Nothing is safe in Pakistan now... Pakistani experts afraid of India's..., scared of 'bunker buster' power of this Indian missile, not Brahmos
Following Operation Sindoor, Pakistan and the rest of the world saw the might of India's military power. India launched Operation Sindoor with missile strikes on terrorism-related infrastructure facilities of Pakistan-based militant groups Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan and PoK. For the first time India used Brahmos missile. How is Pakistan viewing Indian ballistic missiles? If Pakistan sees it as an existential threat and turns to nuclear weapons, such a response will be suicidal for both countries.
With India's Agni-V ballistic missiles and high-power conventional bunker-buster missiles, Pakistan is now more scared. Pakistani experts are saying that now neither the army will be safe in their country nor any underground hideout.
What is Pakistan scared of?
Pakistan's Dawn newspaper has said in its report that India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is modifying the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to carry a huge conventional warhead of 7,500 kg instead of a nuclear payload. This warhead can go up to 80-100 meters inside the ground before exploding. This will enable it to destroy deeply buried targets.
Will work like a bunker buster bomb?
The ability to penetrate its target underground will increase the power of the Agni missile manifold. Its ability to penetrate the ground is similar to America's GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) i.e. bunker buster bomb . This missile allows India to attack strong targets located at long distances quickly and without any warning.
India's new Agni-5 version can neutralise command centres, missile silos and other vital installations buried deep underground in countries like Pakistan and China. India is clearly developing a conventional weapon that can threaten the nuclear command bunkers and missile storage sites of its regional rivals, Dawn's report says.
Will there be violation of the atomic principle?
Pakistan is also concerned that the use of this weapon would not violate India's no first use (NFU) principle of nuclear weapons. The conventional Agni-5 bunker-buster could be argued to allow India to attack Pakistani nuclear assets without breaking its nuclear-freedom (NFU) pledge.
With a smaller and geographically limited arsenal than India, Pakistan has not adopted a no first use policy. Its nuclear policy leaves open the option of first use, conditionally linked to existential threats, including an overwhelming conventional attack by India.
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