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Indonesia expects to sign free trade deal with Russia-led union this year, minister says

Indonesia expects to sign free trade deal with Russia-led union this year, minister says

Reuters7 hours ago

JAKARTA, June 20 (Reuters) - Indonesia expects to sign a free trade agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) this year in a move likely to boost demand for its commodity exports, its senior economic minister said in a statement released on Friday.
Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto said the agreement would open up new opportunities for commodities including crude palm oil, coffee and natural rubber.
Both parties announced on Thursday they had completed substantive talks for the agreement.
"I hope both parties can immediately follow this up by completing all the necessary stages of the process so that this agreement can be signed this year," Airlangga said.
As of March, the value of trade between Indonesia and the EAEU stood at $1.6 billion, 85% more than the same period last year, Indonesia's coordinating ministry for economic affairs said.
The EAEU is already one of Indonesia's biggest palm oil buyers, with imports valued at $544.64 million in 2023. The EAEU's main exports to the Southeast Asian nation include fertilisers and ferro-alloys.
The completion of Indonesia-EAEU FTA talks was announced on Thursday during President Prabowo Subianto's visit to Russia this week for a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The EAEU has five members: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia.

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