Muslims rally against Waqf (Amendment) Act
Condemning the new Waqf legislation, a rally was taken out by Muslims leaders with support from several organisations in Kalaburagi on Sunday.
The protestors gathered at Nagareshwara School in the Nehru Gunj area and kicked off the rally that concluded at Jagat Circle.
The agitators holding placards and banners that said, 'Once a Waqf, Always Waqf', 'Say No To Waqf', 'Save Waqf, Save Constitution', raised slogans demanding revocation of the Waqf Act.
The rally was led by leaders, including Kalaburagi North MLA Kaneez Fatima, Sajjada Nasheen of Hazrat Khwaja Bande Nawaz Dargah Syed Muhammad Ali Al-Hussaini, who is also chairperson of the Karnataka State Waqf Board, director of Khwaja Bande Nawaz University Mazhar Alam Khan, chairman of Kalaburagi Urban Development Authority Baba Nazar Mohammad Khan, Wahaj Baba Junaidi, Mohammad Asgar Chulbul and others were present.
The agitators claimed that the Waqf Act is unconstitutional and that the Modi-led BJP government at the Centre is attempting to take possession of Waqf property across the country.
The amended Act mandates the inclusion of non-Muslims in the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards which interferes with religious affairs of Muslims. The agitators demanded the revocation of the Waqf (Amendment) Act and no implementation of any provision of the Waqf Act should be done till the final orders of the Supreme Court in the matter.
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'In spite of economic backwardness", comments Badruddin Umar, 'East Bengal was an advanced region in respect of social, cultural and political developments. Owing to its cultural and political backwardness and predominantly feudal composition of leadership in West Pakistan they cling to old prejudices" (The Emergence of Bangladesh Vol-1, p. 329). On 3 April 1957, the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly adopted a resolution on regional autonomy, moved by Mohiuddin Ahmad of Awami League and addressed by his party colleague and United Front minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Mujib described regional autonomy as crucial for East Bengal. The resolution demanded full autonomy for East Pakistan except for currency, foreign affairs, and defence, which would remain with the Centre. 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