China Mocks Itself With Own World Court? Beijing To Serve Int'l Justice In Hong Kong
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India Today
14 hours ago
- India Today
Have lot of problems with South Africa: Trump says may skip Johannesburg G20 Summit
US President Donald Trump said on Tuesday he might skip the upcoming Group of 20 (G20) leaders' summit in South Africa in November and send someone else to represent the United States, citing his disapproval of South African policies."I think maybe I'll send somebody else because I've had a lot of problems with South Africa. They have some very bad policies," Trump told reporters aboard Air Force IT'S IMPORTANTTrump has taken issue with South African domestic and foreign policies - ranging from its land policy to its case accusing Israel of genocide in the US ally's war in Gaza. Trump signed an executive order in February to cut US financial assistance to South Africa. In May, Trump confronted South African President Cyril Ramaphosa with false claims of white genocide and land seizures during a White House this year, Secretary of State Marco Rubio also boycotted a G20 foreign ministers' meeting in South Africa, which has the G20 presidency from December 2024 to November TIESWashington, both under Trump and former President Joe Biden, has complained about the case brought by South Africa at the International Court of Justice, where it accused Israel of genocide over its military assault in assault has killed tens of thousands, caused a hunger crisis, internally displaced Gaza's entire population and also led to accusations of war crimes at the International Criminal Court. Israel denies the accusations and casts its Gaza offensive as self-defence after a deadly October 2023 Hamas attack that killed 1,200 people and in which over 250 were taken relations between the US and South Africa have also been strained under Trump due to South Africa's Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies to address the legacy of centuries of racial who has urged Trump to attend the G20 summit, rejects Washington's claims that South Africa will use its land policy to arbitrarily confiscate white-owned land.- EndsMust Watch IN THIS STORY#G20#United States of America#Donald Trump
The Hindu
17 hours ago
- The Hindu
What did the ICJ opinion state on climate obligations?
The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the obligations of countries to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, and the legal consequences of the harm occasioned by their failure to meet these obligations, on July 23 has been the subject of much discussion. While it is a welcome affirmation of the multilateral climate regime at a time when the U.S appears to have damaged it through its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, it also raises questions on, inter alia, its interpretation of the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement and its occlusion of the development imperatives of the global South. How has it upheld the case for the global South? The ICJ's opinion has several elements that the global South, including India, should be able to welcome. First, the Court has emphasised the significance of the totality of the climate regime, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. This is in sharp contrast to the view of developed countries that have argued for sidelining the Convention and dismissing the Protocol, stating that the Paris Agreement had become the sole binding instrument of the multilateral climate regime. Across several paragraphs in its opinion, the Court has set out how the obligations of countries, especially those of developed nations, flow from various articles of the UNFCCC, particularly the provision of extending climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building to developing countries by developed nations. In underlining the foundational role of the UNFCCC, the Court has also reiterated the significance of the Convention's Annex-I and Annex-II, noting that the developed countries listed therein will continue to have additional obligations compared to the rest of the world. This is a firm rebuff, not only to the governments of the global North, but also to a vocal section of climate academia, that had proclaimed the end of Annex-based differentiation since the Paris accord was signed. In yet another affirmation of the global South's perspective, the ICJ opinion identifies the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR&RC), drawing on Article 3 of the Convention, as the 'core guiding principle for determining the implementation of the climate change treaties'. Further in para 152, it affirms universality to the CBDR&RC principle, noting that it 'guides the interpretation of obligations under international environmental law beyond its express articulation in different treaties', opening up the possibility for extending the principle to arenas like biodiversity. Additionally, the ICJ's opinion notes the qualification to differentiation between developed and developing nations introduced by the Paris Agreement with the addition of the phrase, 'and in the light of national circumstances' to the term CBDR&RC. The Court views the qualification as a nuance which points out that what constitutes a 'developed' or 'developing' nations is not static. This will undoubtedly be a bone of contention in further interpretations of this opinion. What about the temperature goal? While these reaffirmations of the fundamental principles and values of the climate regime are noteworthy there is also much in the opinion that conforms to the narrative that developed countries, allied with some of the small island states and a range of vulnerable developing countries, have attempted to build over the years in interpreting the Paris Agreement. The opinion insists that the temperature target for limiting global warming as in Article 