How the US plans to fight off a Chinese invasion of Taiwan
A soldier careens into the briefing tent of Cross Functional Team (CFT) Taiwan, barely able to catch his breath.
'Attention on the floor!' he shouts. 'Sorry to barge in, sir, but you'll want to hear this.'
Chinese ships have begun to cross the Taiwan Strait 'with full intention to invade'.
Chaos breaks out in the command centre, where specialists had been outlining recent operations. Sirens blare, soldiers pick up rucksacks, plastic chairs are pushed aside.
Over the tree-line, hostile drones whirr into view. As troops hustle a visiting congressional delegation to an evacuation point, they swoop overhead and drop munitions.
Ear-splitting explosions send plumes of smoke into the air. People fall by the side of the road, screaming.
So begins the long-feared war between the world's two largest militaries – or at least, a drill simulating the event at the 25th capability exercise of the US Special Forces at Fort Bragg army base.
A hint of slapstick lingers in the air. Called upon to help the wounded, visitors fiddle with their lanyards, while fake blood soaks the clothes of gurgling actors.
The scenario, however, is head-poundingly serious.
Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, has ordered his military to be ready to 'reunify' the self-governing island of Taiwan with the mainland by 2027.
An extraordinary build-up is under way. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) now boasts one million troops more than the US, as well as the world's largest navy, vast supplies of ground-based long-range missiles and a galloping nuclear arsenal set to hit 1,000 warheads by 2030.
In satellite imagery, a mock-up of central Taipei including the president's office can be seen near a desert PLA base.
Beijing also has home advantage: its resources are all closer to Taiwan than the US bases in the Philippines, Japan and Guam. Any movement of US forces will be immediately spotted by China's extensive sensor network.
Pete Hegseth, the US defence secretary, warned on Saturday that the threat from China was real and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could be imminent. He added that any attempt by China to conquer Taiwan 'would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world'.
'Beijing is credibly preparing potentially to use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific,' Mr Hegseth said in a speech to the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia's premier defence forum, in Singapore.
In March, Mr Hegseth issued a classified memo that prioritised efforts to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, leaving Europe to 'assume risk' in facing down Russia.
'China is the Department's sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan – while simultaneously defending the US homeland is the Department's sole pacing scenario,' he wrote.
The memo lifted sections almost word-for-word from a report by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington-based think tank.
'If I had to bet they are laying the groundwork now to begin large swings of forces out of lesser-priority theatres to the Indo-Pacific in around six months,' says Rob Peters, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, who co-authored the report.
In Fort Bragg headquarters, a briefing video opens with the sound of a clock ticking ominously. Chinese lettering fills the screen.
Three red stars mark the years 2014 (Russia's seizure of Ukraine), 2022 (the invasion of Ukraine) and 2027 – the year China could strike Taiwan.
The impact of a Chinese invasion on the lives of ordinary people would make that of the Covid pandemic 'pale in comparison', says Lt Gen Jonathan P Braga, the commander of the US Army Special Operations Command.
It would disrupt the supply of the microchips that power crucial technologies, 'from I can't buy a car, a refrigerator, a cell-phone… all that stuff'.
'We need people… to think about this, because it is by exponential means the greatest threat we have,' Lt Gen Braga says.
What role ground troops would play is open to question. Around 500 US military trainers are currently based on Taiwan, teaching the local forces how to operate advanced weaponry. The first test with the long-range Himars was carried out this month.
Special forces would likely enter Taiwan surreptitiously in the weeks before an invasion; army units might join, but public deployments could inflame the situation.
The defenders' goal would be to 'turn the Taiwan beaches into the beaches of Normandy,' says Mr Peters. Failing that: 'box them in like Anzio.'
But the fiercest battles will be fought in the skies and at sea. The US is preparing a 'hellscape' of drones, mines and unmanned ships to slow down China's crossing of the 100-mile Taiwan Strait.
The PLA navy will form a blockade around the eastern flank of the island, preventing the US from reaching or resupplying the Taiwanese.
