How the US plans to fight off a Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Yahoo

31-05-2025

A soldier careens into the briefing tent of Cross Functional Team (CFT) Taiwan, barely able to catch his breath.
'Attention on the floor!' he shouts. 'Sorry to barge in, sir, but you'll want to hear this.'
Chinese ships have begun to cross the Taiwan Strait 'with full intention to invade'.
Chaos breaks out in the command centre, where specialists had been outlining recent operations. Sirens blare, soldiers pick up rucksacks, plastic chairs are pushed aside.
Over the tree-line, hostile drones whirr into view. As troops hustle a visiting congressional delegation to an evacuation point, they swoop overhead and drop munitions.
Ear-splitting explosions send plumes of smoke into the air. People fall by the side of the road, screaming.
So begins the long-feared war between the world's two largest militaries – or at least, a drill simulating the event at the 25th capability exercise of the US Special Forces at Fort Bragg army base.
A hint of slapstick lingers in the air. Called upon to help the wounded, visitors fiddle with their lanyards, while fake blood soaks the clothes of gurgling actors.
The scenario, however, is head-poundingly serious.
Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, has ordered his military to be ready to 'reunify' the self-governing island of Taiwan with the mainland by 2027.
An extraordinary build-up is under way. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) now boasts one million troops more than the US, as well as the world's largest navy, vast supplies of ground-based long-range missiles and a galloping nuclear arsenal set to hit 1,000 warheads by 2030.
In satellite imagery, a mock-up of central Taipei including the president's office can be seen near a desert PLA base.
Beijing also has home advantage: its resources are all closer to Taiwan than the US bases in the Philippines, Japan and Guam. Any movement of US forces will be immediately spotted by China's extensive sensor network.
Pete Hegseth, the US defence secretary, warned on Saturday that the threat from China was real and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could be imminent. He added that any attempt by China to conquer Taiwan 'would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world'.
'Beijing is credibly preparing potentially to use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific,' Mr Hegseth said in a speech to the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia's premier defence forum, in Singapore.
In March, Mr Hegseth issued a classified memo that prioritised efforts to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, leaving Europe to 'assume risk' in facing down Russia.
'China is the Department's sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan – while simultaneously defending the US homeland is the Department's sole pacing scenario,' he wrote.
The memo lifted sections almost word-for-word from a report by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington-based think tank.
'If I had to bet they are laying the groundwork now to begin large swings of forces out of lesser-priority theatres to the Indo-Pacific in around six months,' says Rob Peters, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, who co-authored the report.
In Fort Bragg headquarters, a briefing video opens with the sound of a clock ticking ominously. Chinese lettering fills the screen.
Three red stars mark the years 2014 (Russia's seizure of Ukraine), 2022 (the invasion of Ukraine) and 2027 – the year China could strike Taiwan.
The impact of a Chinese invasion on the lives of ordinary people would make that of the Covid pandemic 'pale in comparison', says Lt Gen Jonathan P Braga, the commander of the US Army Special Operations Command.
It would disrupt the supply of the microchips that power crucial technologies, 'from I can't buy a car, a refrigerator, a cell-phone… all that stuff'.
'We need people… to think about this, because it is by exponential means the greatest threat we have,' Lt Gen Braga says.
What role ground troops would play is open to question. Around 500 US military trainers are currently based on Taiwan, teaching the local forces how to operate advanced weaponry. The first test with the long-range Himars was carried out this month.
Special forces would likely enter Taiwan surreptitiously in the weeks before an invasion; army units might join, but public deployments could inflame the situation.
The defenders' goal would be to 'turn the Taiwan beaches into the beaches of Normandy,' says Mr Peters. Failing that: 'box them in like Anzio.'
But the fiercest battles will be fought in the skies and at sea. The US is preparing a 'hellscape' of drones, mines and unmanned ships to slow down China's crossing of the 100-mile Taiwan Strait.
The PLA navy will form a blockade around the eastern flank of the island, preventing the US from reaching or resupplying the Taiwanese.
