Israeli Defence Minister admits to Tel Aviv's plan to ‘eliminate' Khamenei during conflict — and why it was ‘unrealistic'
In a first since the recent escalation in tensions, Israel's Defence Minister Thursday said its military was actively planning to 'eliminate' Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei but did not go through with it as the 'opportunity never presented itself'.
'If he had been in our sights, we would have taken him out,' Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz was quoted as saying by Times of Israel in his interviews with three major Israeli television news programmes — Channel 13, Kan and Channel 12. He was speaking days after the US-backed Israel-Iran ceasefire came into effect following the 12-day conflict.
Katz also said that the Israeli military was unable to locate Khamenei once he reportedly went into hiding in a bunker. 'Khamenei understood this, went very deep underground, broke off contact with the commanders… so in the end it wasn't realistic,' Katz told Kan.
The latest statement marks Israel's first public admission of having plotted the killing of Tehran's top leadership. So far, they had only disclosed details of their plans of targetted attacks on Iran's nuclear infrastructure. While the offensives from both sides were ongoing, Katz had said Khamenei 'can no longer be allowed to exist,' reacting to one of Iran's wave of retaliatory attacks that hit a hospital in Beersheba.
As fragile peace seemed to be holding in the Middle East, Katz, talking to Channel 13, said Israel will not continue with its plan to actively attempt to attack Khamenei now following the ceasefire that took hold two days earlier. 'There's a difference — before the ceasefire, after the ceasefire,' he said.
In another interview with Kan, he also said: 'I wouldn't recommend that he stay tranquil.'
Katza also made a reference to Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Iran-backed Hezbollah terror group whom Israel killed last year, asking Khamenei to continue staying in the bunker. 'He should learn from the late Nasrallah, who sat for a long time deep in the bunker. I recommend that he do the same thing,' he added.
In the series of interview, Katz said that Israel did not go into the war knowing the US would join the attack. He added that Tel Aviv was not aware of the exact geographical location of Iran's enriched uranium.
'We don't need permission for these things,' he told Channel 13 on whether Israel had sought American approval over its plan to kill Khamenei.
Earlier on June 17, as Iran and Israel traded strikes at each other, US President Donald Trump has warned Tehran and Khamenei that the US knows his location. He said they could eliminate the Supreme Leader but is holding back 'at least for now'.
'He is an easy target, but is safe there – We are not going to take him out (kill!), at least not for now. We're looking for better than a ceasefire…I didn't say I was looking for a ceasefire. I told them, 'Do the deal'.' Trump wrote in a post on Truth Social warning Iran and Khamenei.
The Israeli defence minister also said they have a 'green light' from Trump to launch an attack on Iran again if it were to make 'progress' with its nuclear programme.
Without naming Israel directly, Khamenei referred to it as a 'fallacious Zionist regime' and congratulated Iran on what he called a 'victory' in a post on his official X account on June 19.
'With all that commotion and all those claims, the Zionist regime was practically knocked out and crushed under the blows of the Islamic Republic,' he said after the ceasefire took hold.
Referring to Iran's retaliatory strike on the US base in Qatar, the Supreme Leader clamed it dealt a direct blow to American military infrastructure. 'The Islamic Republic delivered a heavy slap to the US's face. It attacked and inflicted damage on the Al-Udeid Air Base, which is one of the key US bases in the region,' another post on his account read.
