ROBERT HARDMAN: Gleaming George is back in Trafalgar Square... and still standing on U.S. soil
Standing alongside the British and American flags, as the Band of the Grenadier Guards played a faultless Star-Spangled Banner, a US President received the warmest of welcomes back to a sweltering London yesterday afternoon – with not a single protester to be seen or heard.
A few months short of the expected state visit of President Donald Trump, VIPs from both sides of the Atlantic had assembled in Trafalgar Square for the first warm-up event – the return of President George Washington to the plinth where he was originally erected in 1921.
He is now back again, opposite Lord Nelson's column and looking spotless, too, after extensive restoration work.
Unchanged, however, are the foundations beneath the statue.
Since Washington had allegedly vowed never to set foot on British soil (and never did), his plinth was originally planted on a bed of imported soil from his native Virginia – and that is how he remains.
Even during recent repair work, he rested on a pallet to keep him off British ground.
While the rededication of the statue was certainly timely, given Mr Trump's impending arrival, the catalyst for the restoration had actually been next year's 250th anniversary of American independence.
As Governor of Virginia Glenn Youngkin reflected at a National Gallery ceremony ahead of yesterday's unveiling, this moment was a tribute to 'the birth of our nation and the foundation of our friendship'.
The phrase 'special relationship' was liberally peppered across speeches from speakers including former prime minister Baroness May and Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy.
The new US ambassador to Britain, Warren Stephens, explained: 'As George Washington reminds us, the special relationship was birthed in conflict but quickly became a beacon of light and peace.'
His counterpart, Lord Mandelson, warned American visitors not to be offended if they find that their national hero does not stay looking spotless for long: 'Just remember, the pigeons only drop on the very best.'
George Washington has now stood in Trafalgar Square for more than a century following the gift of the statue in 1914 – though it could not be properly erected until after the First World War. George V decided on a prime spot in Trafalgar Square, in front of the National Gallery.
Back then, a huge crowd heard the welcome speech by the foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, who embraced Washington as an ancestral Brit – 'one of the greatest Englishmen who ever lived because though he fought us and vanquished us, he was fighting for ideals and principles which were as sacred to us as they were to the American people.'
A century on, a number of concerned Americans, led by Virginian businessman John Gerber, had noticed that Washington was looking rather forlorn.
The mundane words on his Portland Stone plinth – 'Presented To The People Of Great Britain And Ireland By The Commonwealth Of Virginia 1921' – were barely legible. Passers-by had no idea who he was.
Moved by Curzon's words, the Friends of the Washington Statue set to work and, yesterday, the great man reappeared from beneath a huge velvet drape, complete with new inscriptions around the base: 'Rededicated In Honour Of Enduring Friendship 2025'; 'To Our Common Ideals And Principles'; and 'To Our Common Sacrifices'.
As for Washington's alleged allergy to British soil, Mr Gerber acknowledged that 'it was probably never said, but it's a good story'.
Nonetheless, Governor Youngkin and his wife, Suzanne, had flown in with some unusual luggage – a cannister of fresh Virginian soil to sprinkle around the base.
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