
Harvey Weinstein Lawyer Asks Jury To Give Him Benefit Of The Doubt
United States:
The lawyer defending fallen Hollywood mogul Harvey Weinstein from rape and sexual assault charges called on jurors to give him the benefit of the doubt Tuesday before prosecutors make their closing argument at his retrial.
A New York state appeals court had thrown out his 2020 convictions after irregularities in the presentation of witnesses at his original trial, forcing two victims of his alleged abuse to testify a second time.
"If there is a doubt about their case, you gotta throw it out. These are the people they want you to believe, they're all women with broken dreams," defense attorney Arthur Aidala said of the women who testified against Weinstein at this trial.
Prosecutors will make their case to the jury later Tuesday.
Weinstein, the producer of box-office hits "Pulp Fiction" and "Shakespeare in Love," has never acknowledged wrongdoing.
He is serving a 16-year prison sentence after being convicted in California of raping and assaulting a European actress more than a decade ago.
Two of the accusers in the case -- onetime production assistant Miriam Haley and then-aspiring actress Jessica Mann -- testified at Weinstein's original trial.
Their accounts helped galvanize the #MeToo movement nearly a decade ago, but the case is being re-prosecuted at a new trial in New York.
His 2020 convictions on charges relating to Haley and Mann were overturned last year by the New York Court of Appeals, which ruled that the way witnesses were handled in the original trial was unlawful.
The retrial also heard new evidence from Kaja Sokola, a Polish former model who testified that the disgraced movie mogul sexually assaulted her when she was a minor at age 16.
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Mint
8 minutes ago
- Mint
Europe cannot fathom what Trumpian America wants from it
Carl von Clausewitz, a 19th-century Prussian general, described warfare as 'the realm of uncertainty'. The fellow never had to deal with an American administration run by Donald Trump. Forget the fog of war Clausewitz posited; Europe is discovering the perils of wading through the haze of Pax Americana, MAGA edition. Wish it luck. Being the biggest trading partner of a country that seeks 'liberation' through tariffs, or a decades-long military ally of a superpower now parroting Kremlin talking points, is akin to inching through a geopolitical pea-souper. Europe is hardly alone in being flummoxed by Mr Trump (many Americans are, too). But it faces a unique problem: Europe cannot fathom what it should do to fix its already broken relationship with the new administration. Even if Europeans wanted to help their historical partner—a big 'if' these days—disagreements abound as to what that partner wants. The alliance with America has never been entirely straightforward. Yankee gripes about anaemic European military spending go back decades. A continent striving for ever-closer union was occasionally splintered into factions for American convenience, as when George W. Bush's lot tried to pit 'old Europe' against 'new Europe' during the Gulf war. American regulators clobbered French and German firms with billion-dollar fines while decrying any constraints on their own tech giants doing business in the European Union. Even pro-European administrations wound up blindsiding the continent's policymakers. In 2022 Joe Biden announced generous green-industry subsidies (Bravo!) which turned out to be closed to market-leading firms in Europe (Zut alors!). But this time is different. The Trumpian top brass making decisions of great import to Europe—not least over the fate of Ukraine—hold America's historical allies in startling contempt. In a recent leak from a not-so-secret Signal group of top officials, Europe was decried as 'PATHETIC' by Pete Hegseth, the defence secretary. J.D. Vance was just as critical, though this was predictable after the vice-president had blasted Europeans at a conference in Munich in February. Mr Trump had himself set the tone, imagining that the EU had been set up with the sole intent to 'screw' America. On April 2nd he whacked European imports with a tariff rate of 20%. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, said she felt 'let down by our oldest ally'. Speaking to diplomats in Brussels and beyond, Charlemagne has heard three theories to explain MAGA hatred of Europe. Understanding which is correct matters, because each comes with its own set of remedies to assuage the Euro-bashers. The first possibility is that Mr Trump simply shares his predecessors' desire that Europeans bear the burden for their own defence, and feels unconstrained by diplomatic niceties in making the case. Barack Obama warned over a decade ago that America would 'pivot to Asia' (ie, away from Europe and the Middle East) to address a Chinese threat that has since grown more acute. That did little to motivate Europe into spending more. By