Spectacular dogfights would erupt: US F-35s, bombers and stealth B-21 raiders attempting to sink the warships, as China's 3,000 aircraft fight back.
To stand a chance, the US will need 'a metric s--- ton' of long-range anti-ship missiles, in particular the new Tomahawk, which has a range of 1,500 miles, says Mr Peters. 'I cannot stress this enough,' he adds, the arsenal is currently 'way, way [too] low.'
One goal of the special forces – however many they number – would be to try and open up air corridors onto the island.
Out on a Fort Bragg training range, a dozen camouflaged soldiers creep through the trees towards a Russian-made Scud missile and nearby command-and-control centre, which form part of China's Integrated Air Defence System (IADS).
To the south of their position, a drone-operator, robot dog and two armoured vehicles mounted with M240b machine guns wait for the signal. Snipers watch behind camouflage.
'Open fire,' the commander orders over the radio. A drone whizzes overhead, dropping a bomb near the Scud. The M240b gunners spray the guards, providing cover for the soldiers to race out of the trees and eliminate those left alive.
The Scud is disabled with a flamethrower (its unique fuel makes explosive detonation tricky).
Then comes the most novel element of the exercise: as Chinese drones launch a counter-attack, an Anduril electronic warfare system breaks the link between the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and their pilots. The special forces team survives and a 'temporary air corridor' is opened.
Whether Beijing's real drones would be so simply overcome is another question.
'There is an assumption that China has been observing [the war in Ukraine, where Chinese drones have been used en masse] and that their ability to ramp up capacity now appears to be better than the US and Nato's ability to produce these systems,' says Colin Smith, a Rand Corp. researcher and Marine veteran.
It can be difficult even to train with the systems on US soil. Electronic warfare systems interfere with nearby residents' garages. On Camp Pendleton, in California, Mr Smith's team was unable to practise with the jammers they used in Afghanistan 'because of the electromagnetic spectrum limitations'.
'Those are things that the Department of Defense is trying to work through on certain bases,' he says.
Homeland defence is the most pressing problem. China's intercontinental ballistic missiles can now strike the US mainland. In May, US Air Force Brig Gen Dough Wickert warned locals around Edwards Air Force Base that a Pearl Harbour-like scenario could hit their Californian homes.
Donald Trump's solution is the Golden Dome, a network of space-based interceptors he claims – unfeasibly – could be finished within three years for a cost of 'just' $175 billion.
In war games on Taiwan, China does often hit the US mainland, says Mr Smith. 'What if they want to hit the west coast and get the American population thinking, 'why are we doing this again'?'
Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel and senior advisor at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), ran a 2023 war game on an amphibious invasion. Over 24 run-throughs, the US managed to prevent China capturing the island most times, but at the cost of dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands of service-members.
The US still needs to decide its position on how and when ground troops will enter the fray, Mr Cancian says. 'When you talk to the services, to the Marine corps, they say 'well of course we're going to be on Taiwan when the war begins'. But the state department says 'there's no f---ing way', as that will precipitate the conflict we're trying to avoid.'
In one round of the war game, a player tried to fly a US brigade into Taiwan. But they turned back after they lost a battalion to air defences. 'After four, five weeks of combat, when the Chinese fleet has been chewed up, [perhaps] then you can start doing things,' he says. Sometimes, nuclear war erupts.
Such hypotheticals are above the pay grade of the soldiers who will be called upon to fight in Taiwan's jungles, cities and beaches should war break out.
On an urban training village in Fort Bragg, two Chinook MH47 helicopters fly a platoon of elite Rangers into battle. The soldiers rappel down ropes onto the roofs, while the helicopters rattle out machine gun rounds.
Doors are stormed through, flash-bang grenades thrown as the unit rapidly clears the buildings.
High above their heads, a single Himars missile streaks through the sky. Here, it will land safely on a patch of Fort Bragg, guided to within 1m of the intended target.
