Japan approves first restart of a nuclear reactor in four years
The Nuclear Regulation Authority on Wednesday approved a preliminary report saying Hokkaido Electric Power's Tomari No. 3 reactor meets post-Fukushima safety rules, according to a live stream of the hearing. Hokkaido Electric's president said in March that he expected the unit to restart in 2027.
Although the government recently approved a new energy strategy to maximize the use of nuclear power, restarts of units shuttered following the 2011 Fukushima disaster have been slow. Fewer than half of Japan's 33 operable reactors have resumed due to lengthy regulatory checks and upgrades, as well as local opposition.
After a public comment period, the regulator's report will be subject to formal approval. The Tomari reactor has been shut since 2012.
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Asahi Shimbun
2 hours ago
- Asahi Shimbun
Assembly faces flak over move against member who backs Kurds
The city assembly of Tsurugashima, Saitama Prefecture, adopts a resolution regarding assembly member Megumi Fukushima on Aug. 4. (Jin Naganuma) TSURUGASHIMA, Saitama Prefecture—After being pushed into a corner by online critics and her colleagues, an assembly member here who seeks to end discrimination against foreigners is gradually gaining support. Earlier this month, the city assembly of Tsurugashima in Saitama Prefecture adopted a resolution calling on member Megumi Fukushima to refrain from using her official title in posts on social media. The problem was that her posts, such as 'Oppose discrimination against foreigners,' were angering certain elements, leading to bomb and death threats. The 18-seat assembly's unusual resolution was approved in the name of ensuring safety. But reports of the resolution have now raised criticism against the assembly. Yoko Shida, a professor of constitutional law at Musashino Art University, said that for assembly members, public expression via social media and street activities 'is a crucial form of communication, and the right to explicitly state their official title falls under freedom of expression.' Shida said the Tsurugashima city assembly's request to Fukushima to refrain from using her title 'constitutes a restriction on her freedom of speech.' Whatever the case, Fukushima said she has no intention to comply with the resolution, which is not legally binding. BATTLING 'HATE SPEECH' Tsurugashima is a bedroom community of around 70,000 people located near the center of the prefecture. Fukushima, 44, who was born and raised in the city, was first elected to the assembly in 2023, running as an independent. She gained 827 votes. She is one of three female assembly members and is its second-youngest member. Fukushima has been active on social media platforms, such as X and YouTube, and identifies herself as a member of the Tsurugashima city assembly. Her posts oppose discrimination against foreigners, including the Kurdish community in the prefecture. Her content also shows herself protesting 'hate speech' sites. According to Fukushima, the backlash against her surged immediately after she posted in March about her attendance at a Kurdish festival. In mid-June, one of her critics uploaded a post on X that included the city government's phone number and urged people to 'make protest calls' against Fukushima. Over two months to late July, the city government and the city assembly secretariat received about 150 opinions regarding Fukushima's words and actions through emails and telephone calls. The majority of messages demanded her resignation or stated she 'lacks the dignity of an assembly member.' In response, Yoshihiro Uchino, 60, chairman of the city assembly, asked Fukushima on three separate occasions to refrain from posting on her social media accounts. Fukushima refused, saying, 'Local assembly members who fight against discrimination are needed.' The situation took a dark turn on the evening of July 22, when a message was delivered through the city's online contact form. It stated: 'During July, I will kidnap and stab to death Tsurugashima city assembly member Megumi Fukushima with a knife. I will bomb Tsurugashima city hall at 1 p.m. on July 25.' City officials immediately consulted with Saitama prefectural police. According to the city assembly secretariat, the assembly held an all-member meeting the following day, July 23, to discuss how to respond to the threat. But Fukushima did not attend. Citing disruptions to city hall operations and identifying Fukushima's public statements as a contributing factor, the assembly decided to issue a resolution. 'I thought the city assembly needed to take some kind of action to quell the turmoil,' said Motomitsu Yamanaka, 62, a member of the assembly's Komeito faction who proposed the resolution. Due to the threatening message, the assembly canceled an Aug. 3 event planned for elementary school students to experience and learn about the city assembly system. Tadayoshi Ota, 76, an assembly member of the Japanese Communist Party faction, said, 'I supported the submission of the resolution out of a desire to resolve (the situation).' On Aug. 4, the city assembly adopted the resolution concerning Fukushima by a vote of 14 to 1. The two-member JCP faction—consisting of Ota and Yukihiro Kojima, 73—initially supported the resolution. However, they reversed their stance before the final vote after concerns were raised from within the JCP that the resolution 'could restrict Fukushima's activities.' Ota abstained from voting while Kojima cast the only dissenting vote. 