2.1 (a) of the Paris Agreement, no longer holds in defining the obligation of states. Article 2.1 clearly designates 'well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels' as the primary goal, while 'pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees C.' However, the Court argues that two paras from decisions of the 26th and 28th Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC, in which Parties have expressed agreement with the need to pursue efforts to limit temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius, constitute an agreement among Parties to rewrite the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement itself. Hence, the opinion concludes, Parties' mitigation efforts must be aligned with collectively achieving the 1.5 degrees Celsius goal and not the range provided in the Agreement. This is a strange conclusion considering that the 1.5 degrees Celsius threshold is likely to be passed in a very few years. Nor does the opinion engage itself with the consequences of the breach of the 1.5 degrees Celsius goal. Even to lay opinion, it appears very odd that decisions taken in implementing an agreement should be interpreted as modifying the terms of the agreement itself. Much of the Court's enthusiasm for the 1.5 degrees Celsius target appears to stem from uncritical cherry-picking of a few headline statements from the Sixth Assessment Cycle reports (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The Court has not considered it necessary that the IPCC reports themselves should be subject to scrutiny through the lens of equity. This is evident when it uncritically cites the IPCC's global target of GHG emissions reduction of 43% below 2020 levels by 2030 and 65% by 2035 for limiting temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius. The recently concluded annual climate meeting of the UNFCCC held at Bonn, Germany, itself has now acknowledged the lack of equity and CBDR&RC in such projections. Has the Court broken new ground on enforcing obligations? Despite the extensive discussion on the obligations of states, in the context of climate laws and more generally in international law, the opinion does not articulate a more stringent framework of enforcement. In direct continuity with the established interpretation of the Paris Agreement by the global North, it holds that the provision of means of implementation as well as domestic mitigation action are only obligations of conduct (this means a duty which is to be performed towards achieving an outcome rather than guaranteeing the outcome itself). Only procedural aspects of the Paris Agreement, such as the timely and periodic submission of Nationally Determined Contributions are held to constitute stronger obligations of result. The opinion argues that even as obligations of conduct, the requirements on countries to meet their commitments can be sufficiently stringent. However, it depends on suitable courts with the requisite jurisdiction to enforce them and is contingent on the circumstances of every individual case. At best, the Court's opinion may be welcomed for reiterating the original intent of the Paris Agreement, in the face of the growing reluctance of developed nations to meet their obligations, but it breaks no significant new ground in this regard. Given the lack of appetite for climate action in the global North, and their opposition to even these weak obligations, the reiteration by the Court is undoubtedly of some value. What are some of the gaps in the opinion? The most striking lacuna in the opinion is its near-total sidelining of the twin challenge that global warming poses to the development of the global South, that is extensively discussed even in the IPCC. On the one hand southern nations will be increasingly unable to meet their energy needs for rapid poverty eradication and sustainable growth in the absence of adequate carbon space, while on the other hand low-carbon development requires finance and technology on a scale that remains out of reach. As Judge Xue Hanqin notes, in concluding her separate opinion, 'the Advisory Opinion fails to point out that, for peoples and individuals of the present and future generations affected by the adverse effects of climate change, the ultimate solution to guarantee them a clean, healthy and sustainable climate lies in a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all states based on international co-operation between developed and developing states.' With the opinion falling short on these two key issues for the global South, its qualification that equity and CBDR&RC would introduce no new obligations but only guide the interpretation and implementation of climate treaties, should be a matter of concern for developing countries. Much of the enthusiasm in global civil society for the opinion, stems from the prospect of further litigation at the national or regional level, with the opinion allowing the possibility that affected countries such as small island states could claim reparation or compensation. However, the opinion also makes clear that these would require independently establishing attribution, 'wrongfulness' and causation regarding the actions of Parties held responsible for harm, though it opens the door to their more expansive interpretation. On the issue of concerted global climate action though, and at the climate negotiations, it is unlikely that the advisory opinion would substantially move the needle, reproducing existing fault lines rather than overcoming them. As several of the separate opinions from various judges themselves indicate, the opinion may represent a missed opportunity rather than a game-changing intervention in the global climate discourse. T. Jayaraman is at the M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, Chennai. Tejal Kanitkar is at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru. Views expressed are personal.
