He sent a message to Tehran through the Swiss ambassador there, proposing direct government-to-government talks. Shortly thereafter, in early January 1998, Khatami gave an interview to CNN in which he expressed ' respect for the great American people,' denounced terrorism and recommended an 'exchange of professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists and tourists' between the United States and Iran. However, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei didn't agree, so not much came of the mutual overtures as Clinton's time in office came to an end. In his 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush characterized Iran, Iraq and North Korea as constituting an 'Axis of Evil' supporting terrorism and pursuing weapons of mass destruction, straining relations even further. 2002: Iran's nuclear program raises alarm In August 2002, an exiled rebel group announced that Iran had been secretly working on nuclear weapons at two installations that had not previously been publicly revealed. That was a violation of the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which Iran had signed, requiring countries to disclose their nuclear-related facilities to international inspectors. One of those formerly secret locations, Natanz, housed centrifuges for enriching uranium, which could be used in civilian nuclear reactors or enriched further for weapons. Starting in roughly 2005, U.S. and Israeli government cyberattackers together reportedly targeted the Natanz centrifuges with a custom-made piece of malicious software that became known as Stuxnet. That effort, which slowed down Iran's nuclear program was one of many U.S. and international attempts – mostly unsuccessful – to curtail Iran's progress toward building a nuclear bomb. 2003: Iran writes to Bush administration In May 2003, senior Iranian officials quietly contacted the State Department through the Swiss embassy in Iran, seeking 'a dialogue 'in mutual respect,'' addressing four big issues: nuclear weapons, terrorism, Palestinian resistance and stability in Iraq. Hardliners in the Bush administration weren't interested in any major reconciliation, though Secretary of State Colin Powell favored dialogue and other officials had met with Iran about al-Qaida. When Iranian hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran in 2005, the opportunity died. The following year, Ahmadinejad made his own overture to Washington in an 18-page letter to President Bush. The letter was widely dismissed; a senior State Department official told me in profane terms that it amounted to nothing. 2015: Iran nuclear deal signed After a decade of unsuccessful attempts to rein in Iran's nuclear ambitions, the Obama administration undertook a direct diplomatic approach beginning in 2013. Two years of secret, direct negotiations initially bilaterally between the U.S. and Iran and later with other nuclear powers culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, often called the Iran nuclear deal. Two years of secret, direct negotiations conducted bilaterally at first between the U.S. and Iran and later with other nuclear powers culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, often called the Iran nuclear deal. Iran, the U.S., China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom signed the deal in 2015. It severely limited Iran's capacity to enrich uranium and mandated that international inspectors monitor and enforce Iran's compliance with the agreement. In return, Iran was granted relief from international and U.S. economic sanctions. Though the inspectors regularly certified that Iran was abiding by the agreement's terms, President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement in May 2018. 2020: US drones kill Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani On Jan. 3, 2020, an American drone fired a missile that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the leader of Iran's elite Quds Force. Analysts considered Soleimani the second most powerful man in Iran, after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. At the time, the Trump administration asserted that Soleimani was directing an imminent attack against U.S. assets in the region, but officials have not provided clear evidence to support that claim. Iran responded by launching ballistic missiles that hit two American bases in Iraq. 2023: The Oct. 7 attacks on Israel Hamas' brazen attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, provoked a fearsome militarized response from Israel that continues today and served to severely weaken Iran's proxies in the region, especially Hamas – the perpetrator of the attacks – and Hezbollah in Lebanon. 2025: Trump 2.0 and Iran Trump saw an opportunity to forge a new nuclear deal with Iran and to pursue other business deals with Tehran. Once inaugurated for his second term, Trump appointed Steve Witkoff, a real estate investor who is the president's friend, to serve as special envoy for the Middle East and to lead negotiations. Negotiations for a nuclear deal between Washington and Tehran began in April, but the countries did not reach a deal. They were planning a new round of talks when Israel struck Iran with a series of airstrikes on June 13, forcing the White House to reconsider is position.
Hindustan Times
an hour ago
- Hindustan Times
AAP's entry could clutter Bihar's poll fray, split Opp votes in direct face-off
Ousted from power in Delhi, Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), that was a constituent of the INDIA bloc in 2024 Lok Sabha elections, has announced to field candidates on all the 243 seats in Bihar and hopes to cash in on by raising the issues of 'BJP's failed promises to migrant Biharis, who constitute a significant number in Delhi'. The announcement came from AAP Rajya Sabha MP Sanjay Singh in Patna, but it remains to be seen if AAP would really go all the way, as it had backed out of election at the last moment in 2020 citing Covid and other factors and has never contested the state polls even at the peak of its popularity in Delhi. 'We will go to all the villages of Bihar and tell the people about the reality of the BJP, which had promised houses in place of jhuggis before Delhi election to migrant Biharis living there for 50 years, and is now demolishing their dwellings. We will present our model to the people of Bihar and field candidates on all 243 seats to seek their support,' he added. The only time AAP contested in Bihar was in 2014, when it fielded candidates on 39 of the 40 Lok Sabha seats, but could win none. In 2015, it did not contest, but lent its support to the anti-BJP alliance. In 2019, its seat-sharing talks with the RJD and the Congress collapsed. In 2020, it again did not contest despite making an early announcement. This time it wants to go solo in Bihar, highlighting the plight of the migrants in Delhi under the BJP government, which came to power in Delhi last year ending the long run of AAP. Political analysts feel that the entry of AAP in Bihar as an independent player could be an attempt to win over the Poorvanchalis, who are set to have deserted it after throwing their weight completely behind Arvind Kejriwal's party in 2015 and 2020, but hurt the cause of the INDIA bloc more than the NDA, as the presence of Jan Suraaj Party and the AIMIM of Assauddin Owaisi would only make the election multipolar to suit the BJP strategy. 'While the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the INDIA bloc are the major formations face to face in the forthcoming Bihar assembly election 2025 yet again, with margin of error likely to be small, the emergence of too many players apart from the two main formations would make the scene cluttered and confuse the voters to some extent, but in a multi-party democracy like ours it is not uncommon,' said former professor of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences Pushpendra. He, however, said that with seat-sharing yet to be formalised in the two main formations, and pulls and pressure likely to intensify in the days to come, there was still time for the political climate to settle, which could throw a new alliance at the last moment. 'In politics, nothing can be ruled out, as a lot happens as part of the strategy to get one's arithmetic right even against odds,' he added. Political analyst Prof NK Choudhary said that the entry of AAP could be an important factor, as Jan Suraaj Party is already there to challenge the dominance of the mainstream parties like the BJP, JD-U, RJD and the Congress, but it would not be easy to fit into Bihar's complex political reality guided by caste and region. 'For AAP, the move is clearly aimed at winning over the Bihar migrants in Delhi through their homes in Bihar, but everything does not happen the way one plans in politics, especially in Bihar. AIMIM has also made its intentions clear to field more candidates than in 2020, when it won five seats for the first time. More formations can take place in the days to come. But it will not be the merrier, as big players will have to watch out against small aberrations,' he added. Political reactions to AAP's entry have been on the predictable lines, with the Congress leader Kanhaiya Kumar describing the move as an 'attempt to split votes to help the BJP'. Tejashwi Prasad Yadav said that Bihar was different from Delhi. BJP, on the other hand, brushed aside AAP's foray into Bihar. 'Bihar people wiped out AAP from Delhi and they are a spent force now. Bihar does not look beyond the development model of the NDA government. The way the Centre is pouring funds in Bihar, development has been fast tracked and jobs are being provided in a big way. People will once again not look beyond NDA,' said Deputy CM Vijay Kumar Sinha.
