Iran after Israel: Apocalyptic regime, everyday opposition

Mada

28-07-2025

In a continuing attempt to understand the internal front of Iran following Israel's June 13 attacks on key military facilities, personnel and nuclear scientists, we speak to Fatemeh Sadeghi, an Iranian political scientist based in Tehran and London.
Sadeghi maps out evolutions and failures within the Islamic revolution, arguing that the current regime and its 'apocalyptic' worldview provide the very ground from which Israel's efforts to destabilize the country, and the region, emerge. She also depicts a fragmented homegrown opposition rooted in everyday life — one that is capable of opening up possibilities but can't create overall change.
Mada Masr: How can we understand Iran's nuclear program evolution after the 1978 Revolution?
Fatemeh Sadeghi: Iran's nuclear program began in the 1940s. In 1974, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last shah of Iran, established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. At the time, the goal was to localize the full nuclear fuel cycle within 20 years and supply the country with electricity. However, following India's nuclear test in May 1974, the shah decided that Iran should pursue nuclear weapons and entered into negotiations with Western powers. That same year, contracts were signed with France, the United States and West Germany for nuclear reactors, including the Bushehr nuclear power plant. It is said that the shah felt insecure because of the Soviet Union.
At the start of the 1979 Revolution, the new Islamic Republic opposed the continuation of nuclear power projects and halted construction, viewing the effort as western interference. However, the 1980 war with Iraq and the threats by the US made Iran restart its nuclear program.
Iran's nuclear program is deterrent and defensive and this is because of the foreign interference that has long been a major concern of religious and secular Iranians alike. This concern transcends ideology.
There are ample examples: the Allied Forces' occupation of Iran during World War II, and the 1953 coup d'état engineered by the US and Britain that overthrew Prime Minister Mohamed Mosaddegh's secular nationalist government. The coup was justified by the West's claim that Iran was drifting toward the Soviet sphere. In reality, the threat posed to British interests by Mosaddegh's nationalization of the oil industry was the primary reason. Another example is the 1980 invasion of Iran by Iraq a year after the revolution. Supported by Western powers, Iraq launched an eight-year war that caused devastating losses in Iran, even though it ultimately failed to achieve its objectives.
Given this history and the ongoing threats from Israel and the US, Iran sees strong military capabilities as necessary for national defence and deterrence. Like Pakistan, Iran sees its nuclear program as a form of strategic insurance against foreign aggression, both from regional and global powers.
These concerns about foreign interference have been consistent across regimes. The shah and the Islamic Republic, despite their ideological differences, have shared the belief that Iran must protect itself from external domination.
In my view, the nuclear issue is also a cover for two broader strategic goals: first, the establishment of a government in Iran that aligns with Western interests; and second, closely tied to the first, is the normalization of Israel in the region and the pressure on countries to recognize and engage with it. Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran has refused to conform to the rules of the international system dominated by the West. This nonconformity not only led to Western support for Iraq during the war but has also been the basis for ongoing international sanctions and diplomatic isolation.
The normalization of Israel is directly connected. Several regional countries, including the United Arab Emirates, have recognized Israel and established diplomatic ties. Others, like Syria, after the fall of the Assad regime, have made reluctant concessions. Iran, however, has consistently refused to recognize Israel. One of the goals behind Israeli hostility toward Iran is to force a policy change either through regime change or by weakening Iran to the point where it is no longer a threat and a more compliant government can take its place.
MM: How did this resistance project, and its anti-imperial ambitions evolve internally in Iran and how was it mediated to the people?
FS: The 'resistance' has undergone many changes since its inception. At the beginning of the Iranian Revolution, it had a comprehensive and universal character. Iran saw its revolution as part of the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles around the world. This was particularly manifested in the Non-Aligned Movement, which had as much to do with Western hegemony as it did with Soviet domination.
Although Islam was the main ideology of the Iranian Revolution, it did not resemble traditional Islam in Iran and Salafi Islam. Rather, it was addressed to all oppressed people, both Muslims and non-Muslims. In this universal approach, resistance meant the liberation of oppressed peoples, including the Palestinians, from colonial rule. In fact, the Islam of the Iranian Revolution was more of a kind of liberation theology.