The Hindu
2 days ago
- The Hindu
Border Fire, Regional Fallout: Thailand, Cambodia, and the Fragility of Peace in Southeast Asia
On 24 July 2025, the long-disputed Thailand–Cambodia border once again erupted into open violence. Cambodian rocket fire reportedly killed Thai civilians and soldiers in Surin Province. In response, Thai F‑16 fighter jets carried out airstrikes near the Ta Muen Thom temple complex, escalating what had been a tense standoff into a full-blown military clash. Within hours, diplomatic relations nosedived—Thailand expelled the Cambodian ambassador, suspended border trade through major checkpoints, and deployed additional troops to reinforce its frontier. From Phnom Penh, Prime Minister Hun Manet condemned the Thai airstrikes as 'unprovoked aggression' and urgently appealed to the United Nations Security Council. Images of bomb craters, wounded villagers, and smouldering fields flashed across Cambodian state television. In Bangkok, the military framed its response as self-defence and insisted Cambodia had violated Thai sovereignty. Yet beyond the rhetoric and the troop movements lies a more concerning truth: this is no ordinary border dispute. It is a symptom of deeper regional instability and a stark warning about the declining capacity of ASEAN to maintain peace among its members. The conflict is rooted in long-standing historical disputes over border demarcation, particularly around temple complexes such as Preah Vihear and Ta Muen Thom. Though the International Court of Justice ruled in Cambodia's favour in 1962 and again in 2013 with respect to Preah Vihear, adjacent areas remain contested. The Ta Muen Thom temple, located in the Dangrek range, is similarly caught in cartographic ambiguity. While clashes in the past were sporadic and localised, the current situation is qualitatively different. Both governments are using the incident to rally nationalist support at home, entrenching positions that make de-escalation more difficult. In Thailand, the crisis coincides with a period of domestic political uncertainty. Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra was suspended just weeks earlier following the leak of a private conversation with Cambodian leaders, raising questions about civilian authority and foreign policy decision-making. The military's prompt retaliation, coupled with the ambassador's expulsion, marks a reassertion of hardline nationalism. In Cambodia, Hun Manet has used the incident to project strength and unity, positioning himself as the custodian of national sovereignty. Both sides are appealing to nationalist sentiments, reinforcing a cycle of confrontation with limited space for dialogue. What is particularly striking is the institutional vacuum into which this conflict has emerged. While ASEAN is yet to convene an emergency summit, appoint a special envoy, or offer a structured mediation process. The bloc's slow response contrasts sharply with the urgency of the situation. Cambodia's turn to the UN for redress is a clear sign of eroding confidence in ASEAN's ability to manage intra-regional disputes. While individual ASEAN members—most notably Indonesia and Singapore—have urged both parties to de-escalate, the regional body appears paralysed. The diplomatic fallout is already taking a toll. Cross-border trade, which supports thousands of livelihoods along the Thai–Cambodian frontier, has come to a halt. The tourism sector, recovering from years of pandemic-induced disruption, now faces renewed cancellations and travel advisories. At the geopolitical level, the crisis opens the door for external actors to play a greater role. China, which maintains strong bilateral ties with both governments, could step in to offer mediation. But such a role is unlikely to be viewed as neutral, particularly in Thailand, where concerns about Chinese influence have intensified in recent years. Meanwhile, Japan and the United States have both expressed concern, raising the prospect of a broader strategic entanglement if the situation worsens. For India, the clash is deeply troubling. As a key strategic partner of ASEAN and an advocate of its centrality in the Indo-Pacific, India has invested heavily in connectivity and trade across Southeast Asia. The India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, for example, hinges on border stability and regional coordination. If ASEAN is unable to fulfil its role as a security anchor, India's own regional engagement could be affected. Moreover, the dispute underscores the importance of effective multilateral institutions. India has always emphasised diplomacy and peaceful dispute resolution—principles that are now under strain in its extended neighbourhood. There is still a narrow window for de-escalation. A ceasefire agreement, ideally brokered through ASEAN's more capable members or with international support, must be prioritised. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation offers mechanisms such as the High Council for mediation—mechanisms that must be activated. If bilateral efforts fail, a neutral monitoring arrangement under UN or ASEAN auspices could help stabilise the situation. But long-term peace will require more than ceasefires. It will need renewed political will, institutional reform within ASEAN, and a return to diplomacy over spectacle. What is unfolding between Thailand and Cambodia today is more than a frontier skirmish. It is a test of Southeast Asia's ability to preserve peace without descending into hardened nationalism or external dependency. The bullets may have been exchanged along an ancient border, but the real battleground is the future of regional cooperation. ASEAN cannot afford to remain silent. And the region cannot afford another failure. 'This article is part of sponsored content programme.'