contrast, Trumpian goading—insulting as it might seem—has been effective at getting allies to step up. If scrimping on defence is indeed what troubles America, the solution is on its way: Europe will promise to spend much more on defence at a NATO summit in June. The second theory of MAGA Euro-hostility is more worrying. According to this school, the invective directed at Europe is about more than freeloading on defence. After all, America's Asian allies also underspend on their armed forces but are facing no such abuse. Rather, Europe is being punished for its crime of lèse-Amérique. By banging on about global norms, Europeans are an irritant to might-makes-right Trumpians. How dare the EU regulate Big Tech? How dare Denmark think Greenland would not be better off in American hands? Europe's role should be to play second fiddle, or, better yet, pipe down. On this reading, to be a better ally, Europe would have to bend the knee, for example by helping constrain China at Washington's behest. This may be humiliating, if not downright unrealistic in the case of ceding Greenland, which is not Denmark's to give away. But seasoned EU diplomats think it may provide the basis for a fraught but workable relationship. Yet some European officials perceive a third kind of MAGA animosity, one they are powerless to do anything about. For this contempt is aimed at a continent that exists only in the imagination of Fox News presenters (as Mr Hegseth once was). Europhobes of this type see it as a flailing continent on the economic skids, one bent on demographic suicide, where the only people who enjoy free speech are Muslim extremists imposing sharia on a woke populace. For them, Europe is a cautionary tale: what America might degenerate into without Mr Trump's 'help'. This fantastical vision offers Europe no way to indulge America, short of handing over power to the likes of Alternative for Germany, a Nazi-adjacent party bafflingly admired by Mr Vance. To be fair to the MAGA Euro-bashers, their spite towards Europe is reciprocated—as any leak of European leaders' candid Signal chats about Mr Trump and his team would probably attest. Without any certainty as to why they are loathed in Washington, Europeans are falling back on their old diplomatic instincts: keep engaging and don't despair. Sometimes it works. On March 29th Alexander Stubb, Finland's president, spent hours playing golf with Mr Trump at Mar-a-Lago. Soon after, Mr Trump declared himself 'pissed off' with Russia's Vladimir Putin for failing to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine—a useful win for Europe. Many hope America might still give concrete support to a Europe-led 'reassurance force' in Ukraine. Occasionally, the two old allies still manage to find one another, through the bitter mist. Subscribers to The Economist can sign up to our Opinion newsletter, which brings together the best of our leaders, columns, guest essays and reader correspondence.
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First Post
an hour ago
- First Post
'Near consensus': Hegseth says Nato close to deal on 5% defence spending
US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth on Thursday said Nato allies are nearing consensus on a new defence spending target of 5% of GDP, a longstanding demand from President Donald Trump to member states read more Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, left, and Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte deliver statements ahead of a meeting of Nato defence ministers at Nato headquarters in Brussels, on Thursday. AP US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth on Thursday said Nato allies are nearing consensus on a new defence spending target of 5% of GDP, a longstanding demand from President Donald Trump to member states. Trump has for months said he wants Nato allies to boost investment in defence to 5% of gross domestic product, up from the current target of 2%. No country is yet at 5%, not even the US, but Hegseth said there was progress on agreeing to the target. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Speaking after a meeting with Nato defence ministers in Brussels, Hegseth said, 'I think it is, it is worth taking a moment to note the historic nature of what just occurred in there, which is not an end state, there's still more to go. But considering 2% was the goal that President Trump set out in his first term, President Trump said other countries need to carry the burden, pay the fair share, and a lot of people thought that was impossible, it couldn't happen, and here we are: countries in there are well exceeding 2% and we think very close, almost near consensus, on a 5% commitment for Nato.' He, however, said there are a few countries that are not quite there yet but expressed the desire to get them there. 