Saudi analyst tells Al Arabiya news that Turki Al-Jasser was a ‘terrorist' and ‘traitor'
Al-Jasser was 'literally a terrorist (and) a traitor, and he had nothing to do with journalism,' Al-Ansari said. Media reports describing him as a journalist were a 'fabrication,' he added.
During the interview, Al-Ansari told Al Arabiya his sources had confirmed Al-Jasser worked for a 'sensitive government agency' and had access to classified information. He added that Al-Jasser had been involved 'in the planning and financing of terrorism.'
Saudi Affairs Expert @Salansar1 rejects claims that terrorism convict Turki al-Jasser was a journalist. He shares new details in an interview on Al Arabiya English's W News. pic.twitter.com/roi0TFY53P
— Al Arabiya English (@AlArabiya_Eng) June 20, 2025
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