Ukrainian strikes cut power to Russian-held areas, officials say
Ukrainian shelling and drone attacks triggered power cuts over swathes of Russian-controlled territory in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions in the south of Ukraine, Russia-installed officials said early on Tuesday.
Officials said there was no effect on operations at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station - Europe's largest nuclear facility which was seized by Russia in the weeks after Moscow's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Russian officials running the plant said radiation levels were normal at the facility, which operates in shutdown mode and produces no power at the moment.
Russia-installed governors in the two regions said the Ukrainian attacks prompted authorities to introduce emergency measures and switch key sites to reserve power sources.
Power was knocked out to all parts of Zaporizhzhia under Russian control, Russia-installed Governor Yevgeny Belitsky wrote on Telegram.
"As a result of shelling by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, high-voltage equipment was damaged in the northwestern part of the Zaporizhzhia region," Belitsky wrote.
"There is no electricity throughout the region. The Energy Ministry of Zaporizhzhia region has been instructed to develop reserve sources of power. Health care sites have been transferred to reserve power sources."
In adjacent Kherson region, farther west, Russia-appointed Governor Vladimir Saldo said debris from fallen drones had damaged two substations, knocking out power to more than 100,000 residents of 150 towns and villages in Russian-held areas. Emergency crews working to restore power quickly, he said.
For many long months in the winter, it was Ukrainian towns and villages that endured repeated electricity cuts as Russian attacks focused strikes on generating capacity.
Each side has repeatedly accused the other of launching attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and running the risk of a nuclear accident.
The UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, said last week in response to a Ukrainian complaint that it saw no sign that Russia was preparing to restart the Zaporizhzhia plant and connect it to the Russian grid.
The IAEA has stationed monitors permanently at Zaporizhzhia and Ukraine's other nuclear power stations.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
The Wire
41 minutes ago
- The Wire
As the G7 Clock Ticks, Silence over India's Invite and What it Means
New Delhi: A year ago, in the thick of a high-stakes general election campaign, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had locked in his attendance at the G7 summit in Italy, confident enough of returning to power to reserve a seat at the outreach segment of the developed world's high table. The BJP fell short of a parliamentary majority, but within days of being sworn in, Prime Minister Modi flew to Italy, signalling where his diplomatic priorities lay. At the summit, he told world leaders that his victory was a ' victory of the entire democratic world '. A year on, with just 10 days to go for this year's G7 summit in the Canadian Rockies, there has been no public indication that India has been invited. Each year, the G7 host country invites a handful of external leaders. These choices reflect both the host's strategic objectives and the group's broader aim of engaging rising powers in an increasingly multipolar world. Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh attended five summits, when the group was still known as G8, as a special invitee. Modi made his debut in 2019 during the French presidency and went on to participate in four consecutive editions. The 2020 summit was held virtually due to the pandemic. Canada has remained tight-lipped about the guest list, with repeated queries to the G7 Canada secretariat only generating a standard reply that an announcement about special invitees would be made in due course. However, media reports made it clear that invitations had begun going out early. The new Canadian Prime Minister, Mark Carney, was quick to reach out to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy , shortly after assuming office in March, even before the snap polls, to extend an invitation. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese publicly confirmed receiving his invitation in the first week of May. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said she was invited during a phone call with Carney on May 15. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva also received an invitation around the same time, as per Brazilian media reports. South Africa's High Commission in Ottawa told a Canadian news agency that Pretoria had been invited, though it did not confirm whether the country would attend. With others having received their invitations well in advance, a last-minute VVIP departure from the Indian capital to Canada appears slim. What's with the silence? Among diplomatic circles in Canada, India's absence from the confirmed guest list has triggered speculation, particularly given the guarded stance of Carney's office in response to informal inquiries. Canada claims to have chosen Brazil and South Africa in their capacities as chairs of COP and G20, respectively. Mexico, grappling with similar tensions with Trump-era policies, fits within Canada's strategic calculus. Australia remains a close Western ally. While both Ottawa and New Delhi have remained quiet, possibly to avoid confirming the denial, the the lack of clarity has already triggered political backlash in India. The Congress party has called the apparent snub a diplomatic failure. 'Whatever spin may be given, the fact remains that this is yet another big diplomatic bungle – after the blunder of allowing the US to overturn decades of Indian foreign policy by mediating between India and Pakistan and allowing American authorities to call for continued talks at a 'neutral site',' said Jairam Ramesh, Congress general secretary in charge of communications, on X. For Modi, who is facing domestic criticism over the diplomatic handling of the recent hostilities with Pakistan, the optics of appearing alongside world leaders would have been politically useful. It would also have underlined India's stature in contrast to Pakistan, which has never been invited to a G8 or G7 summit. It could also have presented an opportunity for a high-profile encounter with US President Donald Trump in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor. But, such an interaction could cut both ways politically for the Indian prime minister due to Trump's fondness for repeating the claim of having played a key role in halting the fighting. Even if an invitation were to arrive now, it is unclear whether New Delhi would be prepared to face certain protests by pro-Khalistani groups. While the summit venue at Kananaskis, Alberta, will be heavily secured, the Canadian hosts have devised a way to pierce the bubble – audio and video feeds from three designated protest zones will be livestreamed to screens at the summit venue. 