
Don't expect a US Marshall Plan to rebuild Ukraine
President Donald Trump wants Ukraine to repay the United States for helping to defend the country against Russia's invasion.
Since 2022, Congress has provided about US$174 billion to Ukraine and neighboring countries to assist in its war effort. Trump inflated this figure to US$350 billion in a March 2025 White House meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron. Separately, he has suggested Ukraine could reimburse the US by giving America access to its minerals.
Ukraine is rich in titanium, graphite, manganese and other rare earth metals used to produce electric vehicle batteries and other tech devices.
Mining and refining these critical mineral resources would require major investment in infrastructure and economic development, including in parts of Ukraine severely damaged by fighting. Some analysts are calling for a return to the European Recovery Program, commonly known as the Marshall Plan.
The Marshall Plan used $13.3 billion in US funds – roughly $171 billion in today's dollars – to rebuild war-torn Western Europe from 1948 to late 1951. It is often evoked as a solution for reconstruction following global crises. Yet, as a military historian and curator, I find that the Marshall Plan is not well understood.
For the US, the economic gains of the Marshall Plan did not come from European countries' repaying loans or allowing the US to extract their raw materials. Rather, the US has benefited enormously from a half-century of goodwill, democratic stability and economic success in Europe.
After World War II ended in 1945, Western Europe faced a staggering burden of destruction and upheaval.
Allied bombardment of major industrial areas and German cities such as Berlin, Hamburg and Cologne had created massive housing shortages. Meanwhile, fighting through agricultural areas and a critical manpower shortage had curtailed food production. What harvest there was could not get to hungry civilians because so many of Europe's roads, bridges and ports had been destroyed.
The United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany and other European governments were buried in debt after so many years of war. They could not afford to rebuild on their own. Yet, rather than cooperating on their mutual economic reconstruction, European nations looked inward, focusing primarily on their own political challenges.
The continent was politically and militarily divided, too. Europe's western half was influenced by the democratic, capitalistic forces led by the US Eastern Europe was beholden to the communist, command-economy forces of the Soviet Union.
In a 1946 speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill articulated Europe's growing postwar divide. Over the ruins of proud nations, he said, 'an iron curtain' had 'descended across the continent.'
Unlike Europe, the US emerged from World War II as the wealthiest nation in the world, with its territory intact and unharmed. Its steel and oil industries were booming. By 1947, the US was the clear successor to Great Britain as the world's superpower.
But President Harry Truman feared the ambitions of the war's other great victor – the Soviet Union. In March 1947, he announced a new doctrine to contain communist expansion southward across Europe by giving $400 million in military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey.
Around the same time, US Secretary of State George Marshall met with Soviet officials to plan Germany's future. Following the Nazis' surrender in May 1945, Germany had been divided into four occupied zones administered by US, British, French and Soviet forces.
Each nation had its own goals for its section of Germany. The US wanted to revitalize Germany politically and economically, believing that a moribund Germany would thwart the economic reconstruction of all of Europe.
Marshall hoped that the Soviets would cooperate, but Soviet ruler Josef Stalin preferred extracting reparations from a prostrate Germany to investing in its recovery. A vibrant German economic engine, the Soviets felt, could just as easily rearm to attack the Russian countryside for the third time that century.
The Truman administration chose to unilaterally rebuild the three Western Allied sectors of Germany – and Western Europe.
Marshall outlined his plan at a commencement address at Harvard University in June 1947. American action to restore global economic health, he said, would provide the foundation for political stability and peace in Europe.
And an economically healthy Western Europe, in turn, would inhibit the spread of communism by plainly demonstrating the benefits of capitalism.
'Our policy is not directed against any country,' Marshall said, 'but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.'
Marshall invited all European nations to participate in drafting a plan to first address the immediate humanitarian aid of Europe's people, then rebuild its infrastructure. The US would pay for it all.
For nearly bankrupt European nations, it was a lifeline. In September 1947, the new Committee for European Economic Co-operation, composed of 16 Western – but not Eastern – European nations, delivered its proposal to Washington.
It would take a masterful legislative strategy for the Democratic Truman administration to persuade the Republican-led Congress to pass this $13 billion bill. It succeeded thanks to the dedicated effort of Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who convinced his isolationist colleagues that the Marshall Plan would halt the expansion of communism and benefit American economic growth.
In April 1948, Truman signed the Economic Cooperation Act. By year's end, over $2 billion had reached Europe, and its industrial production had finally surpassed prewar levels seen in 1939.
Along with economic stability, the Truman administration recognized that Europe needed military security to defend against communist encroachment by the Soviet Union.
