Cloudflare thwarts record 7.3 Tbps DDoS attack with automation

Techday NZ

20-06-2025

Cloudflare has confirmed it recently mitigated what it describes as the largest distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack ever publicly disclosed, clocking in at 7.3 terabits per second (Tbps), surpassing previous known records.
The attack, which occurred in mid-May 2025, targeted a hosting provider customer utilising Cloudflare's Magic Transit service for network defence. According to Cloudflare data, this incident follows closely on the heels of attacks recorded at 6.5 Tbps and 4.8 billion packets per second, illustrating that DDoS attacks are continuing to increase in both scale and complexity.
Cloudflare stated that the 7.3 Tbps attack was 12% larger than its previous record and 1 Tbps greater than another recent attack reported by security journalist Brian Krebs.
Attack analysis
The 7.3 Tbps DDoS attack delivered a total of 37.4 terabytes of data within a 45-second window. During the attack, the targeted IP address was bombarded across an average of 21,925 destination ports, reaching a peak of 34,517 destination ports per second. The distribution of source ports mirrored this targeting method.
The attack employed several vectors but was dominated by UDP floods, constituting 99.996% of total traffic. The residual traffic, amounting to 1.3 GB, involved QOTD reflection, Echo reflection, NTP reflection, Mirai UDP floods, Portmap flood, and RIPv1 amplification techniques. Each vector was identified and catalogued, with Cloudflare detailing how organisations could protect both themselves and the broader Internet from such forms of abuse.
Cloudflare explained that the UDP DDoS component worked by sending large volumes of UDP packets to random or specific destination ports, either to saturate the Internet link or overwhelm network appliances. Other vectors, such as the QOTD (Quote of the Day), Echo, NTP, Portmap, and RIPv1, exploited vulnerabilities in legacy protocols and services to reflect and amplify attack traffic onto target systems.
Global scale
The attack was notable for its global reach. Traffic originated from more than 122,145 source IP addresses across 5,433 autonomous systems in 161 countries. Nearly half of the attack traffic came from Brazil and Vietnam, accounting for around twenty-five percent each. The remainder was largely attributable to sources in Taiwan, China, Indonesia, Ukraine, Ecuador, Thailand, the United States, and Saudi Arabia.
At an autonomous system level, Telefonica Brazil (AS27699) contributed 10.5% of attack traffic, with Viettel Group (AS7552), China Unicom (AS4837), Chunghwa Telecom (AS3462), and China Telecom (AS4134) among the other major sources. The attack saw an average of 26,855 unique source IP addresses per second, peaking at 45,097.
Technical response
Cloudflare utilised the global anycast architecture to divert and dissipate the massive influx of traffic. As packets arrived at Cloudflare's network edge, they were routed to the closest data centre. This incident was managed across 477 data centres in 293 locations worldwide, with some regions operating multiple facilities due to traffic volume.
Detection and mitigation were handled by Cloudflare's automated systems, which operate independently in each data centre. The Cloudflare global network runs every service in every data centre. This includes our DDoS detection and mitigation systems. This means that attacks can be detected and mitigated fully autonomously, regardless of where they originate from.
Upon arrival, data packets were intelligently distributed to available servers where they were sampled for analysis. Cloudflare employed the denial of service daemon (dosd), a heuristic engine that reviews packet headers and anomalies for malicious patterns. The system then generated multiple permutations of digital fingerprints specific to the attack, seeking patterns that maximised blocking efficacy while minimising impact on legitimate traffic.
Within data centres, real-time intelligence was shared by servers multicasting fingerprint information, refining mitigation on both a local and global scale. When a fingerprint surpassed predefined thresholds, mitigation rules were compiled and deployed as extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) programs to block the offending traffic. Once the attack ceased, associated rules were removed automatically.
Botnet feed and future mitigation
Cloudflare also maintains a free DDoS Botnet Threat Feed to help Internet service providers and hosting companies identify malicious traffic originating within their own infrastructure. The company said that over 600 organisations have subscribed to this service, allowing them to receive up-to-date lists of offending IP addresses engaged in DDoS attacks.
Recommendations from Cloudflare emphasise tailored defences to address the unique characteristics of each network or application, with care taken to ensure that mitigation steps do not inadvertently disrupt legitimate traffic, particularly for services that depend on UDP or legacy protocols.
Cloudflare's team highlighted that these successful defences occurred entirely without human intervention, alerting, or incident escalation, underscoring the shift towards fully autonomous, distributed mitigation strategies in response to modern DDoS threats.