But the further we move away from the revolution, the less universal it becomes. The liberation theology gradually gave way to an approach based on a very specific interpretation of Shiism, many elements of which are unknown even to Iranians and are considered superstitious. In accordance with this ideological transformation, resistance is more equivalent to an ideology that links the battle with Israel to the coming of the Shia apocalypse, and the advent of the Savior, Mahdi. There is a big difference between that universal anti-imperialist resistance whose aim was to change the power relations and these particularistic apocalyptic ideas.
The government has been saying for years that 'nuclear energy is our inalienable right,' which is generally true, but many say that having a minimal life is also our inalienable right, and having water, electricity, education and health are also our inalienable rights. Having freedom and security is also our inalienable right. Having an unfiltered internet is also our inalienable right. The absence of censorship is also our inalienable right. The nuclear program has imposed enormous economic costs on society and the destruction and deterioration of infrastructure, and is the main reason for the sanctions, which have led to [a marked rise in poverty].
MM: What kind of opportunities were possible within reform politics in Iran, especially in 2013? Specifically, what was possible with the diplomacy that resulted in the 2015 nuclear deal?
FS: The nuclear deal between Iran and the major powers in 2015 is partly rooted in Iran's domestic politics, especially the events of 2009. Presidential elections were held in Iran that year, but the fraud in favour of the conservative candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, led to widespread protests known as the Green Movement. However, Ahmadinejad was declared president, and authorities refused to recognize the popular demand and severely oppressed protesters. Also, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who were the two protest candidates, were illegally placed under house arrest.
One of Ahmadinejad's actions to overshadow and confront domestic protests was to highlight Iran's right to nuclear energy through an aggressive approach to foreign policy. However, this approach, backed by the supreme leader and other conservatives, intensified sanctions against Iran and worsened the economic situation.
Hassan Rouhani's government, which was elected in 2013 by a landslide, came to power with the promise of improving the economic situation and de-escalating tensions — although Rouhani was not a reformist, he was a moderate conservative who believed in détente and diplomacy. The activation of diplomacy during this period led to the formation of the nuclear deal between Iran and the major powers, as a result of which some sanctions were lifted.
After President Donald Trump took office and withdrew from the nuclear deal, diplomacy and negotiations were sidelined and hardliners were able to gain the upper hand again, which in turn led to the deterioration of the economic and political situations.
The administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian, elected in 2024, has a somewhat reformist approach, but it is not allowed to play much role in domestic and foreign strategic decisions. His role is mostly limited to improving Iran's dire economic situation.
As long as the hardliners are in power, the prospect of political reform at home and a change in foreign policy seems unlikely. Talks between Iran and the US may continue, but the goal does not seem to be to reach an agreement.
MM: Some media have been circulating scattered information about infiltrations within the regime. To what extent does this make sense to you? What have power dynamics been looking like recently in Iran?
FS: One of the reasons for Israel's influence is its intelligence and technological capability in obtaining information, eavesdropping, tracking and assassination, as seen in the Hezbollah pagers incident. One can speculate that the Israelis have been able to obtain information about military commanders or nuclear scientists in similar ways: through the Internet, hacking websites and eavesdropping on conversations with officials.
Then there is the inability of the government to deal with Israeli influence effectively. This is because the judiciary and security apparatus in Iran are more concerned with maintaining factional power than with national security, and all their efforts are focused on maintaining power in the hands of a particular faction. As a result, their efforts are spent on suppressing critics. As long as factional interests take precedence over national interests, the government will not be able to deal with this issue radically. Of course, there have been officials who have tried to warn about infiltration, including Ali Younesi, the former minister of intelligence. In practice, however, due to the prioritization of factional interests and the internal power struggle, there has been no profound reform.
Another reason for Israel's influence that has received less attention is that, in Iran, in the last decade or two, there have been profound changes in the value system among authorities. Previously, they believed in some ethical principles. The Iranian Revolution wanted to make politics religious and moral, but, conversely, we witnessed the instrumentalization of religion and the primacy of power over principles and values. In Dostoevsky's words, 'God has been removed,' and everything is allowed for them. Many of those who hold political positions today pretend that they still adhere to these values to achieve their positions, but in reality, they do not follow any belief system and have no priority other than personal interests. For this reason, they may easily provide information to the enemy in exchange for promises.
MM: What would an Iran without sanctions be like?
