Aim now is to provide state with advanced infra: Govt
Chief minister
Pramod Sawant
, at the state's Revolution Day event on Thursday, said that govt has provided all basic amenities to the citizens, and now the state is aiming to provide 'advanced infrastructure.
He said that, though Goa was liberated much later, it has seen significant development, and there is still a lot of scope for further development.
'From artificial intelligence to research and development, we will achieve Viksit Goa by 2037. Whether it is economic, social, or infrastructure development, we will see that Goa achieves it all. We have not stopped at Har Ghar Jal; we are working to provide Har Ghar Fibre.
"We will soon see our dream fulfilled,' said Sawant, after paying respects at the martyr's memorial at Azad Maidan along with Goa governor P S Sreedharan Pillai, in the presence of several freedom fighters.
He said that earlier, a revolution had to be ignited to free Goa from colonial rule, but now we need a revolution to keep Goa clean. 'Keeping Goa clean and green is not just the work of govt, but of every citizen. We should not misuse our freedom,' said Sawant.
'Goa has been achieving the number one position gradually in the 13 flagship programmes of central govt, whether it is water supply, power supply or the insurance for all scheme,' said Sawant.
He also announced the release of an animated film on Goa's freedom struggle on Liberation Day this year.
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Indian Express
5 hours ago
- Indian Express
What Trump is actually doing — and why India needs to press reform & reset
FOR all the disquiet in Delhi over US President Donald Trump's sugar-uncoated remarks, his rough and ready tactics on trade, there needs to be a sobering acknowledgment of two realities: one, like it or not, tough tactics often win on the street in a world that's never stopped being an unfair place; and, two, Trump has prevailed. Most mainstream economists dismissed his approach, warning that his aggressive tariff regime would spell disaster for the US economy. Yet, four months after unveiling his first tariff chart on April 2—dubbed 'Liberation Day'— and his second on Friday, Trump has gained enough ground to claim a significant victory. Like a gambler, who believes he is on a winning streak, Trump is set to roll the dice for far more sweeping changes in the post-war global financial and technological orders. The US President's bilateral negotiations are being described as the 'Trump Round' of trade talks, echoing the major rounds of GATT and WTO negotiations that shaped global commercial order. With the exception of Canada and China, most countries refrained from retaliatory tariffs. Instead, they lined up outside the White House, eager to strike deals before the extended August 1 deadline. India was among the early partners to start trade talks but failed to close a deal. While many major economies and middle powers signed agreements on Trump's terms, India now finds itself in the company of Brazil, Burma, and Switzerland facing steep US tariffs. To its credit, Delhi did recognise trade as central to Trump's second-term agenda. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's February 13 meeting with Trump produced a joint statement affirming the goal of expanding bilateral trade to $500 billion and launching time-bound trade negotiations. India negotiated in good faith and continuously. But the gap between India's negotiating brief and Trump's maximalist agenda proved too wide to bridge. Trump's growing impatience was evident in a barrage of tweets targeting India, while senior administration figures—Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Senator Marco Rubio—spoke publicly about the President's 'frustration' with Delhi's posture. Frustration had also defined Trump's first-term trade engagement with India. Robert Lighthizer, Trump's former US Trade Representative, recounts in his book, No Trade is Free, how difficult it was to conclude even a modest trade agreement with Delhi. He placed the blame not on India's bureaucracy, but on the entrenched interests of the Indian capitalists that fiercely guard the barriers protecting them from external competition. Lighthizer revealed he kept files on top Indian tycoons—whom he labeled 'oligarchs'—to better understand Delhi's negotiating strategy. Trump's complaint about India's 'obnoxious' non-tariff barriers rings familiar. India's neighbours have long voiced similar grievances, although a lot more politely. Yet, the deeper issue may be Delhi's underestimation of the scale and ambition of the Trump Round. Trump's goal was not merely a new bilateral deal here or there, but a systemic overhaul of the global trading order constructed after the Second World War and revamped at the turn of the millennium. On the campaign trail and in office, Trump has argued that the international trade regime has failed the American people—and must be overturned. The strategy, often dismissed as irrational, had a logic of its own. Stephen Miran, Trump's economic adviser, argued in a paper written before the presidential election that Washington could exploit the global export dependence on the US market—and allies' reliance on US security