Reform UK wins three seats in Harlow and Thurrock by-elections
Reform UK has gained three seats in by-elections that took place across Essex. The party gained its first seat on Harlow Council and picked up two seats on Thurrock Council.Nigel Farage's party has been celebrating victories in local elections across England.There were six by-elections in total in Essex, with the other three seats being secured by the Liberal Democrats in Chelmsford.
Reform candidate Paul Jago won the seat in the Mark Hall ward in Harlow by polling 81 more votes than the Conservatives.The by-election took place after the Labour councillor quit.In the Ockendon ward in Thurrock, Alan Benson and Russel Cherry picked up the seats for Reform - meaning the party now has three seats on the council.Benson and Cherry secured more than 1,000 votes each - more than double that of their closest rival, Tory Sue Johnson who picked up 533.A decade ago, Farage's former party UKIP won seats in Ockendon.
Chelmsford's Liberal Democrat MP Marie Goldman vacated her position on Essex County Council and Chelmsford City Council to focus on her job in Westminster.Her seat on the county council for Chelmsford Central was won by Lib Dem David Loxton by 1,074 votes.Essex County Council, which comprises of 75 councillors, is controlled by the Tories.She stepped back from her Moulsham and Central seat on the city council - as did Lib Dem Graham Pooley due to ill health.Helen Ayres and Seán Manley won those two seats for the party.They secured more than 1,000 votes each, more than double that of their closest rival, Reform's Darren Brooke who got 572.
Follow Essex news on BBC Sounds, Facebook, Instagram and X.
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
New Statesman
2 hours ago
- New Statesman
Rachel Reeves' economic credibility is on the line
Photo byIt's Spending Review day, when Rachel Reeves gets to set departmental budgets for much of the rest of the parliament. The Chancellor's balancing act – ensuring public services have the day-to-day funds they need and are able to fulfil Labour's missions, without breaking her tax pledges or her 'ironclad' fiscal rules – is an unenviable one. George Eaton has already written this week on how Reeves intends to rebut the twin accusations that the government is embarking upon austerity 2.0 and that Labour is losing its grip on the purse strings. Today, Reeves will try to frame her stance – maintaining her fiscal rules while boosting overall spending by £300bn – around a pledge to 'invest in Britain's renewal'. 'In place of chaos, I choose stability. In place of decline, I choose investment,' she will say (with an accompanying promise of £39bn for a new Affordable Homes Programme over the next decade). It's a dangerous moment for Reeves: while the chatter about the precarity of her position at the start of the year has simmered down, there is real dismay within Labour at some of the Chancellor's choices, and her name is one of those most cited as patience begins to wear thin. We'll find out later this afternoon if Reeves can pull it off, but rather than speculating on what we might hear in a few hours' time, let's zoom out and examine the wider context. While Spending Reviews are always important, this one comes at a particularly critical time. Less than a year since winning a landslide victory, Labour's popularity has plummeted. Though the Conservatives remain in disarray, Reform has leapfrogged both mainstream parties to top the polls, with Nigel Farage presenting himself a realistic alternative prime minister. One of the key attack lines against Reform used by both Labour and the Tories has concerned economic credibility. Last month, Farage announced the outlines of Reform's economic programme, which consisted of lots of popular but expensive policies (slashing taxes while restoring the winter fuel allowance and scrapping the two-child benefit cap) with little word on how to pay for them. According to the IFS there is an estimated £80bn black hole in the plans. Cue accusations of 'fantasy economics' – or, as the Liberal Democrats pithily put it, 'Trussonomics on steroids'. The Farage-as-Truss comparison is one Keir Starmer has been hammering at PMQs. Unfortunately, the public do not seem to be buying it. New polling from More In Common ahead of the Spending Review contains much to terrify Downing Street, but most disturbing is surely the revelation that Reform and Labour are neck-and-neck on who the public trust most on the economy (on 22 per cent each) – with Starmer and Farage virtually tied in a head-to-head (51 per cent to 49 per cent, in Starmer's favour). Why isn't the Truss attack, which proved so effective at skewering the Tories (resentment over the mini-Budget still comes up on the doorstep), not working against Reform? One reason may be down to what people actually think happened back in October 2022. While there is widespread belief that 'Liz Truss crashed the economy', drill down in focus groups and you'll find people are far hazier on how exactly she managed to do so. 