Spectacular dogfights would erupt: US F-35s, bombers and stealth B-21 raiders attempting to sink the warships, as China's 3,000 aircraft fight back.
To stand a chance, the US will need 'a metric s--- ton' of long-range anti-ship missiles, in particular the new Tomahawk, which has a range of 1,500 miles, says Mr Peters. 'I cannot stress this enough,' he adds, the arsenal is currently 'way, way [too] low.'
One goal of the special forces – however many they number – would be to try and open up air corridors onto the island.
Out on a Fort Bragg training range, a dozen camouflaged soldiers creep through the trees towards a Russian-made Scud missile and nearby command-and-control centre, which form part of China's Integrated Air Defence System (IADS).
To the south of their position, a drone-operator, robot dog and two armoured vehicles mounted with M240b machine guns wait for the signal. Snipers watch behind camouflage.
'Open fire,' the commander orders over the radio. A drone whizzes overhead, dropping a bomb near the Scud. The M240b gunners spray the guards, providing cover for the soldiers to race out of the trees and eliminate those left alive.
The Scud is disabled with a flamethrower (its unique fuel makes explosive detonation tricky).
Then comes the most novel element of the exercise: as Chinese drones launch a counter-attack, an Anduril electronic warfare system breaks the link between the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and their pilots. The special forces team survives and a 'temporary air corridor' is opened.
Whether Beijing's real drones would be so simply overcome is another question.
'There is an assumption that China has been observing [the war in Ukraine, where Chinese drones have been used en masse] and that their ability to ramp up capacity now appears to be better than the US and Nato's ability to produce these systems,' says Colin Smith, a Rand Corp. researcher and Marine veteran.
It can be difficult even to train with the systems on US soil. Electronic warfare systems interfere with nearby residents' garages. On Camp Pendleton, in California, Mr Smith's team was unable to practise with the jammers they used in Afghanistan 'because of the electromagnetic spectrum limitations'.
'Those are things that the Department of Defense is trying to work through on certain bases,' he says.
Homeland defence is the most pressing problem. China's intercontinental ballistic missiles can now strike the US mainland. In May, US Air Force Brig Gen Dough Wickert warned locals around Edwards Air Force Base that a Pearl Harbour-like scenario could hit their Californian homes.
Donald Trump's solution is the Golden Dome, a network of space-based interceptors he claims – unfeasibly – could be finished within three years for a cost of 'just' $175 billion.
In war games on Taiwan, China does often hit the US mainland, says Mr Smith. 'What if they want to hit the west coast and get the American population thinking, 'why are we doing this again'?'
Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel and senior advisor at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), ran a 2023 war game on an amphibious invasion. Over 24 run-throughs, the US managed to prevent China capturing the island most times, but at the cost of dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands of service-members.
The US still needs to decide its position on how and when ground troops will enter the fray, Mr Cancian says. 'When you talk to the services, to the Marine corps, they say 'well of course we're going to be on Taiwan when the war begins'. But the state department says 'there's no f---ing way', as that will precipitate the conflict we're trying to avoid.'
In one round of the war game, a player tried to fly a US brigade into Taiwan. But they turned back after they lost a battalion to air defences. 'After four, five weeks of combat, when the Chinese fleet has been chewed up, [perhaps] then you can start doing things,' he says. Sometimes, nuclear war erupts.
Such hypotheticals are above the pay grade of the soldiers who will be called upon to fight in Taiwan's jungles, cities and beaches should war break out.
On an urban training village in Fort Bragg, two Chinook MH47 helicopters fly a platoon of elite Rangers into battle. The soldiers rappel down ropes onto the roofs, while the helicopters rattle out machine gun rounds.
Doors are stormed through, flash-bang grenades thrown as the unit rapidly clears the buildings.
High above their heads, a single Himars missile streaks through the sky. Here, it will land safely on a patch of Fort Bragg, guided to within 1m of the intended target.
The US hopes it will never come to war with China. Mr Xi may well think twice, wary of a long and costly conflict. If he does gamble, however, the Green Berets will no longer be practising on the fields of North Carolina – and those Himars missiles will be raining down on an army tasting its first real combat.
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