Turkey's weaponisation of water: A geopolitical tool in the Tigris-Euphrates basin

Time of India

15-05-2025

Capt. Amit Singh is an aviation professional with over 35 years of experience in commercial airlines, including pivotal roles in three startup airlines, where he developed systems for efficient, low-cost, and profitable operations. A leader in flight operations, safety, and pilot training, he channels his expertise into writing insightful articles on aviation, history, and strategic thinking. Capt. Singh is a sought-after speaker at international safety and training conferences, blending technical knowledge with a passion for storytelling and analysis. Additionally, he explores his creative side through painting, reflecting a well-rounded personality committed to growth and innovation. LESS ... MORE
Water has emerged as a new front for power and leverage in a region already burdened by war, political instability, and climate extremes. This is more evident than in the Tigris-Euphrates river system, where Turkey's control over the headwaters has granted it unprecedented geopolitical influence over downstream nations, primarily Iraq and Syria.
Through extensive dam projects, Turkey has effectively turned rivers into foreign policy instruments, with devastating consequences for regional water security, agriculture, and communities' survival.
The power of geography
The Tigris and Euphrates rivers originate in the mountains of eastern Turkey. Together, they account for over 90% of Iraq's freshwater and around 88% of Syria's. Yet Turkey, sitting upstream, now controls the tap.
At the core of this strategic control is the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) — one of the world's most ambitious hydropower and irrigation projects. Launched in the 1970s, GAP includes 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric plants, most notably the Atatürk Dam on the Euphrates and the Ilısu Dam on the Tigris.
While Turkey touts the project as essential for development in its southeastern provinces, the implications for its neighbours have been dire.
Iraq: From cradle of civilisation to cradle of crisis
Iraq, once known as Mesopotamia—the 'land between rivers'—is now facing an existential water crisis. According to Iraq's Ministry of Water Resources, water flow from Turkey has declined by more than 50% over the last four decades. With the Ilısu Dam operational since 2020, the Tigris's flow into Iraq is expected to reduce by up to 56% (Al Jazeera, 2021).
The consequences are widespread:
Agricultural collapse : With 70% of Iraq's water used for irrigation, the agricultural sector has suffered greatly. Entire rural communities have been forced to migrate due to a lack of water and crop failures.
: With 70% of Iraq's water used for irrigation, the agricultural sector has suffered greatly. Entire rural communities have been forced to migrate due to a lack of water and crop failures. Environmental degradation : The Mesopotamian Marshes, once one of the world's largest wetland ecosystems, are drying up. This has caused displacement of the Ma'dan (Marsh Arabs) and loss of biodiversity.
: The Mesopotamian Marshes, once one of the world's largest wetland ecosystems, are drying up. This has caused displacement of the Ma'dan (Marsh Arabs) and loss of biodiversity. Urban water shortages: Cities like Basra face salinity intrusion from the sea due to low freshwater flow — a toxic mix that caused mass illnesses and public protests in 2018 and 2022.
Syria's silent struggle
Syria, caught in a prolonged civil war, has had limited diplomatic leverage to counter Turkey's damming policies. Despite a 1987 agreement obligating Turkey to release 500 cubic meters/second to Syria, actual flows have often fallen short, especially during summer months.
In the Kurdish-controlled northeast, Syria has accused Turkey of deliberately reducing water flows to weaken local governance and exert military pressure. The Tabqa and Tishreen dams, which rely on Euphrates inflow, have operated below capacity, leading to power outages and reduced irrigation across eastern Syria (Human Rights Watch, 2022).
Turkey's strategic use of water
While Turkey denies using water as a weapon, its pattern of behaviour suggests otherwise. Ankara's refusal to enter a legally binding multilateral agreement with Iraq and Syria allows it to manipulate water flow unilaterally, releasing water during negotiations or restricting it during political tension.
For instance, in 2021, amid disputes over Kurdish militants, Iraq claimed that Turkey withheld Euphrates water to pressure Baghdad into expanding security cooperation. The timing of such cuts has raised questions about whether Turkey uses water as soft coercion.
Turkey views the rivers not as 'international,' but as 'transboundary', — giving it full rights to develop and regulate them under its domestic policy. This contrasts sharply with Iraq's and Syria's calls for equitable and reasonable use under international water law.
Climate change and compounding pressures
Turkey's water policy would be alarming in any context, but it's hazardous in a warming world.
Climate change is already making the region hotter and drier. Iraq is experiencing more than 300 days of sunshine a year, and the UN Environment Programme ranks it as one of the five countries most vulnerable to climate breakdown.
Meanwhile, Turkey has invested in hydropower for domestic energy needs and as an export asset to Europe. This dual use — economic and strategic — turns water into both a commodity and a political tool.
Attempts at resolution: Too little, too late?
In March 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and agreed to temporarily increase the flow of water. While this gesture was welcomed, it was neither binding nor monitored, and downstream communities report no measurable improvements (AP News, 2025).
Iraq has called for international mediation, possibly under the auspices of the UN or Arab League, to establish a trilateral water-sharing agreement. Yet Turkey remains firm in rejecting third-party arbitration.
Toward a sustainable framework
Without cooperative management, water scarcity in the Tigris-Euphrates basin could become a catalyst for broader conflict. The stakes are high — not just for ecology and economy, but for regional peace.
Key steps must include:
Binding legal frameworks based on international river basin principles.
Joint river commissions involving Iraq, Syria, and Turkey for real-time monitoring.
Investment in water infrastructure downstream to reduce waste.
Third-party mediation, particularly from neutral parties like the UN or EU.
Recognition of water as a shared right, not a weapon of leverage.
Conclusion
Turkey's control of the Tigris and Euphrates has transformed it into a hydrological superpower. But with great control comes greater responsibility. The region cannot afford to let its most vital resource become its next flashpoint.
Water can either be a tool of cooperation or the source of future wars. The choice lies not just with Turkey, but with the willingness of the international community to act before the rivers run dry — and with them, the hope of peace.
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Views expressed above are the author's own.