The US hopes it will never come to war with China. Mr Xi may well think twice, wary of a long and costly conflict. If he does gamble, however, the Green Berets will no longer be practising on the fields of North Carolina – and those Himars missiles will be raining down on an army tasting its first real combat.
Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more.
Hashtags

Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles


Bloomberg
30 minutes ago
- Bloomberg
Explainer How Ukraine's Drone Arsenal Shocked Russia and Changed Modern Warfare
Kyiv's flying machines cost as little as $400 and can neutralize sophisticated Russian equipment worth thousands of times more. Outgunned, outmanned and outspent, Ukrainian troops have kept up the fight against invading Russian forces for more than three years. They might easily have been routed were it not for Kyiv's mass deployment of drones. Tens of thousands of the relatively cheap and expendable machines are now buzzing back and forth over the front lines, pinpointing Russian positions, gathering intelligence to anticipate impending assaults, colliding with enemy targets or dropping bombs on them. By early 2025, drones were accounting for 60% to 70% of the damage and destruction caused to Russian equipment in the war, according to UK-based think tank the Royal United Services Institute. Russia's military has developed a rival drone force and drawn upon a traditional strength in electronic warfare to upgrade its anti-drone technology. Yet Ukraine's highly adaptable drones continue to expose gaps and vulnerabilities in Russian defenses. In early June, drones launched from trucks hit airfields as far from the front as Siberia, damaging part of Russia's nuclear-capable long-range bomber fleet, according to Ukrainian officials. Military commanders around the world are taking note. Taiwan is investing in mass-produced drones in anticipation of a possible conflict with China. Israel has recalibrated the Iron Dome air defense system in the war in Gaza to account for maneuverable drones — one of its biggest blind spots. European governments embarking on their largest rearmament since the Cold War have identified drones and counter-drone systems as an investment priority. The US Pentagon, which pioneered sophisticated and expensive drones sourced from big arms contractors, is looking to buy cheaper ones designed by startups and deployed en masse. With President Donald Trump dialing down US military support for Ukraine, convinced that the war is Europe's problem to fix, Russian leader Vladimir Putin seems intent on pushing his advantage. A prevailing assumption among western military officials is that he aims to slowly wear down the Ukrainian army until the country's fighting power and money is eventually depleted. Ukraine's massive drone program may be its best chance to flip the script. Here's a detailed breakdown of the various types of drones used in Ukraine, and how they're changing modern warfare. Close Kill Drones Small, light drones with multiple rotors have become the defining innovation of the war. Known as first-person view drones, they are typically controlled in real time via a video feed by an operator who can 'see' through an onboard camera using electronic goggles so they can fly beyond the line of sight. Social media is full of videos showing the machines closing in on troops, armored personnel carriers, missile batteries and command posts until the moment of impact, when the picture turns to static. Other rotor drones are used to drop grenade-sized explosives on targets and can be reused if they make it back safely. Fixed-wing loitering munitions hover high in the sky until they locate a target, and then dive and blow up on impact. The latest dive-bombers, such as Ukraine's recently unveiled B-1, are designed to stay airborne for several hours and are quieter than earlier models, making them harder to detect. Deep Strike Drones Long-range drones designed as pilotless, fixed-wing airplanes, can fly hundreds of miles to their targets. Ukraine became painfully familiar with them in late 2022, when Russia started sending over swarms of explosive-laden Shahed drones made in Iran, killing civilians and damaging power infrastructure as far as the country's western borders. Moscow's forces have launched more than 20,000 of these UAVs since then. Kyiv has developed its own long-range strike drones and has been responding with attacks on oil refineries and fuel and ammunition depots in Russian regions as far away as Bashkortostan, some 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) from Ukraine. Ukraine has been stepping up its attacks on military and industrial installations deep inside Russia in recent months. Russia said it downed 485 Ukrainian drones during a two-day assault in early May that damaged several arms manufacturing sites and the country's only fiber-optic cable factory. The strikes, which delayed more than 100 flights as airports around Moscow temporarily halted operations, continued through the daytime, whereas previous attacks typically occurred overnight. It demonstrated Ukraine's growing ability to bring the war to residents of the Russian capital who had been largely insulated from it in their daily lives. No injuries were reported. Naval Drones Unmanned speedboats laden with explosives have made it too dangerous for the Russian fleet to come near Ukraine's Black Sea