Putin's chilling 14-word demand to Zelensky as Kremlin announces three-day ceasefire
Vladimir Putin
has declared a ceasefire, a move that comes
amid escalating pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump
for Moscow to cease hostilities in
Ukraine
.
Russian
state media outlets have
reported that the ceasefire will commence
at the stroke of midnight on May 7 and is set to conclude at the same time on May 11.
"By decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, based on
humanitarian considerations
, during the days of the 80th anniversary of the Victory - from midnight on May 7-8 to midnight on May 10-11, the Russian side declares a ceasefire," the Kremlin proclaimed.
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The Kremlin further stated, "All military actions are suspended for this period," issuing a challenge to Kyiv to reciprocate.
They also cautioned that they would deliver "an adequate and effective response" should Ukraine breach the ceasefire terms, reports
the Express US
.
"The Russian side once again declares its readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions, aimed at eliminating the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis, and constructive interaction with international partners," the Kremlin continued.
Despite previously announcing a unilateral ceasefire concerning energy infrastructure, Russia had breached that declaration.
Victory Day, observed on May 9 in Russia, marks the commemoration of the Soviet Union's triumph over Nazi Germany in World War II.
This update follows Trump's denunciation of Moscow's overnight missile and drone attacks on Kyiv, which left at least 90 people injured and claimed 12 lives. Having been traditionally hesitant to criticize the Kremlin, Trump voiced his discontent, saying he was "not happy" about it.
He called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to halt the destructive bombings, writing, "Not necessary, and very bad timing. Vladimir, STOP!" on his platform Truth Social.
The bombardment ranks among the most severe assaults by Russian forces since Putin commenced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an event Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky labeled as one of Russia's "most outrageous."
In footage shared by Anton Gerashchenko, former adviser to Ukraine's Minister of Internal Affairs, a North Korean KN-23 (KN-23A) ballistic missile is seen hitting Kyiv.
Zelensky later revealed on Telegram that the missile included parts from various nations, including the United States.
According to Zelensky's statement on Telegram, the failure to exert adequate pressure on Russia allows for such missile imports and their subsequent use in Europe, while insufficient actions against North Korea and its partners facilitate the production of these ballistic missiles.
Moscow and Pyongyang have denied allegations of weapon transfers, but Ukraine insists that
North Korea has provided Russia with military support
, including artillery shells, rocket systems, soldiers, and ballistic missiles—specifically 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles.
The assault occurred just as weeks of peace talks seemed to be concluding without a resolution and shortly after Trump criticized Zelenskyy for extending the "killing field" by not conceding the Russia-held Crimea Peninsula in a potential agreement.
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EVN Report
2 days ago
- EVN Report
Iran's Strategic Uncertainty and Armenia's Security Challenges
Following the Second Karabakh War, and particularly after Azerbaijan's assault on Armenia's sovereign territory in September 2022, many observers began describing Iran's regional policy as increasingly pro-Armenian. While Tehran continues to pursue a broadly balanced approach in the South Caucasus , this perception has been reinforced by frequent high-level visits with Armenian officials, regular statements affirming Armenia's territorial integrity, and a sustained ' war of words ' with Baku. Tensions deepened amid reports of Azerbaijani involvement in Israel's strike on Iran. Both the recent 12-day Israeli-American-Iranian war and shifting Iran-Azerbaijan dynamics carry direct implications for Armenia's security. As the risk of renewed escalation lingers, this article assesses those risks from the perspective of Armenia's security. Iran-U.S.-Israeli War and Its Outcome After Donald Trump returned to the White House and declared his strategic goal of becoming a ' peacemaker president ', mediated talks resumed between Washington and Tehran on Iran's nuclear program. Following five Oman-mediated meetings described as ' successful ', the parties appeared close to reaching an agreement. However, shortly before the sixth round of negotiations, Israel attacked Iran, killing key nuclear scientists and senior military officials. Israel subsequently convinced the U.S. to join in the military action against Iran, using ' bunker buster' bombs to strike Iran's Fordow nuclear facility. Though a ceasefire was established after 12 days of conflict, uncertainties about Iran's nuclear program and the future of negotiations persist. All sides declared ' victory ,' yet paradoxically, each fell short of its strategic objectives. This phase of the conflict left relations between the parties no clearer than before. Uncertainty over Iran's nuclear program persists, as U.S. military strikes provided no conclusive evidence that it has been fully disrupted. Iran has acknowledged significant damage to its nuclear infrastructure, likely delaying any potential nuclear weapon development by months or years (whether Iran intends to create such a weapon is a separate discussion). Reports suggest Iran preemptively safeguarded some of its enriched uranium, suggesting Tehran may have had advance knowledge of the U.S. strikes. Meanwhile, according to American sources , informal U.S.