DRC, Rwanda sign peace deal in US
The deal is aimed at ending decades of conflict in eastern DRC and the M23 rebel group's territorial gains in key cities including Goma.
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Daily Maverick
07-07-2025
- Daily Maverick
Domestic power struggles likely to complicate US brokered Rwanda-DRC peace deal
Peace efforts must acknowledge the deeply political nature of the eastern DRC crisis, including the fallout from the collapsed power-sharing deal between Joseph Kabila and Félix Tshisekedi. Recent efforts to resolve the M23 crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have taken a new turn. After the breakdown of the Angola-led Luanda talks in mid-December 2024, a joint East African Community-Southern African Development Community attempt to merge the Luanda and Nairobi processes started in early 2025. However, Qatar ultimately facilitated the April Doha dialogue between Kinshasa and the M23 rebel group with its political affiliate, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). Then, on 27 June, regional talks spearheaded by the US led to a peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. The US-brokered negotiations aim to secure the Rwandan forces' withdrawal from eastern DRC and end Rwanda's support to AFC/M23. The incentive for doing so is the DRC's commitment to neutralising the Forces Démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) armed group – Rwanda's main security concern in east DRC. Despite its significance, the deal faces criticism for trading Congolese sovereignty for US access to critical minerals, as part of a transactional form of peace mediation. Previous agreements that bargained Rwandan withdrawal in exchange for actions against the FDLR failed after they were repeatedly violated, leading to more violence. The current plan for FDLR neutralisation and Rwandan withdrawal was developed initially under the Luanda process – before M23's takeover of Goma and Bukavu – making it outdated. It fails to address the question of military operations against the FDLR in rebel-held territory, and doesn't deal with the Rwandan and rebel presence far outside zones of FDLR influence. Congolese and US efforts to obtain a Rwandan withdrawal before signing the deal failed, making Rwanda's retreat conditional on anti-FDLR measures. Given the FDLR's deep entrenchment and the lack of clear criteria for 'neutralisation', these terms risk prolonging both Rwandan and rebel occupation, rather than ending it. AFC/M23 leadership has called the Rwanda-DRC peace agreement a 'useful, but limited, step'. The deal is meant to provide leverage for a settlement with AFC/M23, which Kinshasa hopes to sign before a Washington heads of state summit in July. M23 has announced new rounds of talks, though progress has stalled. AFC/M23 accuses the DRC government of refusing concessions, while Kinshasa questions the rebellion's willingness to withdraw. Although AFC/M23 says confidence-building measures are needed to start talks, it ultimately favours a political settlement that ensures its long-term influence in eastern DRC. Kinshasa, however, prefers rebel integration on a case-by-case basis, seeing AFC/M23 as largely beholden to Rwandan interests – an assessment consistently backed by United Nations reports. The challenge is that a Rwandan withdrawal, while necessary for a domestic peace process, might also bury the deal's prospects, as Rwandan backing has been central to M23's strength in any negotiations. Domestic political complexities further complicate peace talks, particularly since former president Joseph Kabila resurfaced. The difficult relationship between President Félix Tshisekedi and the AFC/M23 is shaped by internal power struggles with Kabila. After a bargain with Kabila brought Tshisekedi to power in 2019, political control largely remained with Kabila. To compensate for this, Tshisekedi relied on regional diplomacy, enhancing security and economic cooperation with Rwanda and initiating dialogue with exiled M23 leaders. When he broke with Kabila in 2020 and consolidated power, Rwandan cooperation and M23 dialogue ended, enabling the group's resurgence in November 2021. The collapse of this power-sharing arrangement prompted Corneille Nangaa, former electoral commission chair and facilitator of the 2019 deal, to form the M23-aligned AFC. This hardened Kinshasa's stance, reinforcing its refusal to negotiate and efforts to weaken the exiled Kabila, considered the architect of the AFC/M23 alliance. In late 2024, Kabila re-emerged with fellow Katangan politician