guarantees—to rewrite the rules. Miran describes the post-war free-trade order as a political construct, in which US policy sacrificed domestic industry for Cold War geopolitical goals. He proposed replacing blanket multilateralism with 'strategic pluralism,' forging separate deals with different nations based on US leverage. Before taking over at the Treasury, Bessent, too, hinted at the broader potential of tariffs—not just to reshape trade, but to pressure states on energy, currency, and strategic alignment. For Bessent, Trump's strategy was about a grand rebalancing of the global economy in America's favour. Trump has not held back. He has used tariffs for a variety of objectives. He imposed a 50% tariff on Brazil to weaken President Lula and help his rival Jair Bolsonaro. He is threatening tariffs on Indian and Chinese oil imports from Russia and using economic leverage to push BRICS countries away from their loose talk on de-dollarisation. In the last four months, three core pillars of Trump's strategy have become visible: using tariffs to narrow trade and fiscal deficits; mobilising investment to reindustrialise the US; and compelling trade partners to buy American energy and goods. Even countries with minimal trade ties to the US have had to offer something of interest to the White House. Pakistan's offering was its allegedly 'rich' oilfields. The EU, Japan, and South Korea have made sweeping pledges, including tariff concessions, major investments, and hefty American purchases. Whether these commitments are realised is another question. But they have delivered the optics of victory that Trump craves. What India offered remains unclear—but evidently, it was not enough. If Delhi was unprepared for Trump's counter-revolution in trade, it now faces an even more profound challenge: coping with a broader transformation of the global financial and technological order. Trump is targeting the foundations of the old monetary system. His administration's embrace of cryptocurrencies and stablecoins promises to reinforce the dollar's dominance over the global system and the US ability to leverage it. At the same time, Trump is aggressively deregulating artificial intelligence. At a recent AI summit in Pittsburgh, he announced a sweeping new policy to promote American AI dominance—especially over China—and pledged to invest a significant share of the revenues secured through trade negotiations into AI-driven industrial renewal. Trump's vision of American resurgence hinges less on outsourcing work and insourcing labour and more on technological innovation to restore US industrial might. In short, Trump is not just renegotiating trade. He is leading a radical overhaul of American capitalism by reshoring key elements of the supply chains, promoting a national industrial policy, and investing in tech-centric manufacturing in the United States. As India resumes trade talks with the US later this month, it must recognise this historic moment in the evolution of the global economy. Any negotiating strategy premised on maintaining the status quo at home at a time of radical change abroad will leave India more vulnerable—not just to US pressure, but to the accumulating costs of missing a long-overdue internal economic transformation. This is a moment that demands India to focus on reforming its own economy to make it globally competitive and technologically agile. India owes this to itself – and to its future. (C. Raja Mohan is a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express)
The Hindu
6 hours ago
- The Hindu
How will Trump's tariffs impact India?
The story so far: On July 30, U.S. President Donald Trump announced 25% tariffs on imports from India 'plus a penalty'. While this puts to rest months of speculation over what the tariffs would be on Indian imports into the U.S., it opens up fresh uncertainties with respect to a potential bilateral trade agreement between India and the U.S. What did Mr. Trump announce? Taking to social media, Mr. Trump cited India's tariff and non-tariff measures on trade, and its dealing with Russia on energy and military equipment, as the main reasons behind imposing the 25% tariffs and the penalty. There is no clarity yet on what the penalty will look like, but Mr. Trump has in the past threatened a 10% additional tariff on BRICS countries. If this comes to pass, then effective tariffs on Indian imports would be 35%. There is also a legislation in the U.S. in the process of being passed that could see an additional 500% tariff on India, China, and Brazil for their dealings with Russia. What does it mean for India? Tariffs are paid by importers. Therefore, tariffs on Indian imports would be paid by those in the U.S. that are importing Indian goods. That is, Indian goods will become more expensive for them. Therein lies the true problem for India. On a macro level, the tariffs and the impact they will have on Indian exports are expected to only lower India's GDP by 0.2%, according to research by the Bank of Baroda. So, if India's growth forecast had been 6.6%, then these tariffs — if they are imposed — could lower growth to 6.4%. However, the issue arises in individual sectors. According to the Bank of Baroda, sectors such as garments, precious stones, auto parts, leather products, and electronics (although their inclusion is uncertain) could face the pinch and would have to rework their strategies. 