-Iran negotiations continued even during the strikes. The war also exposed the vulnerability of Iran's military and strategic infrastructure, which can be attributed to several objective realities: The once-united ' Axis of Resistance '—the main pillar of Iran's regional policy and security—is now fragmented. Syria no longer operates under pro-Iranian rule, Hezbollah has suffered significant losses, and Houthis forces face more direct threats and targeted U.S. strikes. Meanwhile, Iran's strategic allies, Russia and China , offered nothing beyond condemnatory statements during the war. Not all of Israel's strategic goals materialized. Its expectation of regime change in Iran proved overly ambitious. While some Iranian ethnic minority movements receive external backing, foreign actors have used separatist rhetoric more as leverage than as a genuine push for Iran's partition. Turkey and Azerbaijan, for example, have encouraged Turkic separatism among Iran's Azeris, yet both understand that Iran's fragmentation could also embolden Kurdish separatism—an outcome Turkey opposes. Likewise, Pakistan condemned the Israeli strikes, likely wary of unrest among its own Baluchi population. Despite public discontent with the regime, Iranian society carries the traumatic memory of the Iran-Iraq War and the painful experience of a foreign-backed coup (the overthrow of Mossadegh ). These historical wounds make expectations of a mass internal uprising against the backdrop of missile strikes unrealistic. While some social media voices portrayed the conflict as a war against the regime rather than the people of Iran, these perspectives were largely perceived as disconnected from actual Iranian sentiment. Nevertheless, despite the regime maintaining its formal integrity, recent developments suggest the possibility of internal change. President Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi took on key decision-making roles during the war, emphasizing continued diplomacy and distinguishing between U.S. and Israeli approaches. Following the war, both officials gave interviews to American media highlighting their willingness to resume negotiations on Iran's peaceful nuclear program. In an interview with Tucker Carlson, Pezeshkian stated that Iran would welcome American investors if sanctions were lifted, clarifying that 'the slogan 'Death to America,' by no means refers to the American people, or even officials .' While Iranian conservatives have severely criticized these positions, they will continue to shape Iran's foreign policy as long as distrust in the president remains incomplete. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was absent from the public sphere during the military strikes and did not attend the funerals of military and political figures. The vulnerability of Iran's airspace calls into question both the viability of holding mass public events and the regime's ideological slogans of 'Death to America' and 'Death to Israel.' These slogans are not just rhetoric but form the ideological backbone of the regime. The succession process of the Supreme Leader and the role of a weakened Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) may determine whether Iran pursues ideological reorientation or further escalation with the United States. Rather than complete regime change, Iran may undergo a transformation of its political identity, shifting from the Shiite Islamic concept of ' Velayate Faghih ' toward a more national political strategy. This trend is already visible in Khamenei's commissioning of a patriotic song during Ashura ceremonies, Pezeshkian's emphasis on the need to start dialogue with the political opposition, and even in calls from conservative actors, saying ' we need change .' Thus, Iran's policy in the near future faces strategic uncertainty due to both external conflict threats (with Israel and the U.S.) and internal leadership instability. Three possible scenarios emerge: New military escalation Diplomatic reintegration (perhaps with or without a new nuclear agreement) Or the continuation of the current status quo of strategic uncertainty Iran's Political Uncertainty and Its Impact on the South Caucasus and Armenia Developments around Iran could directly affect the security of the South Caucasus, particularly Armenia's. Recent threats to Armenia included potential breakdown of negotiations with Azerbaijan, political conditions favoring military escalation, ongoing disagreements over the Syunik transit route, and the continuing blockade of Armenia. An Israeli attack on Iran, especially with U.S. participation, could intensify these threats for several reasons: First, conducting negotiations while simultaneously planning what could be termed a ' preemptive attack ', undermines established norms in international relations and encourages other actors to consider military options even during peace talks. Engaging Iran in a protracted war would shift the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Military operations near the region could embolden Azerbaijan to attack Armenia, particularly since a conflict with Iran would jeopardize the security of connections between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Israel's plans for a protracted war include activating separatist forces inside Iran. This scenario would require using the Azeri-speaking population in northern Iran, with Azerbaijan playing a significant role. Such involvement would enhance Azerbaijan's political importance to the West, especially Israel, potentially creating an additional threat for Armenia. If these plans were viable, the transit route through Syunik might become less urgent since Azerbaijan would already have a land border with Nakhichevan. However, there's no guarantee that northern Iran would seek independence or unification with Azerbaijan, even