FS: A stronger Iran, at least. Iranian society has been impoverished and weakened by sanctions. Although the stated purpose of the sanctions was to weaken the government by reducing its financial capacity, the reality is that the government successfully circumvented sanctions in many cases. In such situations, governments generally do not give up vital expenditures but reduce service and welfare expenditures. The result was the formation of a sanction economy that had a significant impact on politics.
MM: What regime change is possible in Iran today?
FS: I think regime change is neither desirable nor possible in Iran, at least for now, for two reasons. First, Iranians have negative memories of imperialist interventions. This has a long history dating back to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Although many Iranians rightfully dislike the Islamic Republic, this should not be confused with support for external intervention.
According to Israel, widespread dissatisfaction would lead to people taking to the streets, toppling the regime and replacing Reza Pahlavi as Israel's puppet. This was a big mistake and showed their ignorance. It also revealed that the son of the last shah, who spent most of his life in exile, has no idea what happened in Iran. I think he was fooled by social media and repeated the mistake of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the main opposition to the Islamic Republic, when they supported Saddam Hussain during the Iran-Iraq war and wanted him to change the regime in Iran. What happened instead was that they lost their social base. I think the same fate awaits him and he is losing his political charm by supporting Israel's attack on Iran.
The second reason that regime change has no chance is that, despite the oppressive government, Iranian society is more confident and capable today compared to the previous years. This confidence is rooted in the powerful civil disobedience and strong non-violent movements of recent years; particularly the Green Movement and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement (also known as the Jina uprisings). These movements depart from the savage/victim/savior paradigm that dominates the Middle East, to borrow from Makau Mutua. This is a mentality that views Middle Eastern regimes mainly as savages and victims, in particular women, who need western saviors to liberate them.
This is an opposition consisting of hundreds of thousands of women, workers, teachers, bus drivers, students, lawyers, university professors, writers, poets and intellectuals, to name a few. Many of them were or are still in jail because of their beliefs or civil activities. They don't believe that liberation comes from outside and don't see people as mere victims. They believe in the power of people and resistance from within. As an example, here's a manifesto published by three prisoners including Varisheh Moradi, Golrokh Iraee, Sakineh Parvaneh and Reyhaneh Ansarinejad after Israel's attack on Evin prison. They accused Israel of committing war crimes in Gaza and systematically dismantling regional autonomy. The objective of these attacks, they argued, was not democracy but 'a weak and submissive Middle East.'
They described the Israeli bombing of Evin prison as a 'calculated escalation targeting defenceless detainees.' Israel bombed Evin prison, where so many political prisoners are being kept. I think the plan was to murder the political dissidents and destroy any political alternatives, because both Israel and its allies know that until there is hope for change from within, they won't have a chance.
Although these movements have not yet been able to change the political and legal structure, they succeeded in dismantling the oppressive apparatus and opening up the possibility for change from within through civil disobedience and resistance. Resistance in these movements is not exclusive to the political arena but is deeply embedded in ordinary life. They have opened possibilities that are visible in everyday life. It was almost impossible to imagine a woman without a veil on Iran's streets ten years ago. This was not only due to the hijab police but also to the internalisation of these rules by society. Iranian women have successfully challenged both. This opposition's main weakness is its lack of organization and scattered nature. It is because the government undermines and oppresses all political and civil organizations. In spite of this, Iranian society is attempting to find alternative ways to transition from within. However, two major forces and obstacles stand in its way: the government, its apocalyptic discourse and oppressive apparatus, as well as Israel and its allies among Iran's opposition.
For these reasons, regime change is not an option.
Having said that, I think Israel's goal is to destabilize Iran and the entire Middle East as a means of stabilizing itself. By destabilization I mean making the general condition turbulent via temporary military operations, such as the recent ones against Iran and Syria, economic sanctions, terrorist attacks and activating ethnic, religious and factional gaps and conflicts with the aim of making societies weak and vulnerable. Turbulent situations often empower far-right groups and hardliners, which further weakens the chance of a peaceful transition. Iranian far-right groups are very similar with their Israeli counterparts. They believe Iran has entered the apocalypse and should engage in a total war with Israel and the West.
I think regime change won't succeed, although Israel can try it in the future. Destabilisation, however, is very likely and has already begun. I think the Iranian government has fallen into this trap which could destroy the country.