Demobilisation programme instituted as second SANDF group returns from DRC
The repatriation process has generated criticism from many quarters. Chris Hattingh, DA defence and military veterans spokesperson, said the event in totality was another example of poor SANDF planning and 'a national embarrassment'.
'The DA warned this event was more about spectacle than sincere recognition,' he said in a statement, adding, 'those concerns were proven correct. The entire ceremony turned into a public embarrassment, with soldiers stranded and their supposed heroes' welcome left in ruins'.
'This is not just a failed media stunt. It is a sign of deeper dysfunction within the department of defence (DoD). Repeated logistic failures, both abroad and at home, raise serious questions about leadership and competence at the highest levels.
'Our troops deserve more than press conferences and red carpets. They deserve clear planning, dignified treatment and respect. Not the humiliation of becoming pawns in a failed PR exercise,' according to Hattingh.
Tshabalala said it was 'a bit unfair to suggest any operational shortcomings on the part of the SANDF when, in fact, we had no control over the logistical constraints presented by the service provider.'
The DA is calling for a full parliamentary report detailing the planning and procurement of repatriation logistics, the causes of delays in troop and equipment movement from Goma, DRC, the full cost of rerouting and VIP arrangements, the status and safety of remaining SANDF personnel and assets in the DRC, and what lessons, if any, have been learnt from this mission's collapse.
'This farcical 'homecoming' is not merely a PR disaster. It reflects the SANDF's growing inability to carry out even the most basic operations, troop movement, equipment return, or co-ordinated logistics, without confusion, delay, or last-minute crisis-driven haphazard improvisation. The minister's own admission that 'we would have just picked up our children and landed them at the airbase' if the SANDF had working aircraft speaks volumes,' Hattingh said.
'No amount of spin can conceal the truth: SAMIDRC ended not in honour, but in disarray. If this is how South Africa withdraws from conflict, what confidence can we have in how it enters one?'
The remaining troops, said to number 2,000, serving with the now terminated SAMIDRC are due to return home by month-end. Equipment is being transported from Tanzania by sea and is expected to arrive later.
— This article was first published by DefenceWeb
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Daily Maverick
2 hours ago
- Daily Maverick
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The Citizen
10 hours ago
- The Citizen
DA leads Masoyi youth march to demand job creation
Less than a minute Monicca Mthembu Less than a minute The youth in the Masoyi area and members of the DA went out in their numbers to demand that the government create jobs for young Mpumalangans earlier today, June 16. The DA leader, John Steenhuisen, led the march in commemoration of Youth Day. ALSO READ: Former president Mbeki enjoys walkabout at Lowveld National Botanical Garden He addressed the attendees on plans to fight youth unemployment, restore dignity and build opportunities for youngsters. 'Today is a day of remembrance, bringing into sharp focus the important role of youth in driving change,' said Steenhuisen. At Caxton, we employ humans to generate daily fresh news, not AI intervention. Happy reading!
