Unseen Notes of India's 2nd Army Chief, And The 1948 Kashmir Crisis

NDTV

2 days ago

(The following is an excerpt from 'Commanded by Destiny', by India's former Chief of Army Staff General SM Srinagesh. Published by Penguin Random House India, it recounts his story through the notes he left behind.)
The military situation in Jammu and Kashmir early in September 1948, when the command was unified, was far from satisfactory. Our garrisons at Leh and Poonch were isolated, and Pakistan was increasing her pressure.
Our L of C [line of communications] Jammu-Srinagar was threatened by infiltrations both from the east and from the west. Although Pakistan had launched no major attacks, our L of C Jammu-Naushehra was also very vulnerable. The threat to Jammu lay in its proximity to the Pakistan border, and to Naushera in the strong Pakistan build-up in the area of Bhimber-Sadabad. Fighting around Jhangar, Uri and Tithwal had been stabilized, and Pakistan had committed her regular troops in these areas supported by mountain and field guns. In the case of Uri, they had also brought up medium guns.
For India, the military situation in Kashmir had been adversely influenced by political considerations. Pakistan had no legal or moral right, in view of the expressed wishes of the people and its ruler, to operate with its army in Kashmir, whereas India did. India referred the matter to the UN, which set up the UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP), before which both parties came to an agreement to refrain from offensive action which was likely to aggravate the situation.
Because of its strict adherence to this agreement, India was unable to use her air force in its primary role of isolating the battlefield by attacking Pakistan's supply and communications bases, or to attack Pakistan's installations on the Indian side of the border, inside Kashmir, such as Muzaffarabad and Mirpur, because of possible escalation.
On the other hand, Pakistan made full use of the lull caused by the agreement to build its strength and supplement its forces in J&K territory, in such a manner that Poonch and Leh were systematically encircled. For Leh, we had an alternative means of communication via Manali; but the route was long and costly and only usable between June and October. Poonch, however, was so closely invested that our supply planes could not land there, while Pakistan constantly used her artillery, shells often falling amongst the refugees whom we had been giving shelter.
The general situation in September 1948, with Leh and Poonch in danger, was, therefore, militarily unsound; but was forced upon us-an example that arms are the servants of political policy. Pakistan continued to aggravate the situation, mustering greater and greater strength against the two isolated garrisons, preparing to defeat them in detail, failing which, starving them and the refugees into submission. The problem was whether we should evacuate these two garrisons or force a link-up.
The gaps in our line were from Baltal via Kargil to Leh and from Rajori to Poonch. Pram Baltal to Kargil (fifty miles), the track was snowbound throughout the winter, whereas from Kargil to Leh (150 miles), it was open throughout the year. Rajori to Poonch was only a distance of fifty miles, but this route ran over a series of high ranges and deep valleys with no tracks across them.
If Kashmir was not allowed to be captured by Pakistan, we had to close these two gaps and link-up these garrisons. To achieve this end, we carried out two relief operations. I shall later describe those two operations: 'OP DUCK' (the name of which was afterwards changed to 'OP BISON', and 'OP EASY'), which led to the ceasefire.
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