'They associate her with being shit but they don't know why,' as one pollster put it. And her failure is very much associated with the Tories. Farage could promise to do exactly what Truss did (his unfunded tax cuts are definitely comparable) and still skirt the toxicity associated with her. Subscribe to The New Statesman today from only £8.99 per month Subscribe There are other worrying insights in the More In Common polling – for Labour, the Tories, and anyone else who values a stable a economy. While 46 per cent of people believe Reform would indeed be a risk to the economy (compared to 29 per cent who don't), almost as many (40 per cent) believe the risk is worth it as 'Reform can't be any worse than other parties when it comes to managing the economy'. This is Farage's argument any time he's called out on his party's dodgy figures (such as in Wales on Monday), pointing to the Conservatives' economic record and Labour's current struggles, with the implicit message 'how much worse could Reform be?' There is an answer to that, and it's one that gives economists nightmares. But both Labour and the Tories need to find a way to tell it compellingly if they are to win on this key battleground. Two other nuggets stand out. First, on economic credibility, the Tories are actually going backwards, with a decline in how much people trust them on a range of economic metrics since March. (Reform has increased trust on all metrics, while Labour is a mixed bag.) Most of the polling will have taken place before Mel Stride made his speech disavowing the Truss era. It's an apology which many Tories believe should have come much sooner. Second, while people want an improvement in public services, there is little appetite for tax rises. The public seem to believe the progress they want can all be funded by that elusive ambition of cutting 'waste' – almost half of Brits (44 per cent) think the government could cut one fifth of government spending without damaging the economy or reducing the quality of public services. This is essentially Reform's argument, with its Musk-inspired DOGE initiative. If it were that easy, previous governments might have tried it. All of which paints Reeves into a corner, at a time when the government's economic credibility – and its wider political reputation – is at stake. The Chancellor needs to make the case for her fiscal rules to an audience that doesn't really understand why they're necessary. That's what her lines about 'stability' over 'chaos' are all about. And she must find a way to present her prioritisation of capital spending over day-to-day budgets not as austerity, but as investing in the future. It's the kind of challenge that requires not just a rock-solid grasp of the figures but a laser-like comms operation. Good luck, Rachel Reeves. [See more: Labour is losing Wales] Related
The National
3 hours ago
- The National
Anas Sarwar's joy quickly sours as reality of UK Labour's record bites
Claiming as Anas Sarwar tried in the immediate aftermath that the result was 'the first stone on the path to a Labour government next year' is less of a stretch and more heroic projection. But given what the story would have been if his party had failed, after a torrid few months you can hardly blame him for trying to put as much hot air in his balloon as he could manage. By Sunday, though, Sarwar's mood had clearly soured. His outing on The Sunday Show was little more than an angry rant, spending much of his airtime not so much failing to answer questions as failing to even allow them to be asked, talking over the presenter with a stream of vitriol about everyone from the SNP in general and John Swinney in particular, to the media itself. READ MORE: Controversial Loch Lomond Flamingo Land plans recalled by Scottish ministers Ironically, he seemed to have far more to say about the SNP warning about the dangers of Reform than he did about the dangers of the Reform party itself. For someone who wants and indeed needs the country to believe that he might still be in with a shout of being our next first minister, let's just say it wasn't very, well, first ministerial. The cause of all this anger? It was hard to tell. But you'd have to say Sarwar really doesn't like being asked to defend his party's dismal record in the UK Government. And he really, really didn't like having it pointed out to him that despite narrowly emerging with the most votes last Thursday, his party has seen a dramatic drop-off in support since last year's Westminster election. Now the smoke has cleared, the reality is this – as disappointing as it was from an SNP perspective not to win, the result was, give or take, in line with national Scotland-wide polling. (Image: Andrew Milligan/ PA Wire) While the SNP were well down on a high point of Holyrood 2021, Labour were also down on what was their 2021 low point. And when compared with the Westminster results last year, it's clear Labour support is down massively while the SNP are posting a modest revival. So, while Labour are not out of it yet, they are still well off the pace. For the SNP, it's a reminder if any were needed that while it was necessary for the party to 'steady the ship', this is insufficient in and of itself to bring the electoral success necessary to advance independence politically. For the Greens, it shows that even though they have no chance of winning first-past-the-post seats, if enough independence supporters favour them in an electoral contest they can take enough support to let a Unionist party slip through to victory. And as for the LibDems, it's clear that vast areas of Scotland are still complete no-go