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Time of India
33 minutes ago
- Time of India
'Double standards': Spain slams EU inaction on Israel deal
AP image In the wake of a damning EU review of Israel's human rights record in Gaza, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez slammed his colleagues for not moving to suspend a trade deal with Israel despite what he called "the catastrophic situation of genocide. " More than 55,000 Palestinians have been killed in the enclave over more than 18 months of Israeli bombardment, according to Hamas-run Gazan authorities. Israel vehemently denies accusations of genocide, maintaining that it is at war with the ruling militant Islamist group Hamas following a massive terror attack on Israeli territory in 2023. In a report distributed to the member states last week based on the findings and allegations of major international bodies, the European External Action Service found "indications" that Israel was breaching its duty to respect to human rights. 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First Post
35 minutes ago
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Zohran may not become New York' next mayor, but he has shown chink in America's armour
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Indian Express
44 minutes ago
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How the US helped oust the Iranian government in 1953 and reinstate the Shah
When US missiles struck Iran's key nuclear facilities on June 22, history seemed to repeat itself. Seventy-two years ago, a covert CIA operation toppled Iran's democratically elected government. Now, as American rhetoric drifts once more toward regime change, the ghosts of 1953 are stirring again. The coordinated US air and missile strike, codenamed Operation Midnight Hammer, targeted three of Iran's principal nuclear sites: Fordow, Natanz, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. The attack immediately reignited fears of a broader war in the Middle East. In the hours that followed, US President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social: 'It's not politically correct to use the term 'Regime Change. But if the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn't there be a Regime change??? MIGA!!!' Though officials in Washington, including Vice President JD Vance, rushed to clarify that regime change was not formal policy, many in Iran heard echoes from 1953, when the US and UK orchestrated the overthrow of Iran's democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh. After being appointed as the prime minister of Iran in 1951, Mossadegh moved to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, then controlled by the British, who had long funneled Iranian oil profits to London. 'He ended a long period of British hegemony in Iran… and set the stage for several decades of rapid economic growth fueled by oil revenues,' wrote Mark Gasiorowski, a historian at Tulane University, in an essay for the volume The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies (2018). 'He also tried to democratise Iran's political system by reducing the powers of the shah and the traditional upper class.' Mossadegh argued that Iran, like any sovereign state, deserved control over its resources. Appearing before the International Court of Justice in 1952, he laid out Iran's case: 'The decision to nationalise the oil industry is the result of the political will of an independent and free nation,' he said. 'For us Iranians, the uneasiness of stopping any kind of action which is seen as interference in our national affairs is more intense than for other nations.' Britain saw the nationalisation as both a strategic and economic threat. It imposed a blockade and led a global oil boycott, while pressuring Washington to intervene. The British adopted a three-track strategy: a failed negotiation effort, a global boycott of Iranian oil and covert efforts to undermine and overthrow Mossadegh, writes Gasiorowski . British intelligence operatives had built ties with 'politicians, businessmen, military officers and clerical leaders' in anticipation of a coup. Initially, the Truman administration resisted intervention. But President Dwight D Eisenhower's election ushered in a more aggressive Cold War posture. 'Under the Truman administration, these boundaries [of acceptable Iranian politics] were drawn rather broadly,' Gasiorowski wrote. 'But when Eisenhower entered office, the more stridently anti-Communist views of his foreign policy advisers led the US to drop its support for Mossadegh and take steps to overthrow him.' Fear of communism's spread, particularly via Iran's Tudeh Party, believed to be the first organised Communist party in the Middle East. 'Although they did not regard Mossadegh as a Communist,' Gasiorowski wrote, 'they believed conditions in Iran would probably continue to deteriorate… strengthening the Tudeh Party and perhaps enabling it to seize power.' While Britain lobbied for a coup, Mossadegh appealed directly to Eisenhower. Eisenhower, in a letter in June 1953, offered sympathy but warned that aid was unlikely so long as Iran withheld oil: 'There is a strong feeling… that it would not be fair to the American taxpayers for the United States Government to extend any considerable amount of economic aid to Iran so long as Iran could have access to funds derived from the sale of its oil.' Mossadegh's response was blunt. He accused Britain of sabotaging Iran's economy through 'propaganda and diplomacy,' and warned that inaction could carry lasting consequences: 'If prompt and effective aid is not given to this country now, any steps that might be taken tomorrow… might well be too late,' he wrote. Weeks later, in August 1953, the CIA and Britain's MI6 launched a covert operation to oust Mossadegh and restore the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to power. 'A decision was made to develop and carry out a plan to overthrow Mussadiq and install Zahedi as prime minister,' Gasiorowski wrote. 