coast, where ships would be able to bombard cities and blockade ports. Recently, Kyiv has started arming them with missiles. In early May, Ukraine's intelligence services said naval drones brought down two enemy fighter jets near the Russian port of Novorossiysk. The drones can be controlled from hundreds of miles away using the US Starlink satellite broadband network. The growing capability of naval drones costing as little as $20,000 challenges the effectiveness of warships that cost hundreds of millions of dollars to build. Reconnaissance Drones Small-rotor aerial surveillance drones help combat units to spy over nearby enemy trenches, while longer-range, fixed-wing drones map the locations of enemy units and equipment, making the staging area behind the front lines more dangerous. Surveillance drones can make aerial attacks more effective by spotting targets and delivering their coordinates for more precise targeting of howitzer artillery and ground- or air-launched missiles. Russia's Forpost spy drone provides laser guidance for glide bombs deployed by manned aircraft flying safely beyond the range of Ukraine's air defenses. For the early part of the war, Ukraine relied on Turkish-made Bayraktar drones to guide artillery firing on Russian armored units. It's now developed its own drones, Leleka and Furia, for the purpose. Russia's Orlan surveillance drones are a regular and menacing presence in the sky over Ukraine as they often foreshadow missile strikes. On the ground, Ukraine has begun deploying remote-controlled robot dogs to locate booby traps and Russian soldiers in places that flying drones can't access — such as inside buildings, along trenches and in dense woodland. Other Uses Rotor-winged drones can be used to haul food, water, medicine and ammunition to troops cut off by the enemy or when it's too dangerous to deliver supplies by road. Drones can be used as flying guides accompanying stranded servicemen out of dangerous territory. They are even used to take prisoners. The buzz of a drone will prompt some soldiers to hide or run. Others may try to shoot it down with a machine gun. Sometimes they signal surrender in the hope that the drone operator notices them and guides them to safety instead of dropping an explosive. How have drones transformed the battlefield? The bulk of FPV drones are easy to assemble in a small workshop from parts bought online. With the cheapest costing about $400, they can immobilize or even destroy a tank or other large piece of machinery worth hundreds of thousands of dollars — sometimes millions. They have allowed Ukraine to achieve some stunning military successes using relatively simple means. This has made Russia's armed forces adjust their tactics. Columns of tanks dispatched toward positions across swathes of open terrain are easy prey for Ukrainian drones. So commanders prioritize speed over armor, sending troops out on motorbikes, electric scooters and golf carts, or sometimes on foot to probe for weak spots in enemy lines. This forces drone operators to confront a multitude of smaller, scattered and fast-moving groups, and preserves the most expensive kit for larger, more coordinated assaults. The downside for Russia is that these mobile teams are more vulnerable when attacked, resulting in heavy casualties. Camouflage has become essential even miles from the front, and armored vehicles now sport jerry-rigged netting to entangle FPV drones that can only carry relatively small explosive charges. With more drones zipping across the landscape, sheltering in trenches has become a preferred option for soldiers when not on the move. The dugouts need to be better camouflaged than those used in earlier wars, and soldiers often forego hot food and avoid gathering in large numbers for fear of being detected by an eye in the sky. This permanent, blanket aerial reconnaissance has made it harder for either side to secure and hold territory, widening the 'gray zone' — the area of battle-scarred no-man's land that snakes for more than 1,000 km across Ukraine's eastern regions — to 25 km from 10 km in 2022. Military experts say it's also a reason why there's been little large-scale movement of the front lines, with Russia making only incremental territorial gains over the past year despite having more troops. Plans for further massive increases in drone deployment make it harder to predict the course of the conflict. Ukraine produced at least 1 million drones last year, and has plans to make 2.5 million in 2025, according to the country's strategic communications center. International sanctions haven't stopped Russia ramping up drone output, with Putin calling for annual production of 1.4 million this year, ten times the number Russia churned out in 2023. Innovations Developments are a constant cat-and-mouse game, with drones evolving on an almost daily basis as the adversaries figure out new ways to deal with each emerging capability. Jamming: It's feasible to knock down large drones such as Shahed using anti-aircraft machine guns, but shooting at tiny, omnipresent FPVs makes little sense. So anti-drone measures on the front line are focused on blocking the radio link between a drone and its operator using devices that emit interference signals. Another tactic is spoofing — using fake GPS signals to trick drones into thinking they're somewhere they're not and steering them off course. To deal with jamming, drone