AB Dynamics (LON:ABDP) shareholders have earned a 19% CAGR over the last three years
AB Dynamics plc (LON:ABDP) shareholders might be concerned after seeing the share price drop 12% in the last quarter. But don't let that distract from the very nice return generated over three years. In the last three years the share price is up, 69%: better than the market.
So let's assess the underlying fundamentals over the last 3 years and see if they've moved in lock-step with shareholder returns.
Check out our latest analysis for AB Dynamics
To paraphrase Benjamin Graham: Over the short term the market is a voting machine, but over the long term it's a weighing machine. One imperfect but simple way to consider how the market perception of a company has shifted is to compare the change in the earnings per share (EPS) with the share price movement.
AB Dynamics was able to grow its EPS at 47% per year over three years, sending the share price higher. This EPS growth is higher than the 19% average annual increase in the share price. So one could reasonably conclude that the market has cooled on the stock.
The company's earnings per share (over time) is depicted in the image below (click to see the exact numbers).
It is of course excellent to see how AB Dynamics has grown profits over the years, but the future is more important for shareholders. You can see how its balance sheet has strengthened (or weakened) over time in this free interactive graphic.
Investors in AB Dynamics had a tough year, with a total loss of 2.3% (including dividends), against a market gain of about 15%. Even the share prices of good stocks drop sometimes, but we want to see improvements in the fundamental metrics of a business, before getting too interested. Longer term investors wouldn't be so upset, since they would have made 1.6%, each year, over five years. If the fundamental data continues to indicate long term sustainable growth, the current sell-off could be an opportunity worth considering. Most investors take the time to check the data on insider transactions. You can click here to see if insiders have been buying or selling.
If you are like me, then you will not want to miss this free list of undervalued small caps that insiders are buying.
Please note, the market returns quoted in this article reflect the market weighted average returns of stocks that currently trade on British exchanges.
Have feedback on this article? Concerned about the content? Get in touch with us directly. Alternatively, email editorial-team (at) simplywallst.com.This article by Simply Wall St is general in nature. We provide commentary based on historical data and analyst forecasts only using an unbiased methodology and our articles are not intended to be financial advice. It does not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any stock, and does not take account of your objectives, or your financial situation. We aim to bring you long-term focused analysis driven by fundamental data. Note that our analysis may not factor in the latest price-sensitive company announcements or qualitative material. Simply Wall St has no position in any stocks mentioned.
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