'The issue really is that some of the competing nations like Vietnam (20%), Korea (15%) and Indonesia (19%) have lower tariffs compared with India,' the Bank of Baroda added in its research note. How did things come to such a pass? While most trade deals are negotiated over years, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Mr. Trump in February 2025 announced that they would conclude the first tranche of a trade deal by fall. To put this in perspective, the recently-signed Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between India and the U.K. took about three years to negotiate. What made the announcement by Mr. Modi and Mr. Trump notable was that it came before the latter's big moves on reciprocal tariffs, which is what pushed other countries to start negotiating with the U.S. The announcement was thus a strong and positive commitment towards strengthening ties between the two countries. But then, on April 2, Mr. Trump announced his Liberation Day reciprocal tariffs. These included a 10% baseline tariff for all countries, and additional tariffs on a country-by-country case. For India, this total was 26%. However, just a week later, Mr. Trump announced a 90-day pause on these tariffs so that bilateral deals could be struck so as to reduce the U.S.'s trade deficit with most of its trading partners. The 90-day pause was to end in July, but Mr. Trump extended it to August 1. What are the points of friction? It's hard to pinpoint any single recent development that has soured relations, but there have been several points of friction between the two countries in the past few months. The matter of India's tariffs and non-tariff barriers has been something Mr. Trump has been highlighting since his first term as President. It was no surprise that he would take up the issue in his second term. Soured relations: The Hindu editorial on Trump's 25% tariff, 'penalty' Mr. Trump has brought up India's engagement with Russia, too, saying countries like India are partly financing Russia's war with Ukraine. India, however, has reiterated that it will secure its national and energy security, and if that means buying cheap Russian oil, then that is what it would do. Russia currently accounts for about 35-40% of India's oil imports, making it a significant partner. In addition, India has remained adamant about keeping core parts of its agriculture and dairy sectors out of trade deals, including with the U.S. This has upset negotiators on the U.S. side, but it is a 'red line' India will not cross. Opening up these sectors would expose India's relatively low-productivity farmers to global competition, which will likely have devastating impacts on their livelihoods. Then, there is the fact that Mr. Trump has repeatedly stated that it was him, and his trade talks, that encouraged India and Pakistan to agree to a ceasefire following the launch of Operation Sindoor by India. The fact that the Indian government has refuted it has only further angered Mr. Trump. Mr. Trump's claims have irked the Indian establishment as well, since it has provided the Opposition a means to attack the government. India has informed the World Trade Organization that it reserves the right to impose additional tariffs on imports from the U.S. to retaliate against its higher tariffs on items like steel, aluminium, and automobiles. Taking these things together, Mr. Trump's tariff announcement comes as a confirmation that at least one, if not all of these factors, worked toward souring relations. Will India continue paying these tariffs? Although there has been a lot of talk about a 'mini-deal' between India and the U.S. to walk back the reciprocal tariffs, Indian officials have been cagey about the date for such a deal. The tariff announcement by Mr. Trump confirms that such a deal is not coming. However, the two sides have been remarkably consistent about their commitment of having some sort of trade deal finalised by the fall 2025 deadline. So far, negotiators from the two sides have met in New Delhi and Washington five times, including the first meeting in March where the Terms of Reference for the negotiations were finalised. The team from the U.S. will visit India in late August to take forward the talks. Things have, however, become trickier for Indian negotiators because Mr. Trump has now directly linked India's dealings with Russia to India's trade relationship with the U.S. The tariffs will come into effect soon. According to an Executive Order dated July 31, Mr. Trump said that his duties on India and other countries would come into effect '7 days after the date of this order'. What about deals with other countries? Over the last month, Mr. Trump has concluded deals with the U.K., Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, the EU, and South Korea. The deal with the U.K. does not specify a general tariff level, but it will see British car exports to the U.S. attract a 10% tariff, down from the earlier 27.5% and a removal of tariffs on aerospace exports to the U.S. Japan negotiated lower tariffs of 15% for its exports to the U.S., the same as the EU.
