Pyongyang-Beijing rail services to resume after 5-year hiatus, sources say
Operations were suspended in January 2020 due to the spread of the coronavirus.
Multiple sources familiar with China-North Korea relations told NHK that the railway authorities of the two countries have agreed to restart the service between Pyongyang and Beijing shortly.
The sources say final arrangements are underway and operations are expected to resume as early as August.
North Korea has been rapidly deepening ties with Russia, including military cooperation.
But some observers say the North is keeping its distance from China, as Beijing's stance is to implement UN Security Council sanctions over Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs.
Meanwhile, visits from North Korea to China for inspection and training purposes have increased since May.
One expert says bilateral relations have shown signs of improvement, but caution is required to determine whether the restart indicates a full-fledged change in their relationship.
China's Foreign Ministry told NHK that it is unaware of any move in relation to the rail service, and the matter should be directed to the relevant department.
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