during internal chaos. Consequently, in the medium term, Azerbaijan would likely still have additional political justifications for demanding a transit route through Syunik, similar to the situation described earlier. On the very first day of the war, news spread in Iranian media that one of Iran's neighbors had supported Israel's attack on Iran. Azerbaijani officials denied these rumors. Nevertheless, the issue became a topic of discussion during a later telephone conversation between the presidents of Iran and Azerbaijan. During his subsequent visit to Azerbaijan, Iranian President Pezeshkian expressed satisfaction with the ' responsible position ' taken by member states of the Economic Cooperation Organization during the war. While some Iranian circles still advocate for a cautious approach toward Azerbaijan, officials are working to ease tensions through diplomatic engagements. The declaration adopted by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul—which referenced the right of return for 'Western Azerbaijanis'—represents one such diplomatic effort. Despite the Iranian ambassador to Armenia stating , 'The use of such wording should be avoided. The name 'Western Azerbaijan' is the name of one of the provinces of the Republic of Iran. It cannot be used to name any other geographical area, especially if it implies any form of territorial claims,' Iran maintained its signature on the document. Similarly, Pezeshkian did not cancel his visit to Karabakh and engaged in cordial discussions with Aliyev regarding destruction attributed to Armenians. The U.S.-backed Syunik Transit Route and Iran's Response Following the war, developments emerged regarding the proposed transit route through Syunik and the U.S. proposal for this route. While official details of the proposal, (or possibly multiple proposals) remained undisclosed, discussions about this possibility spread through both Armenian and international media after the Carnegie Endowment published an article and the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey issued a statement . Iran remained silent for several days. Eventually, during a telephone conversation between the security council secretaries of Iran and Armenia, both parties reaffirmed their commitment to preserving national sovereignty and territorial integrity in any project implementation. In a subsequent interview with Iranian Public Television, Iran's ambassador emphasized that Tehran would accept any project that aligned with Armenia's security interests. Ali Khamenei's foreign affairs advisor, Ali Akbar Velayati, also reaffirmed Iran's opposition to the 'Zangezur corridor' though notably did not address potential American involvement in the transit road. Despite Armenian officials' announcement that Armenia would not 'lease land' to America, it seemed unlikely that American proposals would end there. Indeed, the peace declaration initialed between Armenia and Azerbaijan on August 8 at the White House—in the presence of and witnessed by the U.S. President— included an important provision about the transit road through Meghri, to be named the 'Trump Road for Peace and Prosperity' (TRIPP). Iran's reaction to this event was twofold: First, even before the signing, an article by Ali Akbar Velayati published on August 8 described in harsh terms the path 'to be given to a third party.' Second, Tehran's official response came through a press release from the Foreign Ministry which welcomed peace efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan while expressing concerns about potential American presence in the region. In the days following the declaration, after telephone conversations between Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Pezeshkian , and between Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Abbas Araghchi , and particularly after Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan's visit to Tehran, Pezeshkian and Araghchi issued several statements . They affirmed that Iran's red lines were respected in the declaration, noting there was no mention of a third-party presence, especially armed forces, and that Armenia had assured them the declaration would not negatively impact the shared Iran-Armenia border. Both officials also highlighted the widespread disinformation circulating in the country about this issue. This dualism in Iran's responses should be analyzed primarily through the lens of Iran's domestic politics. President Pezeshkian's government faces criticism for emphasizing the importance of U.S. negotiations after the war. Conservative circles are characterizing recent developments in the South Caucasus as consequences of Pezeshkian's policy that work against Iran's interests. However, these circles lack decision-making authority. When analyzing Iran's response, one should rely exclusively on statements from those with foreign policy authority—namely, members of the government. I believe that President Pezeshkian's August 18 visit to Armenia will provide an important opportunity to clear up existing misconceptions. Iran's balanced response to the fundamental shift that occurred on August 8 in the South Caucasus serves as an important indicator of Iran's potential future role and the evolving Iran-U.S. relations in the broader region. While Iran continues to navigate its ties with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, its fraught relations with Israel and the U.S.—and the prospect of further clashes—pose potential security risks for Armenia. At the same time, the war exposed the vulnerability of Iran's strategic infrastructure, and the possibility of renewed U.S.-Iran engagement could trigger a broader regional realignment. Much will depend on whether the current ceasefire evolves into a lasting settlement through negotiations, rather than serving merely as a pause before renewed conflict.