Moïse Katumbi to oppose Tshisekedi's proposed constitutional reforms. They made joint calls for national dialogue alongside opposition figures like Martin Fayulu, who was sidelined by the Kabila-Tshisekedi 2019 power-sharing deal. Kinshasa used legal and political means to target Kabila. He returned to the DRC in May 2025 via rebel-held eastern territory, where he remains. Kabila's motives remain speculative, ranging from a sincere desire for peace to personal and political gain. He positions himself as a key actor in an eventual peace process by engaging in local dialogues with communities, religious and customary leaders, and rebel authorities in the eastern DRC. Inspired by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that ended the 2002 Second Congo War, Kabila hopes a national dialogue would allow for renewed political bargaining, reversing political and legal actions against him, his family and allies. One setting for such a dialogue is the National Episcopal Conference of Congo-Church of Christ in Congo (CENCO-ECC) peace initiative, which proposes a broad conversation on the root causes of conflict in the east, potentially involving rebel groups. However, the government seeks to exclude AFC/M23 and its allies. Encouraged by Fayulu's recent outreach to form a 'camp de la Patrie', Tshisekedi is framing national dialogue around a divide between a 'republican front' and a 'rebel front' linked to Rwanda, the AFC/M23 and Kabila. He hopes the peace deal with Rwanda will strengthen his domestic position and lead to a unity government opposed to the country's balkanisation. Kabila's relations with M23 and Rwanda remain ambiguous. While both might consider him useful for gaining leverage, past experiences make them wary. He also lacks regional backing. Ugandan military chief Muhoozi Kainerugaba recently blamed Kabila for regional instability and opposed Kabila's call for foreign forces to withdraw. Instead, Uganda signed a bilateral agreement expanding military operations in eastern DRC, aligning with Tshisekedi despite Uganda's ambiguous stance on M23. While Kabila may use the M23 crisis to reassert his political relevance, Tshisekedi's approach appears driven by a desire to sideline him. The result is growing political fragmentation that could undermine peace prospects. Yet the alternative – broad political inclusion – carries risks too, potentially providing legitimacy and political payoffs to insurgent violence. The question of inclusion must be approached cautiously, drawing lessons from past peace deals that prioritised integration but failed to resolve underlying issues. For the Rwanda-DRC deal to provide a route to peace, implementation must be thorough, requiring sustained US engagement and pressure. Peace efforts must also acknowledge the deeply political nature of the eastern DRC crisis. That includes the fallout from the collapsed power-sharing deal between Kabila and Tshisekedi, growing polarisation, democratic backsliding and deteriorating governance. Nevertheless, the Doha process and particularly the CENCO-ECC initiative should not become politicised by the struggle between Kabila and Tshisekedi. A CENCO-ECC-led national dialogue could examine how insurgent violence and politics have become so intertwined, enabling a shift from a culture of impunity to a path of justice, accountability and peace. DM
TimesLIVE
06-07-2025
- TimesLIVE
Rwanda's Kagame unsure whether peace deal with DRC will hold
Rwandan President Paul Kagame said on Friday he was unsure whether a US-brokered peace deal would hold with Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and warned he would respond to any "tricks" from his neighbour. The agreement signed last week calls for Rwandan troops to withdraw within 90 days from eastern DRC, where the UN says they are supporting M23 rebels who seized the region's two largest cities earlier this year. Rwanda denies helping M23 and says its forces are acting in self-defence against Congo's army and ethnic Hutu militiamen linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, including from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Kagame told reporters in Kigali that Rwanda was committed to implementing the deal, but that it could fail if DRC did not live up to its promises to neutralise the FDLR. "If the side that we are working with plays tricks and takes us back to the problem, then we deal with the problem like we have been dealing with it," Kagame said. He said he was grateful for the involvement of US President Donald Trump's administration in mediation efforts.