operators have been equipping drones with frequency-hopping chips to ensure connections remains secure. Fiber Optics: Russian forces pioneered the use of fiber-optic connections that can't be jammed. The drone unspools a cable as it flies, staying connected to the pilot. These drones fly closer to the ground than radio-operated UAVs and don't emit any radio waves, ensuring the safety of the drone and its operator. Often they're flown out across the gray zone and brought to land, where they wait until there's an opportunity to ambush enemy troops. One downside of these drones is that they must carry a heavy spooling reel. This makes them slower and less maneuverable, and so more susceptible to being shot down. The spool reduces the weight of explosives the drone can carry, and the cable is fragile. The drone can fly no further than about 10 kilometers, or just half of that when it's windy as the cable can sway and destabilize the drone. One other problem: Many of the cables are abandoned when a drone is incapacitated, leaving the landscape strewn with plastic pollution. More recently, Ukraine has introduced its own fiber-optic drones. Russian forces have responded by creating 'anti-drone corridors' — stretching protective mesh or wiring along roadsides. Artificial Intelligence: The direct link required between a drone and its human operator remains the weapon's main vulnerability. As soon as a connection is jammed or a fiber-optic cable breaks, the drone is lost. Trained drone operators have also become targets themselves. Advances in AI are making more expensive, fixed-wing drones increasingly autonomous. They can use Simultaneous Localization and Mapping — or SLAM — to gather data about their surroundings and then construct a map of their location. That's then compared with a high-resolution image of the territory to help it pinpoint where it is. At the same time, other sensors provide data about acceleration and velocity that can then determine how far it has traveled and estimate its location. These systems often work in conjunction with each other, as well as with satellite positioning, in order to boost accuracy and stop the drone drifting off course. In a world of fully autonomous drones, the machines could travel unguided across the landscape, identify a target and attack it before returning to base. There are no fully-autonomous drones for now, but some carry target-locking technology where AI takes over to guide the drone over the final 100 meters for the kill after its human operator has identified the target. Achieving full drone autonomy would further reshape the battlefield, potentially reducing the need to train thousands of operators. How are they building them? The Kremlin has used its deeper pockets to scale up mass production of a more limited assortment of drone models. The industry is centered on large weapons-making clusters such as Alabuga in Tatarstan, where Shahed replicas are made, and Izhevsk, where it's producing a long-range combat drone called Garpiya. Russia plans to establish 48 research and production facilities across the country by 2030 to boost its drone capabilities. Constrained by more limited resources, Ukraine's defense establishment relies on a patchwork of more than 500 suppliers. Some mass-produce drones in sprawling factories. Others either build them from scratch in small workshops and garages or repurpose drones bought online from Chinese online marketplaces. Chinese Mavic drones have become a familiar sight on the front lines, even though their maker, SZ DJI Technology Co., has denied selling any to Russia or Ukraine and the Beijing government says it's taken steps to prevent their use in the conflict. The variety of companies, funding sources and production techniques has made the industry fiercely competitive and innovative. The government is encouraging this startup culture through drone design competitions open to everyone including high-school students. Ukrainian company Skyfall has grown into one of the country's biggest drone producers. It was founded by three engineers to develop the Vampire heavy-duty, multi-purpose drone able to carry 15- kilogram bombs or to transport ammunition, food, water and medicine. It's nicknamed Baba-Yaga by Russians, after the wicked witch from children's fairytales. Skyfall has delivered thousands of the machines to the front. The company also makes the popular Shrike FPV, runs an academy for training prospective engineers, operates several drone servicing centers in cities closer to the front lines, and runs a 24/7 hotline to help soldiers solve technical problems with their drones, even in the heat of battle. Ukraine has been receiving shipments of drones from foreign partners including the UK and Germany, but its vibrant drone industry means the national military is procuring a growing share of its weaponry from domestic suppliers. Ukraine's Ministry of Defense allocated over $2.5 billion in 2024-2025 for local drone manufacturers, signing contracts with 76 companies. Oleksandr Kubrakov, a former infrastructure minister who now advises Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, said the country's drone industry remains fragile because it relies so heavily on the state. 'There is a way to reduce this dependence, and that's to officially open up Ukraine's military exports so they can sell drones abroad. For now, exports are forbidden,' said Kubrakov.
