Latest news with #CommandedbyDestiny
NDTV
5 days ago
- Politics
- NDTV
Unseen Notes of India's 2nd Army Chief, And The 1948 Kashmir Crisis
(The following is an excerpt from 'Commanded by Destiny', by India's former Chief of Army Staff General SM Srinagesh. Published by Penguin Random House India, it recounts his story through the notes he left behind.) The military situation in Jammu and Kashmir early in September 1948, when the command was unified, was far from satisfactory. Our garrisons at Leh and Poonch were isolated, and Pakistan was increasing her pressure. Our L of C [line of communications] Jammu-Srinagar was threatened by infiltrations both from the east and from the west. Although Pakistan had launched no major attacks, our L of C Jammu-Naushehra was also very vulnerable. The threat to Jammu lay in its proximity to the Pakistan border, and to Naushera in the strong Pakistan build-up in the area of Bhimber-Sadabad. Fighting around Jhangar, Uri and Tithwal had been stabilized, and Pakistan had committed her regular troops in these areas supported by mountain and field guns. In the case of Uri, they had also brought up medium guns. For India, the military situation in Kashmir had been adversely influenced by political considerations. Pakistan had no legal or moral right, in view of the expressed wishes of the people and its ruler, to operate with its army in Kashmir, whereas India did. India referred the matter to the UN, which set up the UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP), before which both parties came to an agreement to refrain from offensive action which was likely to aggravate the situation. Because of its strict adherence to this agreement, India was unable to use her air force in its primary role of isolating the battlefield by attacking Pakistan's supply and communications bases, or to attack Pakistan's installations on the Indian side of the border, inside Kashmir, such as Muzaffarabad and Mirpur, because of possible escalation. On the other hand, Pakistan made full use of the lull caused by the agreement to build its strength and supplement its forces in J&K territory, in such a manner that Poonch and Leh were systematically encircled. For Leh, we had an alternative means of communication via Manali; but the route was long and costly and only usable between June and October. Poonch, however, was so closely invested that our supply planes could not land there, while Pakistan constantly used her artillery, shells often falling amongst the refugees whom we had been giving shelter. The general situation in September 1948, with Leh and Poonch in danger, was, therefore, militarily unsound; but was forced upon us-an example that arms are the servants of political policy. Pakistan continued to aggravate the situation, mustering greater and greater strength against the two isolated garrisons, preparing to defeat them in detail, failing which, starving them and the refugees into submission. The problem was whether we should evacuate these two garrisons or force a link-up. The gaps in our line were from Baltal via Kargil to Leh and from Rajori to Poonch. Pram Baltal to Kargil (fifty miles), the track was snowbound throughout the winter, whereas from Kargil to Leh (150 miles), it was open throughout the year. Rajori to Poonch was only a distance of fifty miles, but this route ran over a series of high ranges and deep valleys with no tracks across them. If Kashmir was not allowed to be captured by Pakistan, we had to close these two gaps and link-up these garrisons. To achieve this end, we carried out two relief operations. I shall later describe those two operations: 'OP DUCK' (the name of which was afterwards changed to 'OP BISON', and 'OP EASY'), which led to the ceasefire. (Disclaimer: The author and publisher of the book are solely responsible for the contents of the book or any excerpt derived therefrom. NDTV shall not be responsible or liable for any claims arising from the contents of the book including any claims of defamation, infringement of intellectual property rights or any other right of any third party or of law.)
The Hindu
29-05-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
Review of Commanded by Destiny by S.M. Shrinagesh
Commanded by Destiny is a breezy anecdotal memoir of the Indian Army's fourth Indian chief between 1955 and 1957. The USP of the narrative lies in its sweeping landscape and accurate recollection of military and political events during the fledgling years of India's evolution as a nation-state. Adding value is General Shrinagesh's prescient views on several important issues such as civil-military relations, the necessity for an integrated national security architecture and federalism. The book begins with an interesting peek into General Shrinagesh's privileged childhood and education followed by his entry into the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. Navigating the public school environment in England with ease and choosing a military career over a confirmed entry into Cambridge, Shrinagesh's early military career commenced in the mid-1920s as one of the early Kings Commissioned Officers (KCIOs). After a relatively peaceful but interesting five years in Upper Burma with a Pioneer Regiment (the precursor to engineer regiments), he transferred to the Infantry and moved to the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) where his operational baptism took place in fighting and maintaining the peace in the restive tribal areas of what is now called the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Facing a dilemma Missing out on most of the action during the Burma Campaign in World War II, Shrinagesh does not hesitate to offer his views on the dilemma that faced the Indian Army on the status of the Subhas Chandra Bose-led Indian National Army and how mutiny was unacceptable in a military. One of the most detailed parts of the book is reserved for his role as the Corps Commander in charge of the two divisions that saw all the action in the first India-Pakistan War of 1947-48. The narrative around the sieges of Leh and Poonch is riveting and his recollections of specific actions and operational plans are excellent. An unabashed admirer of Jawaharlal Nehru, there is little mention in the book of Nehru when the author discusses some of the post-Independence instances of politico-military dissonance such as the creation of a 'citizen army' rather than a professional army, or the downsizing of the Indian Army in the face of a growing Chinese threat. General Shrinagesh took over the Indian Army in 1955 at a time when peace-time hubris had set in into India's armed forces. Though he spent much time in ensuring that organisational restructuring and training was not neglected, there is little to suggest that there was any serious evaluation of national security threats in the face of a government that was unwilling to be realistic in its approach to regional geopolitics. The China angle With respect to the China debacle too, Shrinagesh is cagey in his memoir to assign accountability to both the political and military leaderships, possibly because of his deep respect for Nehru and not wanting to criticise his peers with whom he had shaped the trajectory of the post-independence army. Transiting with ease and finesse to post-retirement assignments in the academic and gubernatorial domains, his understanding of what it would take to train good administrators at the Administrative Staff College and the responsibilities of a governor in a federal structure and troubled regions such as Nagaland is striking. A slightly jarring aspect of the book for discerning readers emerges in the editorial segment. There is no indication of sources and references or when and how the memoir was written, or why it has emerged only now, nearly five decades after the general's demise. Some appendices comprising the notes left behind by the general would have added value and authenticity. However, in the final analysis, this is an eminently readable book. The reviewer is a retired Air Vice Marshal from the IAF and a military historian Commanded by Destiny: A General's Rise from Soldier to Statesman S.M. Shrinagesh Penguin Veer ₹699