IOL News
06-07-2025
- IOL News
Washington Agreement masks complex regional dynamics
US SECRETARY of State Marco Rubio (C) hosted a peace agreement signing with Democratic Republic of the Congo Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner (R) and Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe (L) at the State Department in Washington, DC, on June 27, 2025. Image: AFP Dr. Sizo Nkala Earlier this year, the DRC President Felix Tshisekedi reached out to US President Donald Trump for security assistance in the form of training and equipment supplies for his forces to enable them to push back the rebel advance in North and South Kivu provinces. In return, US companies would get exclusive access to the DRC's abundant reserves of critical minerals such as cobalt, coltan, lithium and tantalum, among others, which are important for the US industrial competitiveness and technological dominance. This overture led to the Trump administration's active mediation of the conflict involving Rwanda and the DRC, culminating in a peace agreement signed by the two countries on the 27th of June in Washington, DC, United States. Mediated by the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, the deal seeks to end the deadly conflict in eastern DRC that has been raging for decades and has put the two countries at loggerheads. The United Nations and the DRC government have claimed that Rwanda has not only been funding the biggest rebel group in eastern DRC, the M23, but also has up to 4000 soldiers fighting alongside the M23. While Rwandan President Paul Kagame has denied the allegations, he has described Rwanda's involvement in the DRC debacle as 'defensive measures'. On its part, Rwanda has accused the DRC government of funding and arming the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) – a militia group made up of members of the Hutu ethnic group, accused of participating in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The goal of the FDLR is to topple the Kagame regime, which hounded them out of the country when it took power in 1994. The peace deal comes amidst the escalation of the conflict, which has seen the M23 rebels capturing major cities and airports in Congo's North and South Kivu provinces in recent months. The group is also helping itself to the lucrative critical minerals like cobalt, coltan, and lithium found in huge deposits in some of the areas it has key commitments were made in the peace agreement. Firstly, under the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, both countries agreed to implement the Harmonised Plan Neutralisation of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda, which they agreed to in October 2024 under the auspices of the Luanda Process mediated by the Angolan President Joao Lourenco. This is a tacit admission by both parties that they have been supporting non-state forces to counter each other. Concerning Rwanda, the phrase 'disengagement of forces' may be referring to the alleged presence of members of the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) fighting alongside the M23. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ Ad loading Secondly, they agreed to a ceasefire by refraining from any acts of aggression against each other, resolving their differences peacefully through the dispute resolution mechanism established by the agreement, and restraining or withdrawing support for armed groups in their territories. This ceasefire already seems to be shaky as the fighting has reportedly continued even after the signing of the deal. Thirdly and crucially, the parties committed to the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the members of non-state armed groups into the community and the DRC security forces, including the army and the police. This will be a test for the Washington Agreement, as previous peace agreements – the Pretoria Agreement of 2002 and the Nairobi Agreement in 2013 – have collapsed because of the failure to disarm and reintegrate members of the rebel groups. Further, DRC and Rwanda agreed to set up a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism within 30 days, which will monitor and verify the withdrawal of support for and the disbandment of rebel groups. The safe return of refugees to their countries, the return of internally displaced people to their homes and the opening up of a humanitarian corridor were also among the commitments made by the two parties. Importantly, the agreement also enjoined Rwanda and the DRC to jointly produce a regional integration economic framework within three months to, among other things, promote investment and trade in critical mineral supply chains and block the illicit flow of minerals. The framework will promote bilateral economic cooperation, including joint work on 'formalised end-to-end mineral value chains (from mine to processed metal) that link both countries, in partnership, as appropriate, with the U.S. government and U.S. investors'. Finally, the agreement established the Joint Oversight Committee, made up of the African Union facilitators, the US, and Qatar, to help resolve differences and complaints in the implementation of the agreement. However, the published part of the agreement does not reveal anything about the US commitments to military assistance for the DRC. Just like his minerals for security deal with Ukraine earlier this year, it seems Trump has dodged making any security guarantees to the DRC. The agreement demands that the DRC create a safe investment environment first to pave the way for US investment. But the DRC does not have the capacity to address the security situation without direct assistance from the US. What is needed in the DRC is state-building, which the agreement does not address. If its dismal misadventures in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya are anything to go by, the US is clueless when it comes to state-building in foreign countries. Further, the enforcement of the agreement is placed on the laps of the DRC and Rwanda – two countries that share mutual distrust. It takes no genius to see that their leaders working together in good faith on such delicate issues as disarmament and demobilisation is almost impossible at the moment. Another key weakness of the agreement is that it excludes the rebel groups, particularly the M23, which is the most potent and primary military actor in eastern DRC. The group's leaders have already said they will not be bound to an agreement they are not part of. Without the buy-in of the M23 and other rebel groups, a ceasefire, as demanded by the agreement, will not be possible. There have been many ceasefire agreements previously that were invariably honoured in the breach. This agreement does not provide any special safeguards to ensure that the ceasefire will hold. Neither were representatives of civil society organisations, and the various ethnic groups found in the DRC included in the negotiations, which makes the agreement feel like a shallow elite pact devoid of legitimacy.