'The resolution amounts to censorship and ultimately plays into the hands of the perpetrator (who made the threat),' Kojima said. Chairman Uchino on Aug. 5 defended the assembly's move. 'There is absolutely no intention to restrict (her) political speech,' he told reporters. 'It is simply a request for a little consideration.' One assembly member who voted in favor said, 'It was a difficult decision made with the city residents in mind.' WE'RE NOT KAWASAKI The Kawasaki city assembly in Kanagawa Prefecture chose a different approach when a death threat was made against a female assembly member who had advocated the eradication of hate speech. In late July, under the chairperson's name, the Kawasaki city assembly issued a statement, stating, 'Physical or psychological attacks against freedom of speech, even if merely implied, risk creating a chilling effect and, as an act that undermines the very foundation of parliamentary democracy, are absolutely unacceptable.' Fukushima apparently brought up Kawasaki's strong stance against threats to her assembly's leaders. She held a news conference in Tokyo on Aug. 5 and said she was told by the chair and vice chair of the Tsurugashima city assembly, 'Kawasaki is Kawasaki, and we are us.' Fukushima said, 'I am disappointed with the Tsurugashima city assembly's response.' Since the resolution was reported by news media, the city government and assembly secretariat said they have received more than 140 comments. While negative views of Fukushima continue, there has also been an increase in criticism directed at the resolution itself, with some people questioning whether it impedes freedom of speech, they said. THREAT TO DEMOCRACY Professor Shida repeated the concern raised by Kojima. 'By imposing restrictions on the assembly member's speech in this instance, the city assembly has inadvertently empowered the perpetrators and caused a serious distortion in freedom of expression, a cornerstone of democracy,' Shida said. 'While the reality may be that the city assembly aimed to peacefully resolve the situation marked by an onslaught of protests and even bomb threats, by passing a resolution that catered to the intentions of a few individuals who voiced extreme opinions, it has effectively validated their views. 'It is desirable for the city assembly to voluntarily withdraw the resolution, arguing that it is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution."
The Diplomat
a day ago
- The Diplomat
America's New South Caucasus Corridor: Stakes for China, Russia, and Beyond
U.S. President Donald Trump (center) signs a trilateral joint declaration with President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan (left) and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia (right), in the State Dining Room of the White House, Aug. 8, 2025, On August 8, the White House became the unlikely stage for one of the most consequential diplomatic events in the post-Soviet space. U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for a peace agreement that could mark the beginning of a structural peace between two states locked in decades of hostility. The proposed framework goes beyond ending a long-running territorial dispute: it envisions a U.S.-managed transport corridor running through Armenia's Syunik province, linking Azerbaijan's mainland to its Nakhichevan exclave. While hailed as a peace initiative, this move represents far more than conflict resolution — it is a calculated U.S. push into the South Caucasus, a region traditionally dominated by Russia and increasingly courted by China, Iran, and Turkiye. The Armenia-U.S. Strategic Partnership Charter signed on January 15, 2025 laid the groundwork. This agreement pledged U.S. support for Armenia's sovereignty, border integrity, and democratic reforms, while opening avenues for cooperation in defense, economic development, energy, and technology. For Yerevan, disillusioned with Moscow's failure to protect Armenian interests in the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh crises, it was a pivot westward. For Washington, it was a foothold at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East – a location ripe for reshaping regional connectivity in ways that sideline its strategic rivals. Central to this agenda is Armenia's 'Crossroads of Peace' initiative, a plan to reopen Soviet-era transport links and turn the country into a transit hub between the Black Sea, Mediterranean, Caspian, and Persian Gulf. It is positioned as complementary to the International North–South Transport Corridor, a multimodal network of ship, rail, and road routes for moving freight between Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Europe, India, Iran, and Russia. The principles of Armenia's initiative – full respect for sovereignty, reciprocal access, and equal treatment – are designed to avoid the extraterritorial control arrangements favored by Baku's 'Zangezur Corridor' concept, which gives Azerbaijan unimpeded access to Nakhchivan region without Armenian checkpoints. By backing the Armenian vision, the United States signaled support for infrastructure free from Russian or Chinese influences, and for a regional order in which Western commercial and political standards prevail. The breakthrough came with the proposal for the 'Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity' (TRIPP). This corridor would remain under Armenian legal jurisdiction but be developed and operated by a U.S.