Morocco : Jabaroot DZ leak was a hit on notaries, not the land registry
Initially reported as a hack of the National Agency for Land Conservation, Cadastre, and Cartography (ANCFCC) by Jabaroot DZ, the data leak appears to have actually originated from the notaries' platform, as revealed by our colleagues at Le Desk. When contacted by Yabiladi, a cybersecurity expert explained that the breach came from the Tawtik information system, managed by the National Council of the Order of Notaries.
In fact, the leaked documents relate to transactions processed through notaries, and no land titles are included. These are not just property deeds but also powers of attorney and company formation records, which fall outside the scope of the ANCFCC's responsibilities.
«It's also worth noting that the leak concerns only the documents available on Tawtik at a specific point in time, not all notarial acts», the expert added. It is therefore unlikely that the volume of pirated data amounts to 4 terabytes, as claimed by Jabaroot DZ.
As mentioned earlier, the leak of personal data—targeting figures such as Nasser Bourita, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Yassine Mansouri, the head of Morocco's external intelligence agency (DGED)—coincides with the UK's formal support for Morocco's autonomy plan for the Sahara.
This appears to be a diversion orchestrated by Algiers. The diplomatic shake-up in London likely explains the confused statement issued last night by Ahmed Attaf, Algeria's Foreign Minister, as well as the convoluted justifications from Jabaroot DZ about the freezing of Algerian dignitaries' assets by French authorities.
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