'People who want to express themselves, as is their right, can't get close to the leaders, so the leaders won't see and hear the protests. So by establishing that video link, we are helping facilitate that Charter access,' said a senior Canadian official. Khalistani protests outside Indian diplomatic missions have long been a source of friction between India and Canada. India wanted a complete prohibition, while Canada has maintained that peaceful protests is protected under Canadian law. A last-minute invitation would also present serious logistical challenges. Accommodation around the venue is already scarce. A Canadian media report quoted the Japanese consul general as saying it had been a major challenge to secure rooms for the 300-member Japanese delegation. This year's G7 summit also comes twenty months after India's ties with the host country, Canada, collapsed. In September 2023, then Prime Minister Justin Trudeau told parliament that Indian agents were involved in the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canadian citizen whom New Delhi had designated a Khalistani terrorist. India rejected the allegation and downgraded diplomatic relations. Since then, neither country has had an ambassador, and both embassies have been operating with reduced staff. When Canada was initially announced as host of the 2025 summit, it was assumed that Trudeau would chair the event, with Parliament's term running until 2026. At the time, there was little expectation that bilateral ties would improve enough for India to be invited. The hope was also that Trump's import tariffs would also spur both Canada and India to look beyond the Nijjar killings to urgently prioritise a diversified economic partnership. But, Canada has already signalled that full reconciliation would take some time. 'We are certainly taking it one step at a time . As I mentioned, the rule of law will never be compromised, and there is an ongoing investigation regarding the case that you mentioned,' said Canada's new Indian-origin foreign minister Anita Anand last month. The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments.
&w=3840&q=100)
First Post
an hour ago
- First Post
How Ukraine drone strikes deep inside Russia serves as a lesson for other countries
Ukraine's Operation Spider Web — a coordinated series of drone strikes — lays bare the gaps in airspace which can be used by any party with enough planning and the right technology. What Ukraine did was to combine the cheap drones in a way that existing systems could not prevent the attack, or maybe even see it coming read more Plumes of smoke are seen rising over the Belaya air base in the Irkutsk region in eastern Siberia after a Ukrainian drone attack in the Irkutsk region, more than 4,000 kilometres from Ukraine. AP Ukrainians are celebrating the success of one of the most audacious coups of the war against Russia – a coordinated drone strike on June 1 on five airbases deep inside Russian territory. Known as Operation Spider Web, it was the result of 18 months of planning and involved the smuggling of drones into Russia, synchronised launch timings and improvised control centres hidden inside freight vehicles. Ukrainian sources claim more than 40 Russian aircraft were damaged or destroyed. Commercial satellite imagery confirms significant fire damage, cratered runways, and blast patterns across multiple sites, although the full extent of losses remains disputed. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The targets were strategic bomber aircraft and surveillance planes, including Tu-95s and A-50 airborne early warning systems. The drones were launched from inside Russia and navigated at treetop level using line-of-sight piloting and GPS pre-programming. Each was controlled from a mobile ground station parked within striking distance of the target. It is reported that a total of 117 drones were deployed across five locations. While many were likely intercepted, or fell short, enough reached their targets to signal a dramatic breach in Russia's rear-area defence. The drone platforms themselves were familiar. These were adapted first-person-view (FPV) multirotor drones. These are ones where the operator gets a first-person perspective from the drone's onboard camera. These are already used in huge numbers along the front lines in Ukraine by both sides. But Operation Spider Web extended their impact through logistical infiltration and timing. Operation Spider Web exposes vulnerabilities Nations treat their airspace as sovereign, a controlled environment: mapped, regulated and watched over. Air defence systems are built on the assumption that threats come from above and from beyond national borders. Detection and response also reflect that logic. It is focused on mid and high-altitude surveillance and approach paths from beyond national borders. But Operation Spider Web exposed what happens when states are attacked from below and from within. In low-level airspace, visibility drops, responsibility fragments, and detection tools lose their edge. Drones arrive unannounced, response times lag, coordination breaks. Spider Web worked not because of what each drone could do individually, but because of how the operation was designed. It was secret and carefully planned of course, but also mobile, flexible and loosely coordinated. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD A satellite image shows damage to aircraft at an airfield in Irkutsk, following Ukrainian drones attack targeting Russian military airfields, in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict, in Stepnoy, Irkutsk region, Russia. Reuters The cost of each drone was low but the overall effect was high. This isn't just asymmetric warfare, it's a different kind of offensive capability – and any defence needs to adapt accordingly. On Ukraine's front lines, where drone threats are constant, both sides have adapted by deploying layers of detection tools, short range air defences and jamming systems. In turn, drone operators have turned to alternatives. One option is drones that use spools of shielded fibre optic cable. The cable is attached to the drone at one end and to the controller held by the operator at the other. Another option involves drones with preloaded flight paths to avoid detection. Fibre links, when used for control or coordination, emit no radio signal and so bypass radio frequency (RF) -based surveillance entirely. There is nothing to intercept or jam. Preloaded paths remove the need for live communication altogether. Once launched, the drone follows a pre-programmed route without broadcasting its position or receiving commands. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD As a result, airspace is never assumed to be secure but is instead understood to be actively contested and requiring continuous management. By contrast, Operation Spider Web targeted rear area airbases where more limited adaptive systems existed. The drones flew low, through unmonitored gaps, exploiting assumptions about what kind of threat was faced and from where. Lessons to be learnt from Operation Spider Web Spider Web is not the first long-range drone operation of this war, nor the first to exploit gaps in Russian defences. What Spider Web confirms is that the gaps in airspace can be used by any party with enough planning and the right technology. They can be exploited not just by states and not just in war. The technology is not rare and the tactics are not complicated. What Ukraine did was to combine them in a way that existing systems could not prevent the attack or maybe even see it coming. This is far from a uniquely Russian vulnerability – it is the defining governance challenge of drones in low level airspace. Civil and military airspace management relies on the idea that flight paths are knowable and can be secured. In our work on UK drone regulation, we have described low level airspace as acting like a common pool resource. This means that airspace is widely accessible. It is also difficult to keep out drones with unpredictable flightpaths. Under this vision of airspace, it can only be meaningfully governed by more agile and distributed decision making. Operation Spider Web confirms that military airspace behaves in a similar way. Centralised systems to govern airspace can struggle to cope with what happens at the scale of the Ukrainian attacks – and the cost of failure can be strategic. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Improving low-level airspace governance will require better technologies, better detection and faster responses. New sensor technologies such as passive radio frequency detectors, thermal imaging, and acoustic (sound-based) arrays can help close current visibility gaps, especially when combined. But detection alone is not enough. Interceptors including capture drones (drones that hunt and disable other drones), nets to ensnare drones, and directed energy weapons such as high powered lasers are being developed and trialled. However, most of these are limited by range, cost, or legal constraints. Nevertheless, airspace is being reshaped by new forms of access, use and improvisation. Institutions built around centralised ideas of control; air corridors, zones, and licensing are being outpaced. Security responses are struggling to adapt to the fact that airspace with drones is different. It is no longer passively governed by altitude and authority. It must be actively and differently managed. Operation Spider Web didn't just reveal how Ukraine could strike deep into Russian territory. It showed how little margin for error there is in a world where cheap systems can be used quietly and precisely. That is not just a military challenge. It is a problem where airspace management depends less on central control and more on distributed coordination, shared monitoring and responsive intervention. The absence of these conditions is what Spider Web exploited. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Michael A. Lewis, Professor of Operations and Supply Management, University of Bath This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Time of India
an hour ago
- Time of India
Medical education in Gujarat now costs as much as studying in Russia, Georgia
SLUG: FEE HIKE Ahmedabad: A significant fee hike in Gujarat's private and semi-govt medical colleges has drawn sharp criticism from medical fraternity and political leaders, who say the move makes studying medicine in the state either comparable or costlier than in countries like Georgia, Russia, and Uzbekistan. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now The fee regulation committee (FRC) revised medical course fees upward by as much as 12% this week, putting management quota seats at some private colleges above Rs 1 crore. Even govt quota seats cost more than Rs 57 lakh in some colleges. The Indian Medical Association says this will push aspiring doctors to seek cheaper options overseas. Every year, around 15,000 students from Gujarat go to pursue MBBS degrees in countries Russia, Georgia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh, where colleges offer full medical degrees for lower fees and lower academic barriers for admissions. Experts believe the fee hike will accelerate the exodus of students to these countries. An expert said, "In India, students face immense competition, and admissions are mostly based on merit. However, getting into these foreign medical colleges is relatively straightforward and does not depend on merit. The average cost for a medical degree (five-year course) in Eastern Europe ranges between Rs 40-50 lakh, with Russia averaging around Rs 30 lakh, and Nepal and Bangladesh between Rs 38-40 lakh. An Ahmedabad-based immigration consultant told TOI that before the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Ukraine was a favoured destination for students pursuing medicine from Gujarat and, by extension, India. "But even today, about 15,000 students from the state pursue medical education abroad," said the consultant. Students in countries such as Georgia are often trained for exams such as the Foreign Medical Graduate Examination (FMGE) in India after their return. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now For Europe and the US, students prepare for the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) and Professional and Linguistic Assessments Board (PLAB), they added. "The students work hard for two or more years for NEET and then compete for coveted govt quota seats. While there is an increase in seats, there have been no new govt-run medical colleges in the past 10 years. In such a scenario, students have no option but to opt for GMERS or private colleges," said an educationist. "After a doctor spends lakhs and crores on education, we expect them to serve society selflessly. We must provide a level-playing field to aspirants. "