-led consortium. Azerbaijan would gain its land link to Nakhichevan and, through Turkiye, to broader markets – a long-standing strategic objective – while Armenia would secure both sovereignty guarantees and new transit revenues. U.S. oversight for up to 99 years, in theory, would ensure the route's neutrality and continuity even in times of tension. Yet the strategic implications extend far beyond logistics. For China, the U.S. plan is a mixed blessing. Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative already threads through the South Caucasus via the 'Middle Corridor' that links China to Europe through Central Asia, the Caspian, and the South Caucasus, especially with the groundbreaking of the long-planned China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway last December. Any new east-west route could, in principle, complement these ambitions. But a U.S.-controlled corridor threatens to dilute China's influence, impose foreign regulatory oversight, and potentially serve as a chokepoint in a crisis. While Beijing has reacted cautiously in public – endorsing peace and territorial integrity – the likely response will be to double down on relationships with Azerbaijan and Turkiye, invest in alternative transit infrastructure, and ensure Chinese cargo is not hostage to U.S. strategic calculations. During Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's April visit to Beijing, China upgraded the bilateral relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Meanwhile, despite the Uyghur issue, trade imbalance, and strategic competition for influence in the region, China and Turkiye have maintained a Strategic Cooperation Relationship and bilateral intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms since 2010. Russia's reaction to TRIPP is more publicly defensive. The South Caucasus has been an important component of Moscow's near-abroad strategy since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with Russian troops and peacekeepers long serving as guarantors – and gatekeepers – in the region. The sight of Washington brokering a peace accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and assuming operational development rights over the strategic corridor, is a direct affront to that legacy and marks a palpable erosion of Russian influence in the region. Publicly, Russia has refrained from obstructing the accord, cognizant that overt opposition could alienate both Baku and Yerevan. Russian officials have largely stayed muted while the United States claims exclusive development rights to the corridor, an arrangement that significantly sidesteps Moscow's traditional mediation role. Privately, however, Moscow is unlikely to concede its influence willingly. Expect Russia to push for joint administration of the corridor – seeking a say in its governance to safeguard its strategic stakes – or to deepen Armenia's economic and security integration within Russia-led institutions such as the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia remains the principal arms supplier to Yerevan and maintains a substantial military base in Gyumri, though Armenian relations have notably cooled, given Moscow's tepid support during the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh offensive and Pashinyan's public acknowledgment that relying solely on Russia was 'a strategic mistake.' Moreover, Moscow may also find common cause with Tehran in opposing 'foreign interference,' a diplomatic euphemism for keeping the West at arm's length. Iran's reaction has been the most openly hostile. Sharing a border with Armenia's Syunik province, Tehran sees any corridor running through it as a strategic red line – especially if managed by the United States. The fear is twofold: economic marginalization, if north-south trade routes bypass Iranian territory; and geopolitical encirclement, if U.S. and Israeli influence reaches directly onto Iran's northern border. Iranian officials have backed Armenia's sovereignty-based 'Crossroads of Peace' but reject U.S. involvement, instead promoting alternatives like the North–South Transport Corridor linking Russia to the Indian Ocean. For Tehran, keeping a hand on the region's transport networks is both an economic necessity and a security imperative. Nevertheless, given Iran's recent continuous setbacks in its Shia Crescent, and the 12-day war with Israel, plus mounting pressures from the Trump administration's tough stances, Tehran is unlikely to act on the issue immediately. Turkiye, by contrast, has welcomed the development. Long aligned with Azerbaijan