NDTV
8 hours ago
- NDTV
Trump's Tariffs Leave A Lot Of Losers. But Even Winners Will Pay A Price
President Donald Trump's tariff onslaught this week left a lot of losers - from small, poor countries like Laos and Algeria to wealthy US trading partners like Canada and Switzerland. They're now facing especially hefty taxes - tariffs - on the products they export to the United States starting Aug 7. The closest thing to winners may be the countries that caved to Trump's demands - and avoided even more pain. But it's unclear whether anyone will be able to claim victory in the long run, even the United States, the intended beneficiary of Trump's protectionist policies. "In many respects, everybody's a loser here,'' said Barry Appleton, co-director of the Center for International Law at the New York Law School. Barely six months after he returned to the White House, Trump has demolished the old global economic order. Gone is one built on agreed-upon rules. In its place is a system in which Trump himself sets the rules, using America's enormous economic power to punish countries that won't agree to one-sided trade deals and extracting huge concessions from the ones that do. "The biggest winner is Trump," said Alan Wolff, a former US trade official and deputy director-general at the World Trade Organization. "He bet that he could get other countries to the table on the basis of threats, and he succeeded - dramatically.'' Everything goes back to what Trump calls "Liberation Day'' - April 2 - when the president announced "reciprocal'' taxes of up to 50% on imports from countries with which the United States ran trade deficits and 10% "baseline'' taxes on almost everyone else. He invoked a 1977 law to declare the trade deficit a national emergency that justified his sweeping import taxes. That allowed him to bypass Congress, which traditionally has had authority over taxes, including tariffs, all of which are now being challenged in court. Trump retreated temporarily after his Liberation Day announcement triggered a rout in financial markets and suspended the reciprocal tariffs for 90 days to give countries a chance to negotiate. Eventually, some of them did, caving to Trump's demands to pay what four months ago would have seemed unthinkably high tariffs for the privilege of continuing to sell into the vast American market. The United Kingdom agreed to 10% tariffs on its exports to the United States, up from 1.3% before Trump amped up his trade war with the world. The US demanded concessions even though it had run a trade surplus, not a deficit, with the UK for 19 straight years. The European Union and Japan accepted US tariffs of 15%. Those are much higher than the low single-digit rates they paid last year, but lower than the tariffs he was threatening (30% on the EU and 25% on Japan). Also, cutting deals with Trump and agreeing to hefty tariffs were Pakistan, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. Even countries that saw their tariffs lowered from April without reaching a deal are still paying much higher tariffs than before Trump took office. Angola's tariff, for instance, dropped to 15% from 32% in April, but in 2022 it was less than 1.5%. And while the Trump administration cut Taiwan's tariff to 20% from 32% in April, the pain will still be felt. "20% from the beginning has not been our goal, we hope that in further negotiations we will get a more beneficial and more reasonable tax rate," Taiwan's president Lai Ching-te told reporters in Taipei Friday. Trump also agreed to reduce the tariff on the tiny southern African kingdom of Lesotho to 15% from the 50% he'd announced in April, but the damage may already have been done there. Countries that didn't knuckle under - and those that found other ways to incur Trump's wrath - got hit harder. Even some of the poor were not spared. Laos' annual economic output comes to $2,100 per person and Algeria's $5,600, versus America's $75,000. Nonetheless, Laos got rocked with a 40% tariff and Algeria with a 30% levy. Trump slammed Brazil with a 50% import tax largely because he didn't like the way it was treating former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who is facing trial for trying to overturn his electoral defeat in 2022. Never mind that the US has exported more to Brazil than it's imported every year since 2007. Trump's decision to plaster a 35% tariff on longstanding US ally Canada was partly designed to threaten Ottawa for saying it would recognize a Palestinian state. Trump is a staunch supporter of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Switzerland was clobbered with a 39% import tax, even higher than the 31% Trump originally announced on April 2. "The Swiss probably wish that they had camped in Washington'' to make a deal, said Wolff, now senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. "They're clearly not at all happy.'' Fortunes may change if Trump's tariffs are upended in court. Five American businesses and 12 states are suing the president, arguing that his Liberation Day tariffs exceeded his authority under the 1977 law. In May, the US Court of International Trade, a specialized court in New York, agreed and blocked the tariffs, although the government was allowed to continue collecting them while its appeal wound its way through the legal system, and may likely end up at the US Supreme Court. In a hearing on Thursday, the judges on the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit sounded sceptical about Trump's justifications for the tariffs. "If (the tariffs) get struck down, then maybe Brazil's a winner and not a loser,'' Appleton said. Trump portrays his tariffs as a tax on foreign countries. But they are paid by import companies in the US who try to pass along the cost to their customers via higher prices. True, tariffs can hurt other countries by forcing their exporters to cut prices and sacrifice profits, or risk losing market share in the United States. But economists at Goldman Sachs estimate that overseas exporters have absorbed just one-fifth of the rising costs from tariffs, while Americans and US businesses have picked up the most of the tab. Walmart, Procter & Gamble, Ford, Best Buy, Adidas, Nike, Mattel and Stanley Black & Decker have all hiked prices due to US tariffs "This is a consumption tax, so it disproportionately affects those who have lower incomes,'' Appleton said. "Sneakers, knapsacks ... your appliances are going to go up. Your TV and electronics are going to go up. Your video game devices, consoles, are going to go up because none of those are made in America.'' Trump's trade war has pushed the average US tariff from 2.5% at the start of 2025 to 18.3% now, the highest since 1934, according to the Budget Lab at Yale University. And that will impose a $2,400 cost on the average household, the lab estimates. "The US consumer's a big loser, Wolff said.