'The operation was to be led by Kermit Roosevelt, who headed the CIA's Middle East operations division.' The mission, code-named Operation Ajax, used anti-Mossadegh propaganda, bribes, and orchestrated street unrest. After an initial failure and the Shah's brief exile, loyalist military units staged a successful coup on August 19. Mossadegh was arrested, tried, and placed under house arrest until his death in 1967. In 2013, the CIA officially acknowledged its role, releasing declassified documents that described the coup as 'an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government.' In Iran, schoolchildren learn about the 1953 coup in classrooms. State media airs annual retrospectives on Mossadegh's downfall. His name recurs in graffiti, political speeches, and university lectures. In his book The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations, the historian Ervand Abrahamian called the operation 'a defining fault line not only for Iranian history but also in the country's relations with both Britain and the United States.' It 'carved in public memory a clear dividing line — 'before' and 'after' — that still shapes the country's political culture,' he wrote. While Cold War defenders portrayed the coup as a check on communism, Abrahamian sees oil and empire as the true motivators. 'The main concern was not so much about communism as about the dangerous repercussions that oil nationalisation could have throughout the world,' he argues. Following the coup, the Shah ruled with increasing autocracy, supported by the US and bolstered by SAVAK (Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar), a secret police trained by the CIA. Decades of repression, inequality, and corruption gave way to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which toppled the monarchy and established the Islamic Republic. 'The strategic considerations that led US policymakers to undertake the 1953 coup helped set in motion a chain of events that later destroyed the Shah's regime and created severe problems for US interests,' wrote Gasiorowski. On November 4, 1979, the US Embassy in Tehran was seized. Fifty-two Americans were held hostage for 444 days. Revolutionaries repeatedly cited 1953 as the origin of their mistrust. Though Washington denied involvement for decades, few Iranians ever doubted the CIA's role in Mossadegh's fall. 'The coup revealed how the United States began almost instinctively to follow in the footsteps of British imperialism,' write David W Lesch and Mark L Haas editors of The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies . 'Demonstrating a preference for the status quo rather than the forces of change.' Even President Barack Obama, in a 2009 speech in Cairo, acknowledged the long shadow of 1953, noting that the coup had created 'years of mistrust.' No US president has ever issued a formal apology. Dr Omair Anas, director of research at the Centre for Studies of Plural Societies, a non-profit, non-partisan, independent institution dedicated to democratising knowledge, sees the 1953 events as not just a turning point but a template for today's impasse. 'The 1953 coup was staged in the backdrop of the Cold War which resulted in Iran's inclusion into the CENTO alliance along with Pakistan and Turkiye,' he said. He is sharply critical of current regime change rhetoric, describing it as detached from Iran's internal political conditions. 'The most important player is Iran's domestic politics,' he said. 'At this stage, it is not willing and prepared for a regime change.' Anas points out that the government has already absorbed considerable dissent: 'Previous anti-hijab protests have already accommodated many anti-regime voices and sentiments.' But absorbing discontent, he suggests, is not the same as welcoming systemic change. 'Any regime change at this stage would immediately lead the country to chaos and possible civil war, as the new regime won't be able to de-Islamise the state in the near future.' Trump's rhetoric, therefore, landed with particular resonance. While senior officials have attempted to distance the administration from talk of regime change, many in Iran and beyond see a familiar playbook: pressure, provocation, and the threat of externally imposed political outcomes. Dr Anas contends that many of the so-called alternatives to the Islamic Republic are politically inert. 'Anti-regime forces since 1979 have lost much ground and haven't been able to stage a major threat to the revolution,' he said. 'The West is fully aware that the Pahlavi dynasty or the Mujahidin-e-Khalq (MEK) have the least popularity and organisational presence to replace the Khamenei-led regime of Islamic revolution.' As he sees it, the system's survival is not merely a matter of repression but of strategic logic. 'Khamenei can only be replaced by someone like him,' he said. 'The continuity of the Islamic revolution of Iran remains more preferable than any other disruptive replacement.' He also warns that a forced collapse of the current order could have serious regional implications. 'In the case of violent suppression of Islamist forces, the new Iranian state might seek the revival of the Cold War collaboration with Pakistan and Turkiye and a strong push against Russia.' For India, a country that has generally maintained a policy of non-intervention, such a development could be deeply destabilising. 'Any abrupt change would complicate India's West Asia and South Asia strategic calculus,' he said, 'and more fundamentally India's Pakistan strategy.' Dr Anas also sees Western credibility as severely eroded across the region. 'The West has left no credibility whatsoever about human rights, freedom, and democracy after the Israeli-Gaza war,' he said. 'The Middle Eastern public opinion, including that of Kurds, Druze and Afghans, have lost hope in Western promises. They prefer any autocratic regime to West-backed regimes.' India, he said, risks being caught flat-footed if political transitions come suddenly. 'India generally stays away from the normative politics of the Middle East,' he said. 'While this shows India's principled stand on no intervention in internal politics, it also puts India in a weak position once the regime changes, as happened in Syria.' His recommendation? 'India needs to engage more actively with West Asian civil society to have more balanced relations beyond states.' Aishwarya Khosla is a journalist currently serving as Deputy Copy Editor at The Indian Express. Her writings examine the interplay of culture, identity, and politics. She began her career at the Hindustan Times, where she covered books, theatre, culture, and the Punjabi diaspora. Her editorial expertise spans the Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Chandigarh, Punjab and Online desks. She was the recipient of the The Nehru Fellowship in Politics and Elections, where she studied political campaigns, policy research, political strategy and communications for a year. She pens The Indian Express newsletter, Meanwhile, Back Home. Write to her at or You can follow her on Instagram: @ink_and_ideology, and X: @KhoslaAishwarya. ... Read More