Libyan Express
5 days ago
- Libyan Express
Trump says ‘no deal until there's a deal'
BY Libyan Express Aug 16, 2025 - 01:33 Trump says 'no deal until there's a deal' after Putin summit U.S. President Donald Trump said on Friday that his long-awaited meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska ended without any formal agreement, after nearly three hours of talks centered on the war in Ukraine. 'There's no deal until there's a deal,' Trump told reporters, acknowledging that no ceasefire or binding commitments were reached. The U.S. president described the discussions as 'very productive' and claimed 'some great progress' had been made, but offered no specifics. 'We didn't get there,' he added, before leaving without taking questions from the gathered press. The summit, held at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson in Anchorage, was part of Trump's effort to encourage direct negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv. While stressing that he was not negotiating on Ukraine's behalf, Trump said he planned to arrange direct talks between Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Putin expressed hope that all sides would respect what had been discussed and hinted at the possibility of meeting again, but no follow-up summit has been scheduled. For Washington's allies in Europe and the Middle East — many of whom have a direct stake in regional stability and energy markets — the meeting's failure to produce a breakthrough underscores the difficulty of reaching a negotiated end to the conflict. The views expressed in Op-Ed pieces are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of Libyan Express. How to submit an Op-Ed: Libyan Express accepts opinion articles on a wide range of topics. Submissions may be sent to oped@ Please include 'Op-Ed' in the subject line.
EVN Report
7 days ago
- EVN Report
What Does Armenia Stand to Gain? Musings on the Washington Signing
On August 8, 2025, during a meeting at the White House between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, U.S. President Donald Trump, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, documents were signed that not only have serious significance in the context of resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, but also aspire to fundamentally transform the security architecture formed in the South Caucasus as a result of the Armenian-Russian-Azerbaijani trilateral statement of November 9, 2020 that ended the Nagorno-Karabakh War. The trilateral and bilateral documents signed at the Washington summit became the subject of heated discussions in Armenia, ones that show no signs of abating. This article seeks to advance that conversation by drawing parallels between the political events of spring 2018, known as the 'Velvet Revolution,' and current perceptions of the Washington process. It will also examine the interdependence of the economy, military power, and negotiation dynamics to address a widely asked and legitimate question: What does Armenia stand to gain from this process? Finally, it will outline the political realities and variables of which the Washington process is either a component or a consequence. It is important to note that the primary aim of this article is not to enumerate all the advantages or disadvantages of the signed agreements for Armenia. Its focus lies elsewhere, as outlined below. The analysis draws heavily on the key ideas presented in Paul Kennedy's 'The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers', Thomas Schelling's 'Arms and Influence' and Fred Charles Iklé's 'Every War Must End.' Don't Confuse the Beginning With the End: The Imperative of Effective and Purposeful Work One of the enduring misjudgments following the 2018 Velvet Revolution, including by some members of the incoming administration, was treating those events as an endpoint rather than a beginning. The sense of victory was premature, a moment to celebrate rather than a mandate to act. In reality, 2018 marked a new beginning, an opportunity whose success could only be measured by the effectiveness of the steps and processes that followed. Yet, in hindsight, misreading the moment, misaligning priorities, neglecting the military imbalance and ineffective work in key areas led to serious failures not only in domestic and foreign policy, but also overshadowed the very political achievements of 2018. For many, the 'revolution' they once embraced became a source of caution, and some even came to question their participation. The documents signed in Washington did, indeed, formalize the status quo surrounding Artsakh, enshrining the results recorded on the battlefield. However, the Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue is far from concluded. This is not an end, not a final reality, but the beginning of a new process, one that, whether we want it or not, is already unfolding. It is no coincidence that Nerses Kopalyan, who directly participated in the negotiations, notes that during meetings with the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council, American officials framed the Washington summit not as 'a one-off engagement, but rather a foundational framework for what the United States views as a three year process, from this normalization initiative to signing a final peace treaty.' In other words, while some objective developments do not hinge on Armenia, the final outcome of the agreements reached in Washington will depend on the government's subsequent efforts. The ruling party cannot assume that signing the accords guarantees peace or justifies a lighter pace of work. Instead, they must learn from previous mistakes, and try to protect and advance Armenian interests to the fullest within the evolving framework. Without drawing a direct parallel to the May 5, 1994 ceasefire in Bishkek that ended the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, it should be emphasized that Azerbaijan pursued a consistent strategy from that point onward. Baku strengthened its economy, enabling significant investments in its military, particularly acquiring modern weapons, and conducted effective foreign policy that complemented its internal capabilities ( internal balancing ) with strategic alliances ( external balancing ). Subsequently, in line with established political science principles, these efforts were directly reflected on the battlefield, and in subsequent negotiations. Azerbaijan continued to work with this same logic even after the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020. There may be different opinions about whether Armenia gained more than it lost in these accords, with strong arguments on both sides. What is undeniable, however, is that the agreements have given us breathing room, a chance to regain our footing. The existing playing field is complemented by a new, significantly important dimension—with its own challenges and opportunities. The side that acts with greater intelligence and effectiveness will ultimately benefit the most. In Bishkek, Azerbaijan emerged as the losing side, but through sustained effort it transformed that position into a winning one. How Armenia proceeds after Washington depends precisely on us. In his book 'Every War Must End,' prominent American military expert Fred Charles Iklé specifically emphasizes this—no document establishes a final status quo; the outcomes depend on how the parties act afterward. The Three Year Window of Opportunity Negotiation outcomes are not detached from economic, military, and diplomatic realities; they are deeply interconnected. That is, a side that is economically and militarily weaker, and with more limited diplomatic capacity, cannot enter negotiations from a position of strength and secure greater gains than its stronger counterpart. There may be exceptions when, under certain conjunctural conditions, the weaker side benefits beyond what its own resources would allow. Yet, the general pattern of history is clear: economic potential translates into military capability, military capability into influence, and that influence is then leveraged diplomatically to elicit desired behavior from the other party. Parallel to all this, however, one cannot underestimate the impact of geographical position, the development of state institutions, the effectiveness of state governance, and the presence of political will. Economic Strength, Military Power and Peace The launch of the Washington process opens new horizons for Armenia's economic development. Proposed American investments can serve as a powerful catalyst, sparking interest from other countries and attracting additional capital. It is possible that Armenia will become a participant in the creation of major corridors connecting East and West, which in turn can generate additional financial resources . The prospect of deterring the threat of war for at least three years, combined with an official U.S. presence in southern Armenia—with clear economic and business interests, offers not only an additional layer of security, but also the potential to significantly improve Armenia's strategic position. Paul Kennedy, in his seminal work ' The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, ' emphasizes that the triumph and collapse of great powers has often been conditioned not only by the results of wars, but by the economic strength cultivated before and during conflicts. Expanding production capabilities has enabled greater investments in armed forces, while military growth, in turn, has allowed powers not only to defend their own borders, but also expand them. This pattern can be seen in the France of Napoleon Bonaparte, the subsequent century-long hegemony of the British Empire, the German Empire and Nazi Germany before the two World Wars, and later, in the global reach of the United States and the Soviet Union after 1945. In all these cases, the development of economic capabilities led to an increase in military potential, which—alongside other important factors such as effective state governance, political will, and work ethic—contributed to achieving political success. We currently see how China is rapidly transforming accumulated economic power into military power , which in turn dramatically increases its political weight. The same logic operates in the cases of Germany and Japan . Looking at the post–Bishkek ceasefire period, the contrast between Armenia and Azerbaijan is stark. Azerbaijan, by steadily building its economic potential, was able to channel greater resources into its military, an investment that proved decisive in shaping later military-political outcomes. Armenia, by contrast, faced a confluence of debilitating factors: the imposed blockade, entrenched corruption (also present in Azerbaijan), and an inefficient state apparatus. These constraints stifled economic growth and, in turn, left the country without the economic or military capacity needed to meet emerging military-political challenges. Moreover, in the case of Armenia, what is called ' retrenchement ' in international relations occurred. Starting from 1994, Armenia appeared as the main guarantor of Artsakh's security, which meant that