'I won't name any names. It's amongst friends in that room. We'll get them there. But from France to Germany to the Baltics to the Nordic countries to Poland to Greece to Hungary, to so many more, the commitment is there 5% on defence spending. When you consider the threats that we face, the urgency in the world, it's critical,' he added. 'Capability targets' Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte confirmed ministers agreed on 'capability targets' to strengthen military readiness. These targets involve priority acquisitions like long-range missiles, drones, and air defence systems, as well as logistics tools to enhance rapid deployment. 'All these investments have to be financed,' AP quoted Rutte as saying. Earlier in the days as he arrived for the Nato meeting, Hegseth said that all Nato members must commit to spending 5% of their GDP on defence by the upcoming summit of Nato leaders scheduled for June 24–25. According to diplomats, European allies recognise that increasing defence spending is essential to securing continued US support for the continent's security. They believe enabling President Trump to claim a victory on his 5% demand is key to maintaining American engagement, especially during the Hague summit, reported Reuters. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD 'That will be a considerable extra investment,' Rutte told reporters. He expressed confidence that at the Hague summit, 'we will decide on a much higher spending target for all the nations in Nato.' In an effort to reach Trump's 5% target, Rutte has proposed that alliance members increase direct defence spending to 3.5% of GDP and allocate an additional 1.5% to broader security-related initiatives, Reuters reported. Hegseth expressed support for that plan on Thursday. 'You got to spend to have hard power,' Reuters quoted Hegseth as saying. 'This alliance, we believe, in a matter of weeks, will be committing to 5%: 3.5% in hard military and 1.5% in infrastructure and defence-related activities, that combination constitutes a real commitment.' Spain not on board However, not all member states are aligned. Spain, for instance, has expressed hesitation about adopting the 5% target. 'We think that this 2% is enough to meet the responsibilities we have committed to,' Reuters quoted Spanish Defence Minister Margarita Robles as saying on Thursday. 'What is important is that each country is able to meet the objectives it has set itself,' Robles added. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Nato's investment plan Negotiations over Nato's new investment plan are expected to continue up to the summit's eve. Meanwhile, Rutte said allies are set to agree Thursday on 'historic' new capability targets —defining troop numbers, weapons, and ammunition contributions — to better balance defence efforts across Europe, Canada, and the US. Germany will need 50,000–60,000 additional active troops under the proposed targets, according to German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius. Disagreements remain over the timeline for meeting the 5% spending goal. Rutte has suggested 2032, a deadline some Eastern European countries say is too slow, while others see it as too ambitious. Estonia wants the target reached within five years. 'We don't have time for 10 years, we don't have time even for seven years,' said Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur. Sweden is pushing for 2030. Debate also continues over what counts as 'defense-related' spending, with possible inclusion of cybersecurity and certain infrastructure projects. With inputs from agencies


Indian Express
an hour ago
- Indian Express
With Poland's new president, Europe's rightward tilt becomes more pronounced than ever
Written by Aman K Pandey If last week's presidential election result in Poland confirms anything, it is the populist zeitgeist in Europe, where conservative, populist, and far-right parties are now on a path of normalisation. Just last week, the far-right Chega, founded only in 2019, became the largest opposition force in the Portuguese parliament — just like the AfD in Germany, which became the principal opposition party in the Bundestag following the snap election held in February. The trend was visible in last year's elections for the European Parliament, where far-right forces from different countries gained a favourable share of the vote, although not on the scale and magnitude predicted by many pre-election polls. The only recent exception to this trend was the election of Nicușor Dan to the Romanian presidency with a decisive eight-point majority over his populist rival, George Simion. But given the broader trend in Europe, the result of the Romanian election looks like an outlier. The continued rise of right-wing and populist forces has changed the political dynamics in Europe, where mainstream centrist and liberal parties have been forced to react to the new reality by adopting agendas once considered exclusive to the former, such as tighter immigration rules and increased border security. What is common to these elections is the direct support of US