Man sentenced to 10-year RI for smuggling 124 kg of ganja
The Special Court for Essential Commodities and Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act Cases in Madurai has sentenced D. Raju alias Mahendra Banoth to 10-year rigorous imprisonment for smuggling 124 kg ganja in Madurai in 2018.
According to a press release, the Special Court also imposed a fine of ₹3 lakh on Raju who is from Warangal district in Telangana.
In 2018, the Madurai Narcotics Intelligence Bureau CID Unit officers and the police conducted a vehicle check on Madurai - Theni road. They intercepted a car bearing Andhra Pradesh registration number and conducted a search. The officers seized 124 kg of ganja from the car.
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