Philippines set for ‘more robust' Balikatan joint drills, but no mention of Typhon
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Without giving detailed information on the dates and number of soldiers slated to join the drills, Brigadier General Michael Logico, Balikatan's executive agent, said last week that the 40th Balikatan exercises would be a full battle test.
'There will be participation coming from the Australian Defence Force and the Japanese Self Defence Force,' Logico told reporters at a briefing after a live fire exercise last week in Capas, Tarlac, adding he was waiting for 'newer developments from other countries' before giving further details on this year's Balikatan.
Like last year, the drills will feature sinking exercises 12 nautical miles outside the Philippines' territorial waters.
The Typhon missile system was deployed in the Philippines during the first phase of the Salaknib exercise in April of last year and used in the Balikatan joint exercises the following month.
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Muhammad Faizal Bin Abdul Rahman, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, told This Week in Asia the coming Balikatan drills would continue to serve as a deterrent against China along the first island chain, where Philippine interests in the South China Sea and the security of the Taiwan Strait were implicitly linked.
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AllAfrica
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The AIIB's accountability mechanism, its president and its board should have the power to call for an investigation into whether a project complies with AIIB's environmental and social standards. The AIIB is responsible for compliance with its own rules, so it should be able to initiate an independent investigation even if no complaint is filed. The AIIB's accountability mechanism policy should be reviewed every five years to ensure that it is maturing alongside the bank. This is standard practice to ensure that AIIB's policies and practices don't become outdated. If the bank adopts these changes, we will applaud the bank's evolution towards responsible investing. If the bank does not adopt these changes, we will have proof that the bank cares more about itself than its mission. The AIIB does not have to be the same as other multilateral development banks; indeed, its promise lies in new approaches it can bring to improve upon past development practices. 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