President Donald Trump and members of his administration for many of the far-right candidates. While the right-wing presidential candidate in Romania had openly declared himself a follower and supporter of Trump, Karol Nawrocki — now the President of Poland — had visited the White House before the election and was openly endorsed by Kristi Noem, the Homeland Security Secretary and a member of the Conservative Political Action Conference of the US, which seeks to promote conservative ideas across the world. This endorsement came just five days before the second round of the election was scheduled to take place on 1 June. Similarly, many leaders — like Herbert Kickl of Austria, Marine Le Pen of France, Andrej Babiš of the Czech Republic, and more prominently, Viktor Orbán, the poster boy of Make Europe Great Again (MEGA) — have expressed admiration for Trump and praised his leadership, showcasing their ideological alignment. The overt support of Trump for these populist parties has prompted mainstream European leaders and parties to accuse his supporters of interference in European domestic politics. The critical support that Elon Musk provided to Alice Weidel, the AfD candidate in the German election, prompted Friedrich Merz to warn the billionaire of possible consequences for interfering in the German election. The open support that Vice President JD Vance gave to the AfD, and his harsh criticism of European allies — while addressing a gathering at the Munich Security Conference — for allegedly hindering free speech, only reinforced this belief. Although far-right parties do not share universal agreement on many issues facing Europe — the conflict in Ukraine, for example — they remain united in their collective distaste for mainstream centrist and liberal parties. They accuse these parties of promoting the post-Cold War liberal international order, which, in their view, is responsible for weakening traditional Christian values, dismantling European borders (thus compromising the sovereignty of nation states), encouraging migrant influx into Europe, and, above all, strengthening the influence of media and NGOs to promote globalist and so-called 'woke' agendas. For the European far-right, Trump is at the centre of efforts to weaken the Washington-led liberal international order, which they believe sought to replace the traditional tenets of Western civilisation with progressive ideologies. Trump's well-known hostility towards climate change action and multilateralism has found strong resonance among like-minded parties in Europe, as his actions tend to justify and legitimise their own nationalist and conservative ideals — especially through their anti-EU and anti-Green Deal rhetoric. In February, prominent far-right leaders belonging to the Patriots for Europe group — the third-largest bloc in the European Parliament — gathered in Madrid not only to praise Trump's return to power but also to showcase unity by focusing on common enemies: globalists, 'woke' ideology, gender theory, and environmentalist culture. They downplayed Trump's aggressive threats to Denmark's sovereignty over Greenland and his ensuing tariff war against Europe. The gathering, in fact, widely shared Trump's antipathy towards multilateral organisations like the WHO, celebrated his anti-immigration policies, denounced the EU's climate and tariff policies as greater threats, and engaged in a great deal of chest-thumping about their close ties with Trump. These leaders, however, faced an uncomfortable situation within a month when Trump and his Vice President launched a humiliating verbal attack on Zelenskyy during his visit to the White House. Ukraine has been a point of contention among European populists: leaders like Giorgia Meloni have expressed complete solidarity with Ukraine, while Orbán has repeatedly taken a pro-Russian stance. The Trump-Zelenskyy spat placed Russia-sensitive European far-right leaders in a tight spot, prompting many to attempt a balancing act. They have done similar balancing on the question of Trump's tariff actions, where most of the time these leaders have questioned the effectiveness of the EU rather than criticising Trump's dwindling commitment to already declining transatlantic relations. The focus of the European far-right has been on the mainstreaming of their agenda — something that received a boost with the return of Donald Trump to the White House. Trump, in many ways, legitimises their economic, political, and cultural crusade against the mainstream parties in Europe and reinforces their Eurosceptic rhetoric. The challenge, however, is the growing disenchantment of the European public with Trump's erratic, unpopular, and unpredictable policies. The real question for Europe's right-wing parties now is how to remain close to Trump without compromising their credibility in the eyes of their electorate at home. The writer is a researcher with the Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi