How Pakistani Scientist's Nuclear Black Market Fuelled Iran's Nuclear Ambitions

India.com

4 hours ago

New Delhi: Before the world ever saw satellite images of buried centrifuges at Natanz, before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) dispatched teams to inspect suspicious sites in Fordow and long before Israeli missiles lit up Iranian skies this month, the seeds of Tehran's nuclear capability were already sown. But it happened in Pakistan, Dubai and Kuala Lumpur.
At the center of this shadowy nuclear web was Abdul Qadeer Khan – Pakistani metallurgist who, decades ago, stole blueprints from Europe and built Pakistan's atomic bomb. What few could imagine then was that Khan would go on to export that know-how in secret, creating the world's most dangerous underground market for nuclear technology – one that would arm Iran with more than just ambition.
Khan began his nuclear journey in the laboratories of Europe in the early 1970s, working for Urenco Group – a Dutch-German-British nuclear consortium. It was there that he accessed and copied sensitive centrifuge designs. By 1975, he returned to Pakistan with a suitcase full of secrets.
His role in developing Pakistan's uranium enrichment programme at Kahuta earned him celebrity status at home. But while the world celebrated non-proliferation treaties, he quietly flipped the script.
In the 1980s and 1990s, he built a secret pipeline that bypassed governments and treaties. Operating through shell companies, friendly states and willing middlemen, Khan's network smuggled critical nuclear equipment, blueprints and even bomb designs to multiple countries. Iran was one among them.
The most consequential sale came in 1987. Iranian officials met intermediaries of Khan's network in Dubai and secured an initial package: centrifuge blueprints, assembly manuals and a roadmap to enrichment. These were based on the P1 and P2 centrifuges – the same models Pakistan used to develop its bomb.
In the 1990s, entire sets of components – bellows, rotors, vacuum pumps and high-speed motors – made their way to Iran. Much of the hardware was built in Malaysian factories under Khan's supervision and then disguised and routed through Dubai to avoid detection.
By the early 2000s, Iran had a pilot enrichment facility running. The world watched, stunned, as Tehran's capabilities grew faster than intelligence agencies had predicted. But the acceleration was not magic – it was the Khan blueprint at work.
Khan's operation was not run out of basements or back alleys. It looked like legitimate business. Precision parts came from Europe and Southeast Asia. Firms like Scomi Precision Engineering in Malaysia manufactured rotors and pipes under the radar. Dubai-based logistics firms repackaged them for discreet delivery to Iran.
One of the biggest exposes came in 2003, when U.S. and British forces intercepted a ship bound for Libya. Onboard were centrifuge parts matching Khan's designs. That led to Libya giving up its nuclear program and to the unraveling of the entire network.
Investigations by the IAEA and Western intelligence revealed that Khan had sold similar materials to North Korea and Iran. Technical documents recovered from Iranian facilities bore unmistakable Pakistani signatures – even Chinese-style bomb schematics that Khan had allegedly passed along.
What Did Iran Really Get?
Centrifuge designs: Detailed plans for P1 and P2 centrifuges – blueprints, machining tolerances and assembly procedures. Manufactured parts: From rotors to vacuum systems, thousands of components were delivered over years. Weaponisation docs: Perhaps the most alarming were documents on how to build an implosion-style nuclear weapon. These were not basic concepts, they included measurements, trigger designs and engineering drawings.
Technical support: Though no direct evidence exists of Pakistani scientists physically working in Iran, declassified files suggest consistent technical communication and support through intermediaries.
The Lasting Impact
Even today, Iran's centrifuge models – IR-1 and IR-2 – closely mirror Khan's P1s and P2s. While Iran insists its programme is peaceful, the technological DNA traces directly back to Khan's black-market empire.
In 2022, Israeli intelligence leaked documents suggesting that Iran's 'AMAD Plan', an alleged nuclear weapons programme halted in 2003, used Khan-provided blueprints to model bomb designs.
The war now raging between Israel and Iran has reignited fears that Tehran's decades-long accumulation of nuclear knowledge may still carry a weapons-grade potential. And while Iran denies any intent to build a bomb, its ability to do so was never entirely homegrown.
It was bought, smuggled and built – piece by piece – in the shadows of Abdul Qadeer Khan's legacy.