Britain's rearmament choices put us between a rock and a hard place

Telegraph

14-03-2025

Well, it happened. The Government has wisely increased the defence budget, however modestly, by raiding another department. It's a start. But the real agony of decision-making in military spending is now about to be felt.
Over the past forty years, see-sawing acquisitions policy has cost the MoD and the country dearly. From go-it-alone self-sufficiency to off-the-shelf equipment buys, projects have come and gone, and kit that was supposed to be affordable ended up costing multiple factors more.
With the seismic shift in American foreign policy and the seeming return of muscled mercantilism, Britain no longer has the wiggle room for miscalculation in defence acquisitions. Already, scare stories are circulating in Europe that the US government has a 'kill switch' to disable the American-made F-35 stealth fighter in service with its allies including the UK. The reality is more nuanced, but the fact remains that some control is ceded with foreign-sourced weapons.
The simple fact is that a medium-sized power cannot have it all in terms of military capabilities. Some technologies, such as nuclear and cyber, are vital for preserving operational sovereignty while others have to be acquired from abroad in partnership or else off the shelf. The trick is in getting the balance right.
Success in the past has been mixed. Even selecting existing or foreign-designed platforms has been no guarantee of savings and efficiencies. The much maligned Ajax armoured combat vehicle has become the poster child for defence acquisition mismanagement. When new requirements get shoved into development down the track, costs inevitably rise, and slowing programmes to save money only means more spent in the longer term.
The new Wedgetail early warning aircraft has been in service with Australia and other nations for years, but entry into the RAF has faced lengthy delays due to subcontractor difficulties and conversion issues. Crucially, many cost overruns and operational delays in defence have been caused by lack of investment in support infrastructure at bases and facilities. The Royal Navy has struggled to keep even a modest number of frigates, destroyers, and submarines available for patrol due to maintenance issues and lack of crews (the latter down to persistent recruitment and retention woes). The two new aircraft carriers have been a mixed blessing as there are still insufficient aircraft on their decks nor enough escort vessels to protect them.
The army's new Boxer armoured personnel carrier – a German vehicle manufactured in the UK – will hopefully benefit from the lessons of the Ajax debacle and might serve as a successful example of off-the-shelf tech built here. Britain's next-generation Tempest fighter, now under development as the Global Combat Air Programme, could become a model of international cooperation avoiding the workshare bun-fight witnessed on the Tornado and Eurofighter programmes of yore. But will the Government have deep enough pockets to maintain cutting edge aerospace development on these shores sufficient for a 6th generation fighter jet? And can the ever-ballooning costs of the Trident nuclear deterrent be tamed?
This is just a taste of what Lord Robertson and his team have been dealing with in their preparation of the Strategic Defence Review, commissioned when Labour took power last July and due this Spring. Lord Robertson, as a former defence secretary and Nato secretary, is no stranger to these discussions and is the author of the well-regarded 1998 SDR. But with SDRs, changing circumstances and fickle fortune can make mayflies look long-lived in comparison.
The Review will determine the roles, capabilities, and reforms required by the MoD to meet likely threats and challenges in the medium term. Yet, according to its official remit, the review is directed to present recommendations that are 'deliverable and affordable within the resources available to Defence within the trajectory to 2.5 per cent.' Given the current state of affairs, fulfilling that will be a tall order indeed and hopefully won't end up merely offering the MoD a Procrustean solution.
Reconstituting Britain's shrunken defence industrial base will take years, time that the country does not have to acquire a sufficient conventional deterrent force. Sophisticated weapons systems also take years to enter service. What remains of the UK defence industry is small, much having been sold off or swallowed up by foreign players. The UK will have to husband what remains and choose which technologies to invest in.
The rapidly changing face of modern warfare means the country needs to step-up in terms of drones, missiles and missile defence, AI and cyber. This is without considering the fact that even the basic building blocks of manpower and munitions have been allowed to atrophy. Whatever route we go down, those in charge of Britain's defence are in for a world of pain.