areas for them. In all the noise about Reform, however, one story seems to be being largely missed and that is how they are eating the Scottish Tories alive, to the point where if it continues, the Tories could end up duking it out for fourth, fifth or even sixth place in Holyrood next year between the Greens and the LibDems. It would be quite the fall from grace for the party that managed to take official opposition status at Holyrood under Ruth Davidson's brand. But as the brand tarnished in the slipstream of Boris Johnson, the aftermath of Brexit and the general vacuity of her eponymous project, so the politics and the rhetoric became ever more extreme. There's a distinction to be drawn between Reform the party and people voting Reform. The party seems to be attracting a motley mix of cranks, obsessives and opportunists as candidates, all of whom just about manage to agree with each other on who and what they dislike, and that, for now at least, 'in Nigel we trust'. But no matter what you can say about their public representatives and the hash they are making of the responsibilities they have been given, it's worth reflecting that not all of those who chose to favour them with their votes right now are necessarily signed up to the full-fat Reform agenda, scant on detail as that is. It's quite obvious large numbers of voters are scunnered right now. The cost of living crisis might be spoken of less but is no less present. If you have a frustration about the political system and the outcomes it has delivered; are disinclined to vote for independence as a route to something better; if you see a party which seems to be annoying all the right people as you see it; and if you feel the stakes are low enough, then 'why not?', you might feel. But back to the SNP. It should be clear by now there is no shortcut back to previous levels of popularity, and even if there is an 'independence button' out there to be pushed, it will only be to provide a temporary dopamine hit for the already convinced. If the SNP want to win back independence supporters – and crucially, those who are not yet independence supporters but who could be persuaded – the only route to that is through good government in the present; a clear vision for the future; and putting front and centre our arguments about why those who live in Scotland should be deciding what happens in Scotland.
The National
3 hours ago
- The National
What if we are wrong about reasons for rise in far-right support?
A year into government, it faces criticism for its economic decisions. The promise of change has quickly curdled into disappointment. And yet Labour won – beating both the SNP and Reform UK, which came in third with more than a quarter of the vote. It was a bruising night for the SNP. On Sunday, First Minister John Swinney appeared on television to defend his campaign strategy. He had framed the by-election as a two-horse race between the SNP and Reform – the implication being that a vote for anyone else was a wasted vote that might let the far right in. READ MORE: Controversial Loch Lomond Flamingo Land plans recalled by Scottish ministers That message didn't land. Swinney fell back on a now-familiar script: Reform voters are angry. They're frustrated. They feel ignored. But what if that's the wrong diagnosis? What if the real problem is not anger, but resentment – a quieter, more insidious emotion? And what if the people voting for the far right know exactly what they're doing? What if they are not reacting blindly but actively choosing a vision of society that speaks to them more clearly than anything being offered by the political mainstream? This uncomfortable argument is at the core of Michel Feher's work. In his book Producteurs et Parasites (Producers and Parasites), he explores why far-right movements are gaining traction and why their vision is compelling to voters. His central thesis is simple, yet difficult to swallow – the far-right vote isn't just about anger, it's about moral vision. Voters aren't simply rebelling against the status quo; they are choosing a worldview that resonates with their sense of who belongs and who deserves to be part of society. Far from portraying far-right voters as dupes or nihilists, Feher asks us to take their world-view seriously. He suggests that parties like France's Rassemblement National and, by extension, Reform UK, are not winning votes in spite of their ideology, but because of it. What they offer is not anger, but moral reassurance. Not a protest vote, but a deeply satisfying imaginary in which voters see themselves as the true contributors, the real backbone of the nation. Feher's concept for understanding this logic is 'producerism'. It divides society into two archetypes – producers and parasites. But unlike Marxist class analysis, this is not an economic structure of labour versus capital. It's a moral division. The producer is imagined as someone who works hard, plays by the rules, doesn't ask for much, and just wants to enjoy the legitimate fruits of their labour. The parasite is the person who benefits without contributing – the scrounger, the speculator, the bureaucrat, the outsider. This is not a vision of oppression – it's a vision of theft. And the emotional tone is not indignation at injustice, but resentment; not 'how can we fix this?', but 'why do they get more than they deserve?'