In July 1949, 12 European countries, the US and Canada established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO committed each member country to the mutual defense of fellow NATO members.
Since 1947, NATO has steadily expanded eastward to include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other former Soviet satellite states directly bordering Russia.
Ukraine, which declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, is not yet a NATO member. But it desperately wants to be.
Ukraine applied for NATO membership in 2022 after Russia's invasion. Its application is pending. Russian President Vladimir Putin has said any peace deal with Ukraine must bar NATO membership.
Modern-day Ukraine mirrors the Western European countries of the Marshall Plan era in meaningful ways.
It suffers from the physical devastation of war, with its major cities heavily damaged. The threat of military attack from hostile neighbors remains urgent. And it has a functional, democratic government that would – in peacetime – be capable of receiving and distributing aid to develop the nation's economic growth and stability.
US global leadership, however, has changed dramatically since 1948.
Outright American taxpayer financing of Ukraine's reconstruction seems impossible. Any plan to reconstruct the country after war will likely require public funding from multiple nations and substantial private investment. That private investment could well include mineral extraction and refinement ventures.
Ultimately, Ukraine's recovery will most likely involve Ukraine and neighboring nations reaching agreement to restore its economic and military security.
The European Union, which Ukraine also seeks to join, has the bureaucratic and economic resources necessary to reconstruct Ukraine, restore peace and ease tensions on the continent.
Any future Marshall Plan for Ukraine will probably be European.
Frank A Blazich Jr is curator of military history, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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Asia Times
41 minutes ago
- Asia Times
US lethality not enough to counter China's malign influence
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RTHK
an hour ago
- RTHK
'HK an ideal spot to raise funds for infrastructure'
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Asia Times
an hour ago
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Forging a European third pole in the Indo-Pacific
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The forum has conducted more than 20 joint exercises and supports expert working groups in areas such as maritime security, counterterrorism and cyber defense. However, bloc cleavages are deepening. Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea are much more dependent on US defense systems, while Russia, in the aftermath of its war in Ukraine, is increasingly dependent on China. ADMM-Plus may be due for a strategic evolution, one in which Europe could act as a stabilizing third pillar of Indo-Pacific security. Europe's full membership as dialogue partners would enable it to contribute meaningfully to regional capacity-building, particularly in maritime domain awareness, counter-piracy and cybersecurity, areas where it possesses deep technical expertise. Second, Europe can increase its strategic relevance in the region by linking defense exports to local industrial development. Southeast Asian states increasingly expect arms deals to include technology transfers, job creation and long-term economic value. This was reflected in ASEAN chairman Anwar Ibrahim's SLD25 statement that 'trade is part of our strategic architecture.' Recent European defense deals have embraced this logic. Sweden's Gripen sale to Thailand included training and maintenance infrastructure. France's 7.5 billion euro (US$8.6 billion) Rafale agreement with Indonesia and Germany's 1.2 billion euro submarine contract with Singapore similarly offered industrial participation. To move beyond fragmented, bilateral arrangements, however, the EU should use instruments such as the European Peace Facility (EPF) and Security Action for Europe (SAFE), a 150 billion euro defense investment fund approved in May 2025. These mechanisms can support coproduction, joint ventures and localized assembly aligned with both European supply chain interests and Southeast Asia's development needs. Finally, programs like SAFE are designed to strengthen Europe's defense industrial base by financing large-scale joint procurement and infrastructure. But scaling this capacity cost-effectively may require trusted partnerships beyond Europe's borders. ASEAN offers that potential, particularly if it is more closely integrated into European defense supply chains. If structured to meet SAFE's eligibility criteria – such as majority EU ownership or controlled IP – these arrangements could support the program's objectives of efficiency, resilience and industrial depth while enabling Southeast Asian states to modernize affordably under transparent, rules-based frameworks. All in all, Europe's growing Indo-Pacific aspirations are diplomatically significant but strategically incomplete. To play a central role, Europe needs to embed itself in regional institutions such as ADMM-Plus, align defense engagement with economic development and integrate trusted regional partners into its defense industrial supply chains. These moves won't match American force projection or offset Chinese naval expansion, but they could anchor Europe as a durable, strategic partner in a region looking for options beyond the familiar two superpower poles. Marcus Loh is chairman of the Public Affairs Group at the Public Relations and Communications Association (PRCA) Asia Pacific. He also serves on the executive committee of SGTech's Digital Transformation Chapter, contributing to national conversations on AI, data infrastructure, and digital policy. A former president of the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore, Loh has played a longstanding role in shaping the relevance of strategic communication and public affairs in an evolving policy, technology and geoeconomic landscape.