under the 'one nation, two states' slogan, Ankara supports any arrangement that gives Baku direct access to Nakhichevan and beyond. While it previously favored the fully Azerbaijani-controlled Zangezur Corridor, Turkey appears willing to accept U.S. management if it ensures reliable, checkpoint-free movement for goods and people. In fact, Ankara may see value in a U.S. presence that balances Russian and Iranian influence, provided Turkish commercial and geopolitical interests are secured. This evolving geometry in the South Caucasus creates a new layer of the global power contest. For the United States, the corridor is not just about regional peace – it's a supply chain insurance policy, a geopolitical wedge against Russia and Iran, and a counterweight to Chinese logistics corridor diplomacy. For Armenia, it's a path out of isolation and into Western networks. For Azerbaijan, it's a compromise that trades some control for broader strategic and economic gains. But the deal also imports the broader China-Russia-U.S. rivalry into a fragile region, raising the stakes of any future disruption. Three scenarios could unfold. In the best case, the corridor opens on schedule, tensions ease, and the South Caucasus becomes a genuine crossroads of trade and cooperation. This would showcase the U.S. capacity to deliver public goods, strengthening its hand in global infrastructure competition. In a second, more volatile outcome, domestic politics or security incidents derail the plan, giving Russia or China an opening to insert themselves as alternative guarantors. In the most complex scenario, the corridor operates but becomes one of several parallel routes, each aligned with different powers – an arrangement that would require delicate management to avoid turning trade lanes into geopolitical front lines. To deliver success, Washington must invest in more than ribbon-cutting. Apart from a basic requirement of foreign policy consistency even across changing administrations, that means securing multilateral buy-in – from the EU, development banks, and possibly even cautious regional rivals – to make the corridor a shared economic lifeline rather than an exclusive Western asset. It also means delivering visible benefits to local communities along the route, so that the infrastructure is seen as a driver of prosperity, not just a chess piece in a great-power game. The South Caucasus has rarely commanded sustained U.S. attention. But in a world where geography, infrastructure, and political alignment are increasingly intertwined, ignoring it is no longer an option. A single rail line in Syunik can ripple through the balance of influence among Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Ankara. If managed wisely, the United States' new foothold could stabilize a volatile region and offer an alternative to the connectivity models of its strategic rivals. If mishandled, it could just as easily deepen divisions and draw the South Caucasus into the center of another global rivalry. The stakes, quite literally, run along the tracks.
Japan Times
a day ago
- Japan Times
Koizumi presses Seoul to lift fishery curbs, meets S. Korea, China counterparts
Agriculture and fisheries minister Shinjiro Koizumi on Monday called on South Korea to remove restrictions it has placed on imports of fishery products from eight Japanese prefectures. South Korea has been suspending imports of fishery products from Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma and Chiba prefectures following the 2011 meltdown at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant in northeastern Japan. In his 30-minute meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun in Seoul, Koizumi stressed the safety of Japanese fishery products and called for an early removal of the restrictions. "Many (South Korean) tourists visiting Japan are enjoying safe and delicious Japanese food. Confidence in Japanese food has recovered sufficiently," Koizumi told reporters. The meeting between Koizumi and Cho, the first between a Japanese agriculture minister and a South Korean foreign minister, came amid a recent improvement in relations between the two countries. Koizumi said that realizing the meeting "may be a sign of South Korea's intention to develop Japan-South Korea relations." He added, "If we proceed based on scientific grounds, we will gain understanding," expressing hope for an early removal of the South Korean restrictions on Japanese fishery products. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is expected to visit Japan late this month to meet with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Koizumi separately held a three-way meeting with his Chinese and South Korean counterparts, Han Jun and Song Mi-ryung, in Incheon near Seoul — the first such meeting in seven years. The three ministers agreed to strengthen collaboration for the sustainable and sound development of livestock production against the spread of transboundary animal diseases, according to their joint statement. They stressed the need to boost food self-sufficiency and strengthen reserve systems amid rising threats to food supplies, and agreed to consult as necessary in times of crisis.