. Feher highlights a second layer. Producerist imaginaries don't see a single enemy but two. Parasites come in two flavours: those from above – speculators, financiers, 'globalists,' intellectual elites; those who profit from circulation rather than production. And the parasites from below – the 'welfare class,' immigrants, bureaucrats; those who live off redistribution, taking more than they give. This brings Feher to a striking distinction – producerism is not quite populism. Populism traditionally casts the 'people' at the bottom of a pyramid, rising up against a corrupt elite. Producerism instead imagines society as a bell curve: a decent, hard-working middle ground, flanked by parasitic extremes. In this worldview, the political mission is not to empower the bottom, but to purify the middle, to restore a world in which only those who contribute are allowed to remain. That's why it sounds so moderate to those who believe in it. It's not radical or extremist in tone, it's moral, tidy, 'common sense.' And this is what makes it so dangerous. Once structural injustice is replaced by moral blame, the solution is no longer reform — it's expulsion. Feher is writing about the Rassemblement National in France, but his framework travels well. In Britain, Reform UK has little of the traditional anti-financial elite tone that Marine Le Pen's party has adopted in the past decade. (Image: Stephanie Lecocq, REUTERS) Reform's leadership – Nigel Farage, Richard Tice, Zia Yusuf – are millionaires. The party doesn't rail against financiers or landlords. Quite the opposite: it champions them. But that doesn't mean it's not producerist. It simply defines 'producers' differently. In this imaginary, the ideal citizen is not necessarily working class, they are self-reliant. A homeowner, a small investor, a taxpayer. Someone who doesn't take handouts. Someone who resents the idea their contributions are being diverted to the undeserving. In that world, a millionaire investor doesn't contradict the narrative. He embodies it. One of Feher's most sobering insights is historical. Producerism was not always a right-wing idea. It was born in the revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries – in the cry of the French Third Estate against a parasitic nobility living off land and bloodlines. In its early form, producerism was a left-wing demand for justice. Those who worked deserved dignity; those who inherited wealth deserved scrutiny. But over the 19th century, especially as Marxist class analysis took hold on the left, producerism drifted rightward. Thinkers like Proudhon began to attack not just rentiers and tax collectors, but Jews and foreigners — the scapegoats of modern nationalism. The figure of the 'good producer' became nationalised and moralised. What had begun as a critique of structural privilege became a fantasy of national purification, a return to a society made up only of hard-working, self-sufficient 'real' people. That legacy still shapes the far right today. When Le Pen talks about giving money 'back to the French,' or when Reform UK say they want to 'take back control' and reward British workers, they are drawing on this same moral economy. The appeal of producerism is not just that it names a culprit, it reassures the voter that they are on the right side of the ledger. That they give more than they take. That they are good. But, as Feher warns, that clarity comes at a cost. It replaces the politics of solidarity with the politics of resentment. It prepares the ground for policies that punish the weak, not the powerful. To confront this, the left needs more than economic fixes or anti-fascist slogans. It needs a competing moral vision – one that celebrates interdependence, that revalues care, that speaks to people's desire for dignity without turning it into a demand for exclusion. In the final pages of Producteurs et Parasites, Feher argues that the 2024 French legislative elections – triggered by Emmanuel Macron in a gamble to stop the far right – shattered a comforting illusion, the idea that Rassemblement National voters were merely 'angry,' not truly adherent. What the results revealed, Feher writes, is that this was no protest vote, it was one of conviction. Jordan Bardella, RN's rising leader, had bent over backwards to reassure the markets before the second round. He pledged not to repeal the pension reform, not to cut VAT on basic goods and to postpone a new wealth tax. None of this cost him votes. On the contrary, Feher notes, commentators across the spectrum were forced to admit the obvious: this was a vote of adhesion – proud, informed, desired. Faced with this reality, Feher argues, the only response is a counter-force of equal moral intensity. And here, surprisingly, the left responded, not because of polls or media tactics but because it remembered antifascism is its foundation. Facing an existential threat, the left united around core values, a shared way of life, and an unwavering commitment to its principles. Its campaign, built on a clear platform of rebuilding public services, strengthening common security, championing rights, and rejecting discrimination, surpassed all expectations. Their success wasn't about tactics; it was about remembering their fundamental purpose. Maybe there's a valuable lesson to learn there.
