
How India and Pakistan are preparing for the next conflict
Along the border separating
India from
Pakistan , the aftermath of five days of aerial combat hangs in the air, thick with uncertainty. The conflict's true legacy may be a dangerous new normal, analysts say – one where escalation is only ever a provocation away.
New Delhi maintains that Operation Sindoor – launched in response to a deadly terrorist attack in disputed Kashmir
in April that it blamed on Islamabad – is far from concluded, hinting at the possibility of further punitive actions.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has
promoted its army chief of staff , Asim Munir, to field marshal for what it regards as a successful defence of the nation between May 7 and 11.
Officials in Islamabad insist the country stands ready for renewed clashes, but caution that any escalation risks plunging both nations into a nuclear-armed stand-off. Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi has vowed not to succumb to what he calls Pakistan's 'nuclear blackmail'.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi salutes servicemen at an air base in Punjab on May 13. Photo: Indian Press Information Bureau/EPA-EFE
Any future confrontation could unfold in myriad ways, analysts say, shaped by the evolving strengths and vulnerabilities of both militaries.
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While less overt today, this military collaboration continues in more discreet and sophisticated forms. A strong indicator of sustained US strategic engagement is the consistent flow of financial and multilateral support to Pakistan—even during times of heightened geopolitical tension. In May 2025, amid escalating conflict with India following Operation Sindoor, Pakistan secured a crucial US$1 billion disbursement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under its $7 billion Extended Fund Facility. The release, widely believed to have been facilitated by US influence, was met with disapproval in India due to its timing during active hostilities, reinforcing the perception in New Delhi about Washington's long-standing geostrategic interests in Pakistan. Since 1958, Pakistan has received 24 IMF loan packages totaling around $34 billion, including a $1.3 billion tranche earlier in March 2025. At the same time, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved an $800 million assistance package—comprising a $300 million program-based loan and a $500 million policy-based loan. This support came in addition to previous climate resilience financing, including a $500 million CDREP loan. Despite Indian concerns about potential military diversion of the funds, these disbursements proceeded, signaling strong external backing. Furthermore, continuous US support for the maintenance and upgrade of Pakistan's F-16 fighter fleet continues to reflect a long-standing defense partnership between Rawalpindi and the Pentagon. Despite its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US continues to view Pakistan as a vital component of its broader regional strategy. Facilities like Noor Khan air base—and possibly others—are believed to serve as forward-operating locations for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. 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