Armenia's economic and military potential, as well as alliance capabilities, should have been sufficient to protect not only Armenia's, but also Artsakh's security. However, time showed that Armenia's capabilities, measured relative to Azerbaijan's , were insufficient not only for Artsakh's, but even for Armenia's own security. As a result, we lost not only Artsakh, but also about 200 square kilometers of internationally recognized Armenian territory. We now see the same process in Russia's case: with the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, Russia's influence is weakening or receding in other regions, particularly in Syria and the South Caucasus . Azerbaijan's 'Bargaining Power' and Washington's Soft Deterrence for Armenia Many in Armenia feel that Azerbaijan has benefited more from these agreements than Armenia. While arguments and counterarguments can be made, a key distinction remains: unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan is able to defend its borders with its own forces and, until recently, effectively used the threat of renewed war as leverage in negotiations. Moreover, Azerbaijan's security was not at risk without the Washington agreements, whereas Armenia's was. One of Armenia's main achievements from the Washington agreement has been preventing a possible Azerbaijani offensive in the near term. We often overlook that since November 9, 2020, Armenia has not been able to defend its borders solely with its own forces. After the Jermuk battles of 2022, it finally became clear that Russia would not honor its alliance obligations toward Armenia. In response, at Yerevan's request, the EU monitoring mission was deployed along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. To be fair, since their arrival, ceasefire violations have significantly decreased , and Armenia has not lost even a single square kilometer of territory due to military actions. Prominent American economist and professor of foreign policy and national security Thomas Schelling, in his book ' Arms and Influence ,' notes that 'bargaining power' in negotiations is conditioned by the ability to cause physical pain to the adversary (power to hurt). Schelling argues that it is precisely this desire to avoid pain that weakens one's negotiation positions and compels them toward concessions. He calls this process 'the diplomacy of violence,' the purpose of which is to extract the desired result under the credible threat of using weapons and causing pain, without getting involved in real war. The Washington process allows Armenia to crack the above-described coercive framework imposed by Azerbaijan since November 9, 2020. The active involvement of the United States in the process of regulating Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, the construction of 'Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity' in southern Armenia, as well as President Trump's personal interest give Armenia a weighty soft deterrence mechanism to deter new Azerbaijani aggression. It is no coincidence that during a press conference, Trump emphasized that the parties can call him in case of problems. These factors, in addition to the presence of the EU monitoring mission, significantly strengthen Armenia's external balancing potential. The success of the process largely depends on whether the Armenian government will be able to use this window of relative stability to strengthen Armenia's military power to such an extent that it becomes as self-sufficient as possible. The question is clear: how many days can Armenia defend its borders with its own forces, and what price must the aggressor pay? It is important to realize that every ceasefire or agreement, including a peace treaty, is more stable when the cost of war outweighs the political gains expected as a result. This is the formula that can make the expected peace more stable. And finally, following the advice of Paul Kennedy and Fred Charles Iklé, the Armenian government should make the most of the three-year window provided by the Washington process. This requires remaining vigilant and resisting the temptation to prioritize highly visible, short-term projects that appeal to daily public needs at the expense of critical defense spending. Restoring military balance must go hand in hand with investments that foster long-term economic growth and strengthen domestic manufacturing capacity. Conclusion Despite heavy losses, Armenia now has an opportunity to significantly strengthen its security system. How we do this depends on us. The government should present a roadmap outlining specific programs, action plans and timelines for implementing the commitments set out in the documents, including for example, Armenia's complete unblocking. Public uncertainty around the Washington process remains high, and it is the duty of state officials to address these doubts with transparency and facts. Opposition forces should closely follow, monitor, and constructively criticize the government's actions, demanding more effective work. It should be realized that criticism devoid of substance does not produce results, and too often creates an environment in which authorities feel less pressure to perform. Armenian civil society also has an important role to play. Not constrained by the struggle for power, civil society organizations, expert groups, and independent analysts can bring impartiality and professionalism to the debate, providing a necessary counterweight between the government's overly optimistic narratives and the opposition's overly pessimistic perspectives.