Yahoo
an hour ago
- Yahoo
Huang Yang Tiantian on the verge of cancellation over earrings issue
3 Jun - Rumours are rife that actress Huang Yang Tiantian is now facing cancellation over the pair of earrings she wore last month. The whole issue sparked after the 17-year-old actress shared a photo of the earrings during her school coming-of-age ceremony, saying that she borrowed them from her mother. As per usual, netizens decided to investigate and found the earrings to be worth RMB 2.3 million. They also went on to uncover images of Huang showing off her lavish lifestyle that they said would be impossible for a teenage actress, or even a former Ya'an government employee like her father. Although Huang's father has released a statement saying that the earrings were not authentic, the issue sparked an investigation by the Ya'an Discipline Inspection Committee against him. It is now reported that Huang is also facing problem in her work, as her newly filmed drama, "Ice Lake Rebirth" is reportedly at risk of being pulled, while the upcoming project "Sparrow Bones" (translated title) allegedly has replaced her with actress Xiang Hanzhi. Although it was reported that Huang herself withdrew from the latter drama, no further details were given. Huang started her career as a child actress, gaining recognition for her portrayal of the younger versions of lead characters in dramas like "Princess Agents" and "Ruyi's Royal Love in the Palace". She is also known for her resemblance to Zanilia Zhao, earning her the nickname "Little Zanilia Zhao". (Photo Source: Huang Yang Tiantian Weibo)
Yahoo
an hour ago
- Yahoo
Top retired Chinese general Xu Qiliang dies of illness: state media
BEIJING (Reuters) -Top Chinese general Xu Qiliang, a close ally of President Xi Jinping who was the former vice chair of the powerful Central Military Commission, died of illness at age 75 on Monday in Beijing, state media reported. Xu served two consecutive terms on the Communist Party's highest military command body between 2012 and 2022, as Xi came to power. Before that, he spent decades in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) air force, rising to Air Force Commander in 2007 after a stint in the PLA General Staff Department. Xu was described as an "outstanding member of the Communist Party" and an "outstanding leader of the People's Liberation Army" in a short obituary published on Monday by state news agency Xinhua. He was the first Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chair not to have been from the land forces, a sign of Beijing's growing emphasis on different branches of the military as the PLA pursues combat integration and modernisation. He emerged seemingly unscathed by the anti-corruption campaign targeting the highest ranks of the PLA soon after Xi came into office, which took down his predecessors Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, both vice-chairs of the CMC. China's military has undergone a renewed anti-corruption purge since last year, with over a dozen PLA generals including two former defence ministers and a serving CMC member, Miao Hua, removed or suspended from their posts. Born into a peasant family in eastern China's Shandong province, Xu joined the PLA in 1966 at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, a decade-long period of turmoil spearheaded by Mao Zedong. He was a strong advocate of military modernisation, helping transform the air force from a reliance on outdated equipment to domestically developed stealth fighters and amphibian assault ships. Xu was commander of an air force unit in Fuzhou, Fujian province, while Xi was the city's Communist Party chief in the early 1990s. It is during this period that the men were reported to have become close.